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Key Developments

FBIS Duma Election Report 11 Oct

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[FBIS Media Note] ***This is the fourth in a weekly series of reports that FBIS will produce on the campaign for the 17 December Russian Duma elections. It is based solely on Russian media reporting.***

Recent Developments

Criminal List Prompts Debate on Deputies' Immunity Minister of Internal Affairs (MVD) Anatoliy Kulikov's announcement that he had given the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) a list of 85 candidates under investigation for criminal activities (Moscow Radio, 7 October) has led deputies in the Stability faction of the Duma to begin campaigning for a constitutional amendment to lift Duma deputies' immunity from prosecution (INTERFAX, 5 October). CEC Chairman Nikolay Ryabov announced his backing for the faction's efforts and said that the CEC is "analyzing the lists of candidates" and "exposing people who have some connection with the criminal world." Campaigning in Rostov, Russia's Democratic Choice leader Yegor Gaydar said that he also agrees that immunity should be lifted so that the Duma does not "turn into a club of criminals hiding from justice" (*Kommersant-Daily*, 5 October).

In a related matter, the Duma voted to recommend that the Prosecutor General strip Sergey Mavrodi, head of the well-known MMM pyramid scheme, of his deputy's seat. The vote was 303-0, three votes more than the two-thirds majority required by Duma rules. Duma Mandate Commission Chairman Vitaliy Sevastyanov said that documents from the tax police and the State Taxation Inspectorate indicate that Mavrodi still heads the MMM Investment Fund and has set up 13 more branches during his term in the Duma, thus violating a ban on "commercial activities" by lawmakers (ITAR-TASS, 6 October). The CEC recently rejected the election registration application for Mavrodi's Party of People's Capital.

CEC Warns Against Breaking Campaign Rules At a meeting on 5 October with representatives of several parties and blocs, CEC Chairman Ryabov outlined the legal guidelines for the Duma elections and reportedly indicated that "offenders" will be "severely punished" (*Krasnaya Zvezda*, 6 October). The Defense Ministry's newspaper pointed out that "in most cases" such "offenders" can "expect a rather long investigation, which in effect means being out of the election struggle." According to *Krasnaya Zvezda*, "it could turn out that because of a single, shall we say, 'hitch,' several hundred or even thousand signatures might simply not get counted toward the total of a particular party or independent candidate." Such a "hitch" sidelined several aspirants prior to the December 1993 Duma elections, including the "Accord for the Sake of the Fatherland" political movement headed by current Congress of Russian Communities (KRO) leader Yuriy Skokov.

Shumeyko on Federation Council Support for Regional Candidates Federation Council Chairman Vladimir Shumeyko said at a 3 October news conference that "you will see decisions or actions on how the Federation Council and its chairman personally" will support regional candidates "once it is known which election blocs" qualify for the ballot by the 22 October deadline. Shumeyko asserted that members of the upper chamber of parliament "will do our best" to support regional candidates "who possess the required moral and professional qualities, legislative and management experience, and [who] represent the interests of regions and are supported by people locally" (INTERFAX, 3 October). Earlier, Shumeyko publicly indicated that he supports Sverdlovsk Oblast Governor Eduard Rossel's Transformation of the Fatherland bloc (see "FBIS Duma Election Report 26 Sep").

Kozyrev Running as an Independent in Murmansk Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev told INTERFAX (6 October) he has submitted supporting signatures to seek reelection in Murmansk's Murmanskiy Electoral District (Electoral District No. 116) as an "independent candidate." Although he is listed among the single-seat candidates for Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin's Russia Is Our Home (NDR) bloc (*Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 26 September), Kozyrev told INTERFAX that he is not running on the NDR ticket because "I believe that I will be more useful" to the Murmansk region as "an independent who does not have to stick to a party line." While noting that he supports "numerous provisions" of the NDR program, Kozyrev somewhat cryptically said that "one does not change horses when one crosses a river." An unidentified "source" in the "Kozyrev circle" told INTERFAX that the foreign minister's decision to run as an independent "has been coordinated" with "top" Russian officials, including President Boris Yeltsin. Kozyrev ran on the Russia's Choice ticket in 1993 and won election in the Murmansk single-seat race.

Should he win and decide to keep his Duma seat, Kozyrev will not be allowed to continue as foreign minister. The Constitution prevents Duma deputies from performing other "state service," although an exception was made on a "transitional" basis for members of the current Duma. According to the 7 October *Segodnya*, however, Kozyrev suggested that the electoral law was unclear on the issue, saying that he hopes that the issue of holding dual posts will be "clarified" because he "likes both jobs." Asked by INTERFAX if Kozyrev would give up his ministerial post, the unidentified "source" said that the foreign minister is "not a man to deceive the hopes of his electors."

Candidate Grachev? According to a report released by Ekho Moskvy's information agency (6 October), My Fatherland leader and Grachev antagonist Gen. Boris Gromov "announced" in an interview with one of the independent radio station's correspondents that Defense Minister Pavel Grachev "plans" to "stand personally" for election to the Duma in one of Saratov Oblast's single-seat electoral districts. While Grachev has not been observed to have publicly confirmed or denied Gromov's assertion, another Grachev foe, Duma deputy and human rights activist Sergey Yushenkov, told Ekho Moskvy that he "approves" of such an action on Grachev's part. Yushenkov said that he would "help" Grachev get elected because "it would mean he would not be defense minister" any longer and "then the entire armed forces and the country as a whole would heave a sigh of relief."

In the Provinces

More Fallout for Military From Volgograd Elections Despite the total failure of all military candidates in the 1 October Volgograd city elections (see "FBIS Duma Election Report 4 Oct), leaders in the region and the local media have protested the military's conduct during the local campaign, according to an ITAR-TASS report (4 October). They sent a "letter" to Grachev protesting the "aggressive activities" of the Volgograd Military District command and claiming that the military's actions resembled an "attempt to seize power by force." The letter reportedly alleged that a garrison commander had "authorized" servicemen to "display military hardware and other ammunition," hold a parade, and use portable radio equipment as "a means of psychological pressure to make the city's population vote for the military candidates." The letter was handed over to Col. Gen. Anatoliy Bogdanov, the deputy chief of the General Staff, who then met in Volgograd with Mayor Yuriy Chekhov "behind closed doors" for two hours to "clarify the matter," according to ITAR-TASS.

Tatarstan Candidates Appear on Two Party Lists *Izvestiya Tatarstan* (5 October) reported that two local candidates are apparently ignoring the Duma Election Law's prohibition against running on more than one party's slate. The president of the Tatarstan Union of Writers, Rinat Mukhamadiyev, is number 5 on the federal candidate list of former Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoy's Derzhava party and fifth on NDR's Tatarstan regional list. Sergey Shashurin, president of the "Kazan-Tan" association, heads the regional lists and is a single-seat district candidate for two parties—Derzhava and eye surgeon Svyatoslav Fedorov's Party of Workers' Self-Government. Shashurin is running in Tatarstan's Privolzhskiy Electoral District (Electoral District No. 26), and, according to *Izvestiya Tatarstan*, he has already collected the required number of signatures to appear on the ballot.

Izvestiya Tatarstan also reported that the CPRF's (Communist Party of the Russian Federation) first secretary in Tatarstan, Aleksandr Saliya, is the only other candidate in the district to collect the necessary signatures as of 4 October. Other aspiring candidates in the district include Federal Duma Deputy Valentin Mikhaylov on the Russia's Democratic Choice-United Democrats ticket, and NDR's Aleksey Kolesnik, a deputy in the republic's legislature.

NOR Defector Claims Bloc Using Strong-Arm Tactics Aleksandr Kashcheyev, who until recently was deputy chairman of Stavropol Kray's NDR branch, said at a 5 October news conference that he had been "threatened" by NDR "activists" after breaking with the bloc and "hampered" from collecting supporting signatures in his effort to run as a single-seat candidate. Kashcheyev also claimed NDR officials had sent down a "written instruction" to regional leaders to launch signature-collection campaigns in support of the bloc and that local industrial managers were having their arms twisted" by NDR officials to "try to make them comply with the instruction" (INTERFAX, 5 October). In his account of the bloc's early September congress at which the list of NDR candidates was named, Kashcheyev claimed that NDR Executive Committee Chairman Leonard Vid had drawn up a "secret instruction" on how to vote on the candidate lists and that input from regional delegates was ignored. Kashcheyev's remarks were reported in *Novaya Yezhednevnaya Gazeta*, No. 33, 7-13 September.

Stavropol Polls' Results Contradictory Two polls of potential Stavropol voters appear to have yielded conflicting results. According to the 30 September *Severnyy Kavkaz*, a poll by Moscow "sociologists" showed Women of Russia having the highest approval rating among various parties, with a 45.6 percent rating. The paper reported that the CPRF finished "second" (although it apparently listed erroneously the party's rating as 6.7), followed by the Agrarian Party of Russia (21.1), NDR (20), Russia's Democratic Choice (5.6), and the KRO, which finished with a rating of "absolutely zero."

A separate poll by the local Center for Humanitarian Research came up with entirely different results, however. Yabloko had the largest number of sympathizers (no figures given), followed in order by the CPRF, Russia's Democratic Choice, NDR, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and Women of Russia.

Taganrog Communists Split The Taganrog city branch of the CPRF has reportedly split over selection of a candidate to run in the local district. *Severnyy Kavkaz* reported on 30 September that the local party's "most fiery orator" and "organizer of all of the communists' local legislative activity," party second secretary Oleg Nabokov, "deserted" the party and is running as a candidate for former Soviet Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov's Power to the People! party in Rostov Oblast's Taganrogskiy Electoral District (Electoral District No. 147). He reportedly expected to be the CPRF's candidate to challenge Gen. Yuriy Rodionov, who narrowly defeated Nabokov in the 1993 Duma elections. The party, however, selected the city branch's first secretary, Nikolay Borisenko, as its candidate, prompting Nabokov and other "comrades" to leave the party.

Other candidates for the seat include Duma deputy and NDR candidate Sergey Shapovalov; head of the Rostov Oblast office of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Sergey Mironov, from Yabloko's list; and director of the "Puls" television-radio company, Aleksey Sklyarov, from Russia's Democratic Choice.

Recently Released Businesswoman Running in Podolsk Valentina Solovyeva, released from jail on 30 September after serving a three-month term for tax evasion and fraud, has reportedly collected the required number of signatures to support her candidacy in Moscow Oblast's Podolskiy Electoral District (Electoral District No. 112). INTERFAX reported on 2 October that Solovyeva, owner of the "Vlastilina" firm, has collected over 5,000 signatures, with 4,461 signatures required for a candidate to appear on the ballot in the district. *Moskovskiye Novosti* had reported in its 24 September-1 October issue that most of the signatures came from military units near Moscow, where many officers reportedly invested in her firm and are still hoping to see a return on these investments. INTERFAX quoted sources from the district's electoral commission as saying that her lists of signatures include "major violations of the election law," including "missing passport numbers" and names and information that were alleged to have been rewritten after signatures were collected.

Solovyeva's case took on added significance in September when Duma Security Committee Chairman Viktor Ilyukhin asserted that during her testimony, Solovyeva accused Federation Council Chairman Vladimir Shumeyko and First Deputy Premier Oleg Soskovets of having "directly or through figureheads" borrowed "many millions and billions" of rubles from "Vlastilina," "gaining enormous profits" (*Izvestiya*, 15 September). Shumeyko and Soskovets denied the accusations, and ***Moskovskiye Novosti*** contended that Ilyukhin himself had invested $700,000 in the firm, displaying a copy of his alleged investment certificate.

The Media Beat

ORT To Aid All "Sensible" Political Forces Public Russian Television (ORT) General Director Sergey Blagovolin told RIA (7 October) that ORT will air all campaign programs "strictly in accordance" with CEC guidelines. He added, however, that ORT's leadership will have the final say about "all other social and political programs, some of which may deal with the election campaign" and will "help all sensible political forces." According to Blagovolin, ORT's "policy" is to give support to "all political forces that advocate national harmony, stability, and a search for a sensible compromise that will make it possible to keep Russia together and continue reforms."

Published Lists of Candidates

Official candidate lists for the following parties and blocs were published in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (unless noted otherwise) from 5-7 October (see the previous issues of "FBIS Duma Election Report" for lists published earlier in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* or elsewhere). Each entry below lists the party's 12 core federal list candidates in order and gives the date when the list was published. If the party's list of candidates in the single-seat districts was published, the entry notes that date as well.

People's National Party [Narodnaya natsionalnaya partiya] Aleksandr Ivanov-Sukharevskiy, Vladimir Osipov, Vyacheslav Demin, Aleksey Shiropayev, Vladimir Popov, Arkadiy Vysochenko, Andrey Chernikhov, Aleksandr Martynov, Mikhail Filin, Viktor Trostnikov, Aleksey Vdovin, Tatyana Felyushina (Federal and single-seat lists published 7 October)

We Serve Russia! [Sluzhim Rossii!] Mikhail Nenashev, Galina Karaseva, Vladimir Danilchenko, Valeriy Demin, Andrey Goptar, Yevgeniy Vvedenskiy, Vadim Smishchenko, Yuriy Abramov, Anatoliy Shishkov, Nikolay Kuznetsov, Grigoriy Leshkevich, Gleb Bogatskiy (Federal and single-seat lists published 7 October).

List of Single-Seat Electoral Districts

The list of the 225 single-seat districts for the 17 December elections was published in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (22 August) and *Rossiyskiye Vesti* (24 August). It lists each district's name and number; the total number of voters; the district's center; and other cities, towns, and rayons in the district.

Election Schedule—Key Dates

22 October: Deadline for submitting 200,000 signatures in support of party lists, with no more than 7 percent coming from a single republic or region. Single-seat candidates must collect signatures equaling at least 1 percent of a district's voters (Federal electoral law published in the 28 June *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*). Although 22 October is also the deadline for registering party lists and single-seat nominations, parties and candidates cannot begin collecting signatures until after they are registered. Registration of party and single-seat lists began after the list of electoral districts was published in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* on 22 August.

5 November: Parties and candidates can begin running campaign advertisements in state-owned federal and regional newspapers (ITAR-TASS, 20 September).

15 November-15 December: Equal and free access for airtime on state-owned federal and regional television and radio channels granted for all candidates; 30-minute blocs of free airtime from 7:00-10:00 and 18:00-23:30 to be drawn by lots.

On a Lighter Note...

The Problem is Not With Your TV Set... Apparently reacting to the frequent television appearances of rotund Russia's Democratic Choice leader Yegor Gaydar, Derzhava leader and former Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoy reportedly said at a press conference in Krasnodar that he has "an enormous tape measure" on his television set that he uses "to measure Gaydar's face." Adding another sarcastic note about the presidential election scheduled for June 1996, Rutskoy said that his "big parrot"—which he claimed knows "only 250 words"—could be "elected president of Russia" (*Izvestiya*, 4 October).

Sverdlovsk Governor Rossel Voices Support for Yeltsin

MK1010065095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 6 Oct 95 p 2

[Report by Yelena Tregubova: "Eduard Rossel Will Support "'Only Boris Yeltsin.' The Governor Does Not Fear the Results of Elections for the Duma as Long as the Country Has Such a President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Eduard Rossel, recently-elected governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast, assured journalists [in Moscow] yesterday that he would support "Boris Nikolayevich alone" in the presidential elections. Responding to a question on whether he is "on Yeltsin's team," Mr. Rossel suggested that the journalists "proceed from the fact that always, even at the most difficult moments," he "supported Boris Nikolayevich, although I had colossal troubles over that." "On two occasions during my life, I received cables with a direct threat of physical violence for supporting Yeltsin," said Mr. Rossel. "The first was sent to me by Yanayev at 0200 during the well-known days of 1991. He threatened capital punishment if I carried out Boris Yeltsin's edicts. The second was sent by Rutskoy, also at 0200, but in 1993. The content was precisely the same, so much so that I even thought those people had prepared the text once and for all, only putting different signatures under it."

Prime Minister Chernomyrdin received far fewer warm words from Eduard Rossel than the president. The Sverdlovsk governor predicted that Viktor Chernomyrdin will soon either ask to be discharged or the president will discharge him." Mr. Rossel vouched this would be retribution for the fact that "with a living president," Viktor Chernomyrdin dared to create his own political movement. True, Mr. Governor could not very well explain how such predictions mesh with the president's direct "blessing" of the NDR [Russia Is Our Home] and Boris Yeltsin's repeated statements on "full understanding with my premier."

Most probable, however, is that yesterday's criticism of the premier is no more than an inalienable part of the electoral campaign of Eduard Rossel, whose party ("Transformation of the Homeland") was conceived as an "organization of regional politicians independent of the center" — the more so because, as the Sverdlovsk governor admitted yesterday, he "read the rules of 'Russia Is Our Home' in detail and from cover to cover" and "did not like" these rules.

Eduard Rossel admitted that he generally does not think the parliamentary elections "decisive for the country." "Even if all the seats in the Duma are taken by Communists, they will pose no danger because property has been almost reformed, and the country has a reliable guarantor of stability — the president, who would not have the country being mocked. The communists would willy-nilly have to begin to cooperate constructively, otherwise the president would put up with such a Duma for six months and then dissolve it," the governor stated.

Chernomyrdin: Elections Not To Be Postponed or Canceled

LD0910205295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1951 GMT 9 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 9 (INTERFAX) — Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on Monday promised that the next parliamentary and presidential elections would be neither canceled nor postponed and predicted that the country's economy would undergo "radical" positive changes before the end of the century.

The parliamentary election would be held on December 17, the presidential election next June, as scheduled, Chernomyrdin assured a group of U.S. business people and the senior editors of the Time magazine, whom he received in Moscow.

He expressed the belief that the main result of the elections would be a firmer policy of market reforms. "The reforms have become irreversible, and Russia will not divert from the market path," he said.

There is "a lot of work" for the government to do before the parliamentary election, the prime minister continued. He said his government had, to date, drafted and submitted to parliament more than 80 laws to improve economic mechanisms.

"We hope that the future parliament will work more effectively than the present one," Chernomyrdin said.

Speaking in this connection about Russia's development prospects, the premier said the country "will carry through a radical change in the economy" before the end of the century.

Text of Commission Chairmen's Election Appeal

MM1010124295 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 7 Oct 95 p 3

["Appeal to Participants in the Election Campaign for the Election of Deputies to the Russian Federation Federal Assembly State Duma, Second Convocation" from "participants in a seminar-conference of chairmen of electoral commissions of the Russian Federation components and district electoral commissions for the Russian Federation Federal Assembly State Duma elections"; date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow — Esteemed Fellow Citizens!

The chairmen of the electoral commissions of Russian Federation components and electoral district commissions for the Russian Federation Federal Assembly State Duma elections in the Central, Central Chernozem, and Northwest regions and the North Caucasus appeal to you.

Russians' attention is currently focused on the upcoming elections of 17 December 1995. This is understandable: On the results of these elections will in many ways depend the achievement of political and socioeconomic stability in our society, the fate of the reforms, people's standard of living, and Russia's future path of development.

The election campaign, as the year's most important political event, has provoked an unprecedented growth in the activity of parties and public associations: More than 30 have joined the battle for seats in parliament independently, and more than 50 as part of election blocs. The federal lists of candidates already include more than 14,000 names. The average number of candidates contesting each seat in the State Duma in single-seat districts in the country is 20, and this includes only those nominated by electoral associations and election blocs.

Fully aware of the responsibility laid on us by the law, we appeal to Russia's citizens and to participants in the election campaign:

We appeal to all voters: Russia's future is in your hands. Play an active part in the forthcoming elections. In this critical time there should be no place for indifference or pessimism, any more than for excessive hotheadedness. Make a deliberate choice, based on an objective assessment of the policy documents of the election associations and the merits of the candidates;

We appeal to young people: The country's future in many ways depends on whom young people vote for;

We appeal to election associations and electoral blocs: Show the maximum restraint during the election campaign, behave honorably and with dignity, uphold the spirit and letter of the law steadfastly;

We appeal directly to those who have entered the campaign for parliamentary seats: Your rivalry should not sow the seeds of discord in society. Do not allow the character of your relations with your opponents to be clouded by unethical attacks and unjustified actions;

We appeal to representatives of the mass media: Be objective and dispassionate. The abuse of the voters' trust in television broadcasts and newspaper articles is unacceptable. The possibilities of television, radio, and the press should be used only for the good of society and only within the framework of the law;

We appeal to leaders of the executive and legislative organs of state power at all levels: Mutual, constructive cooperation based on the norms of the law is the essential condition for ensuring the democratic course of the election campaign;

We appeal to the law-enforcement organs, urgently requesting that you enhance your attention to questions connected with the observance of legislation at the elections. Do not allow violations of the electoral rights of Russian Federation citizens and other participants in the electoral process;

We appeal to our fellow members of electoral commissions at all levels: Our joint actions should be subordinated to our main task of ensuring steadfast observance of the law and fair, free, and democratic elections. Openness and glasnost in our work should be the indispensable condition in carrying out all election activity.

We are convinced that our appeal will meet with understanding and that our common actions will serve the good of Russia.

CEC Grants CPRF R80 Million for Election Campaign

LD0910212295 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1951 GMT 9 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 9 (INTERFAX) — The Russian Central Electoral Commission [CEC] will extend 80 million rubles [R] for the financing of the election campaign of the first registered electoral bloc: the Communist Party of Russia [CPRF], as provided for by the law on parliamentary elections.

The Central Election Commission made such a decision today.

Under the law, the Central Election Commission will earmark equal sums of money for the election campaign of every registered electoral bloc or movement.

Candidates to the State Duma, electoral blocs, movements and parties also form their own election funds for financing their election campaign.

In line with legislation, the Central Election Commission has permitted the Communist Party to open a special temporary account in the Moscow bank of the Russian SberBank for forming the election fund.

The Central Election Commission today also certified the lists of candidates to the State Duma to be fielded in single-mandate constituencies by the National-Republican Party of Russia (4 people) and the Independents' Bloc (109 people).

Unidentified Armed Group Seizes Election Bloc's HQ

LD0810133395 Moscow 2x2 Television in Russian
1200 GMT 8 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A group of unidentified armed men this morning seized the headquarters of the Union of Depositors of Russia — National Salvation Front election bloc situated on 34, Pyatnitskaya Street, the Moscow Echo radio station has been told at the election bloc's press center. The press center said that the headquarters' officials had been forced off the premises with weapons.

UCP-CPSU Chairman Corrects Article on CPRF Registration

MM1010114095 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
7 Oct 95 p 2

[PRAVDA "Correction"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The PRAVDA editorial office has received a letter from O. Shenin, chairman of the UCP-CPSU [Union of Communist Parties-Communist Party of the Soviet Union] Council. In it he notes that an error was made in PRAVDA's item "Communists Join Forces After All" (3 October this year). In particular, the appeal supporting the CPRF election bloc was adopted not at a session of the UCP-CPSU Political Executive Committee but at a working conference of secretaries of former Union republics' communist parties.

The author of the item and the PRAVDA editorial office apologize to readers.

Candidate Lists for Elections Published (Part X)

954E1495B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 Sep 95 pp 5-6

[List of candidates for deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly for balloting in elections for single-mandate electoral districts, presented by the electoral association of the All-Russia Sociopolitical Movement Russia Is Our Home. Appendix to protocol of congress of the electoral association All-Russia Sociopolitical Movement Russia Is Our home held on 3 September 1995. Copy of list registered with the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation on 6 September 1995 (Decree No. 13/98-11]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Republic of Adygea (Adygea)

Adygenskiy Electoral District No. 1

Usacheva, Lyubov Alekseyevna. Born 10 July 1950. Republic Council of the Trade Union of Public Health Workers, chairman. Resides in the city of Maykop.

Republic of Altay

Gorno-Altayskiy Electoral District No. 2

Gnezdilov, Mikhail Zakharovich. Born 3 January 1946. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the city of Gorno-Altaysk.

Republic of Bashkortostan

Birskiy Electoral District No. 3

Sayfullin, Alzam Tukhvatullinovich. Born 27 May 1941. Administration of the city of Dyurtyuli, first deputy head. Resides in the city of Dyurtyuli, Republic of Bashkortostan.

Kirovskiy Electoral District No. 4

Nasibullin, Ravil Talipovich. Born 24 December 1945. Ufa State Aviation Technical University, head of chair. Resides in the city of Ufa.

Oktyabrskiy Electoral District No. 5

Drozdenko, Vladimir Nikolayevich. Born 10 November 1939. Ufa Aggregate Production Association Gidravlika, [Hydraulics], chief engineer. Resides in the city of Ufa.

Sibayskiy Electoral District No. 6

Barbylayev, Khalil Abubakirovich. Born 3 January 1944. Bashkir State University, pro-rector. Resides in the city of Ufa.

Sterlitamakskiy Electoral District No. 7

Utkin, Yuriy Vasilyevich. Born 6 April 1939. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the city of Ishimbay, Republic of Bashkortostan.

Tuymazinskiy Electoral District No. 8

Saetgaleyev, Zifkat Iskhamovich. Born 18 March 1947. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the city of Ufa.

Republic of Buryatia

Buryatskiy Electoral District No. 9

Belousov, Vladimir Vasilyevich. Born 17 January 1950. Administration of settlement of Zagorsk, the city of Ulan-Ude, head of administration. Resides in the settlement of Zagorsk, the city of Ulan-Ude.

Ingush Republic

Ingushskiy Electoral District No. 12

Ugurchiyev, Magomet Maksharipovich. Born 26 January 1966. Permanent representation of the Ingush Republic to the President of the Russian Federation, director of the information and politics department. Resides in the village of Ordzhonikidzevskaya, Sunzhenskiy Rayon, Ingush Republic.

Kabardino-Balkar Republic

Kabardino-Balkarskiy Electoral District No. 13

Sokhov, Vladimir Kazbulatovich. Born 10 September 1939. Cabinet of Ministers of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, deputy prime-minister. Resides in the city of Nalchik.

Republic of Kalmykia-Khalmg Tangch

Kalmytskiy Electoral District No. 14

Golovatov, Aleksandr Vasilyevich. Born 22 March 1952. Committee on Administration of State Property, Republic of Kalmykiya, chairman. Resides in the city of Elista.

Karachay-Cherkess Republic

Karachayevo-Cherkesskiy Electoral District No. 15

Kitov, Akhmed Ismailovich. Born 31 August 1928. Karachayevskiy Technological Institute, head of department. Resides in the city of Cherkessk.

Republic of Karelia

Karelskiy Electoral District No. 16

Kotsyuba, Natalya Vladimirovna. Born 3 December 1954. Territorial Agency on Affairs of Insolvency (Bankruptcy), director. Resides in the city of Petrozavodsk.

Republic of Komi

Syktyvkarskiy Electoral District No. 17

Rassokhin, Gennadiy Vasilyevich. Born 4 February 1937. Ukhta Industrial Institute, rector. Resides in the city of Ukhta, Republic of Komi.

Republic of Mari El

Mariyskiy Electoral District No. 18

Khlebnikov, Ivan Germanovich. Born 27 August 1953. Government of the Republic of Mari El, deputy head of republic government, minister of agriculture and food. Resides in the city of Yoshkar-Ola.

Republic of Mordvinia

Mordovskiy Electoral District No. 19

Guryanova, Valentina Filippovna. Born 26 April 1941. Ministry of Public Health of the Republic of Mordvinia, deputy minister. Resides in the city of Saransk.

Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)

Yakutskiy Electoral District No. 20

Zhirkov, Yegor Petrovich. Born 10 June 1954. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the city of Yakutsk.

Republic of North Ossetia

Severno-Osetinskiy Electoral District No. 21

Tsalmev, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich. Born 5 January 1951. Ministry of Justice, Republic of North Ossetia, minister. Resides in the city of Vladikavkaz.

Republic of Tatarstan

Almetyevskiy Electoral District No. 22

Yegorov, Gennadiy Vasilyevich. Born 9 March 1946. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the city of Almetyevsk, Republic of Tatarstan.

Moskovskiy Electoral District No. 23

Morozov, Oleg Viktorovich. Born 5 November 1953. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in Moscow.

Naberezhno-Chelninskiy Electoral District No. 24

Altukhov, Vladimir Nikolayevich. Born 12 October 1954. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the city of Naberezhnyye Chelny, Republic of Tatarstan.

Nizhnekamskiy Electoral District No. 25

Bagautdinov, Gabdulvakhit Gilmutdinovich. Born 23 May 1939. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the city of Chistopol, Republic of Tatarstan.

Privolzhskiy Electoral District No. 26

Kolesnik, Aleksey Alekseyevich. Born 2 January 1947. State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan, deputy. Resides in the city of Kazan.

Republic of Tyva

Tuvinskiy Electoral District No. 27

Salchak, Galina Alekseyevna. Born 4 October 1949. Ministry of Finance, Republic of Tyva, minister. Resides in the city of Kyzyl.

Udmurt Republic

Izhevskiy Electoral District No. 28

Soluyanov, Andrey Vladimirovich. Born 8 November 1959. AOZT [closed-type joint-stock company] financial-construction company Grad, general director. Resides in the city of Izhevsk.

Udmurtskiy Electoral District No. 29

Vasilyev, Mikhail Arkadyevich. Born 27 September 1960. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the city of Izhevsk.

Republic of Khakassia

Khakasskiy Electoral District No. 30

Kuzmin, Valentin Anatolyevich. Born 18 October 1943. Khakass State University, rector. Resides in the city of Abakan.

Chechen Republic

Chechenskiy Electoral District No. 31

Zapgayev, Doku Gapurovich. Born 22 December 1940. Administration on Work With Territories under the RF President's Administration, section chief. Resides in Moscow.

Chuvash Republic

Kanashskiy Electoral District No. 32

Rulkova, Lyudmila Ivanovna. Born 22 March 1956. Chuvash Republic Ministry on Social Policy, deputy minister. Resides in the city of Cheboksary.

Cheboksarskiy Electoral District No. 33

Petrova, Tatyana Ivanovna. Born 30 December 1958. Chuvash Republic Ministry of Finance, first deputy minister. Resides in the city of Cheboksary.

Altay Kray

Barnaulskiy Electoral District No. 34

Lazarev, Aleksandr Fedorovich. Born 21 August 1947. Altay Oncological Center, director. Resides in the city of Barnaul.

Biyskiy Electoral District No. 35

Zhiltsov, Yuriy Ivanovich. Born 13 April 1940. RAO [Russian joint-stock company] YeES of Russia, department director. Resides in Moscow.

Rubtsovskiy Electoral District No. 36

Gerasimenko, Nikolay Fedorovich. Born 1 December 1950. Altay Kray Administration Committee on Public Health, chairman. Resides in the city of Barnaul.

Krasnodar Kray

Armavirskiy Electoral District No. 38

Solovyeva, Tatyana Sergeyevna. Born 25 November 1956. Rayon newspaper PROVINTSIALNAYA GAZETA, editor in chief. Resides in the city of Labinsk, Krasnodar Kray.

Kanevskiy Electoral District No. 39

Melnik, Aleksey Semenovich. Born 30 June 1939. Subsidiary agricultural enterprise imeni Ilich, director. Resides in Leningradskay, Leningradskiy Rayon, Krasnodar Kray.

Krasnodarskiy Electoral District No. 40

Khannoyev, Igor Matveyevich. Born 1 January 1947. Krasnodar Municipal Treatment-Diagnostic Association, general director. Resides in the city of Krasnodar.

Novorossiyskiy Electoral District No. 41

Glumov, Ivan Fedorovich. Born 11 September 1936. Administration of Mineral Resources of the Shelf and World Ocean, Roskomnedra [Russian Committee on Mineral Resources], chief. Resides in Moscow.

Prikubanskiy Electoral District No. 42

Doroshenko, Galina Stepanovna. Born 15 September 1947. Department of Social Protection of the Population, Krasnodar Kray Administration, general director. Resides in the city of Krasnodar.

Tikhoretskiy Electoral District No. 43

Tkachev, Aleksandr Nikolayevich. Born 23 December 1960. AO [joint-stock company] Agrokompleks, general director. Resides in Vyselki, Vyselkovskiy Rayon, Krasnodar Kray.

Krasnoyarsk Kray

Achinskiy Electoral District No. 45

Kazakevich, Galina Ivanovna. Born 27 September 1962. Achinskiy Rayon Administration Department of Education, chief. Resides in the city of Nazarovo, Krasnoyarsk Kray.

Yeniseyskiy Electoral District No. 46

Karmazina, Raisa Vasilyevna. Born 9 January 1951. City of Norilsk Treasury, director. Resides in the city of Norilsk, Krasnoyarsk Kray.

Kanskiy Electoral District No. 47

Ivanov, Yuriy Vasilyevich. Born 6 March 1948. Dzerzhinskiy Rayon administration, head of administration. Resides in village of Dzerzhinskoye, Dzerzhinskiy Rayon, Krasnoyarsk Kray.

Krasnoyarskiy Electoral District No. 48

Pozdnyakov, Valeriy Aleksandrovich. Born 15 March 1940. City of Krasnoyarsk Administration, head of administration. Resides in the city of Krasnoyarsk.

Maritime Kray

Arsenyevskiy Electoral District No. 49

Usatyy, Leon Ivanovich. Born 19 March 1948. Kray Clinical Hospital, staff surgeon. Resides in the city of Vladivostok.

Vladivostokskiy Electoral District No. 50

Kovalevskiy, Dmitriy Nikolayevich. Born 11 June 1959. AO Medtekhnika, director. Resides in the city of Vladivostok.

Ussuriyskiy Electoral District No. 51

Malyshev, Yuriy Nikolayevich. Born 1 September 1939. GP [state enterprise] Rosugol, president. Resides in Moscow.

Stavropol Kray

Georgiyevskiy Electoral District No. 52

Gontar, Yuriy Afanasyevich. Born 30 July 1947. State Duma of Stavropol Kray, deputy chairman. Resides in the city of Stavropol.

Kazminvodskiy Electoral District No. 53

Porublev, Aleksandr Sergeyevich. Born 12 July 1956. AO Stroyindustriya, president. Resides in the city of Pyatigorsk, Stavropol Kray.

Petrovskiy Electoral District No. 54

Moroz, Vasiliy Andreyevich. Born 12 October 1937. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the city of Stavropol.

Stavropolskiy Electoral District No. 55

Petrenko, Sergey Vladimirovich. Born 9 July 1969. Stavropolskiy City Union of Veterans of Afghanistan, chairman. Resides in the city of Stavropol.

Khabarovsk Kray

Komsomolskiy-na-Amure Electoral District No. 56

Kadyshev, Nikolay Andreyevich. Born 24 July 1958. Solnechnyy Ore-Enriching Combine, commercial director. Resides in village of Solnechnyy, Khabarovsk Kray.

Khabarovskiy Electoral District No. 57

Berezutskiy, Yuriy Nikolayevich. Born 8 August 1956. Far Eastern State Academy of Railroads, pro-rector. Resides in the city of Khabarovsk.

Amur Oblast

Blagoveshchenskiy Electoral District No. 58

Ponosova, Svetlana Ivanovna. Born 1 April 1940. Organ of local self-government of the city of Belogorsk, head. Resides in the city of Belogorsk.

Arkhangelsk Oblast

Arkhangelskiy Electoral District No. 59

Zhigaltsov, Petr Ivanovich. Born 13 October 1938. Procurator's Office of Arkhangelsk Oblast, section chief. Resides in the city of Arkhangelsk.

Kotlasskiy Electoral District No. 60

Nadolimskaya, Varvara Aleksandrovna. Born 20 September 1950. Koryazhemskiy State Committee on Environmental Protection, chairman. Resides in the city of Koryazhma, Arkhangelsk Oblast.

Astrakhan Oblast

Astrakhanskiy Electoral District No. 61

Kagakov, Yuriy Nikolayevich. Born 2 October 1937. Astrakhan Technical University, rector. Resides in the city of Astrakhan.

Belgorod Oblast

Belgorodskiy Electoral District No. 62

Miroshnichenko, Ivan Ivanovich. Born 15 August 1937. Council for Economic Cooperation of Bordering Oblasts of Russia and Ukraine, executive director. Resides in the city of Belgorod.

Novooskolskiy Electoral District No. 63

Varganov, Valeriy Vitalyevich. Born 15 September 1962. Belgorod City Council of Veterans of Afghanistan, chairman. Resides in the city of Belgorod.

Bryansk Oblast

Bryanskiy Electoral District No. 64

Sinenko, Viktor Sergeyevich. Born 28 June 1939. Holding company AO for Construction Machines and Mechanisms, president. Resides in the city of Bryansk.

Pochepskiy Electoral District No. 65

Vorozhin, Aleksey Maksimovich. Born 23 March 1955. Bryansk Oblast Education Administration, deputy chief. Resides in the city of Bryansk.

Vladimir Oblast

Vladimirskiy Electoral District No. 66

Leontyev, Yuriy Aleksandrovich. Born 27 March 1947. Vladimir Oblast Legislative Assembly Committee on Social Policy, chairman. Resides in the city of Vladimir.

Kovrovskiy Electoral District No. 67

Kalinin, Viktor Nikolayevich. Born 28 March 1949. AO Spetstekhsteklo, president. Resides in the city of Gus-Khrustalnyy, Vladimir Oblast.

Volgograd Oblast

Krasnoarmeyskiy Electoral District No. 69

Khomutov, Vasiliy Aleksandrovich. Born 19 November 1947. AO Sarepta, general director. Resides in the city of Volgograd.

Central Electoral District No. 71

Polishchuk, Aleksandr Alekseyevich. Born 14 November 1957. Oblast Administration Committee on Affairs of Youth, chairman. Resides in the city of Volgograd.

Vologda Oblast

Vologodskiy Electoral District No. 72

Sivkov, Yuriy Nikolayevich. Born 30 July 1938. AO Vologdalesprom, president. Resides in the city of Vologda.

Cherepovetskiy Electoral District No. 73

Izotin, Vladimir Ivanovich. Born 23 November 1949. Cherepovets City Duma, secretary. Resides in the city of Cherepovets, Vologda Oblast.

Voronezh Oblast

Anninskiy Electoral District No. 74

Ishkov, Aleksandr Vladimirovich. Born 19 August 1946. Paninskiy Rayon administration, deputy head of administration. Resides in worker settlement of Panino, Paninskiy Rayon, Voronezh Oblast.

Levoberezhnyy Electoral District No. 75

Korolev, Sergey Yuryevich. Born 21 September 1954. Zheleznodorozhnyy Rayon administration, the city of Voronezh, head of administration. Resides in the city of Voronezh.

Pavlovskiy Electoral District No. 76

Guzev, Anatoliy Vasilyevich. Born 26 May 1948. Administration of Bogucharskiy Rayon, Voronezh Oblast, first deputy head of administration. Resides in the city of Boguchar, Bogucharskiy Rayon, Voronezh Oblast.

Pravoberezhnyy Electoral District No. 77

Neretina, Alla Fedorovna. Born 1 October 1936. Voronezh State Medical Academy, professor. Resides in the city of Voronezh.

Ivanovo Oblast

Ivanovskiy Electoral District No. 78

Zimin, Sergey Makarovich. Born 1 January 1960. Ivanovo Medical Insurance Company, general director. Resides in the city of Ivanovo.

Irkutsk Oblast

Angarskiy Electoral District No. 80

Koroleva, Svetlana Ivanovna. Born 13 December 1942. AOOT [open type joint-stock company] Angarsk Sewing Factory, general director. Resides in the city of Angarsk, Irkutsk Oblast.

Irkutskiy Electoral District No. 82

Ten, Yuriy Mikhaylovich. Born 27 September 1951. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the city of Irkutsk.

Tulunskiy Electoral District No. 83

Grishin, Sergey Anatolyevich. Born 21 December 1957. Irkutsk department of the East Siberian Railroad, chief. Resides in the city of Irkutsk.

Kaliningrad Oblast

Kaliningradskiy Electoral District No. 84

Tulayev, Nikolay Petrovich. Born 17 November 1954. Kaliningrad Oblast Duma Commission on Questions of Legislation, chairman. Resides in the city of Kaliningrad.

Kaluga Oblast

Dzerzhinskiy Electoral District No. 85

Baburin, Viktor Sergeyevich. Born 18 April 1950. Dzerzhinskiy Rayon Oblast administration, head of administration. Resides in the city of Kondrovo, Kaluga Oblast.

Kaluzhskiy Electoral District No. 86

Minakov, Viktor Nikityevich. Born 2 August 1941. Legislative Assembly of Kaluga Oblast, deputy chairman. Resides in the city of Kaluga.

Kamchatka Oblast

Kamchatskiy Electoral District No. 87

Temchura, Yekaterina Mikhaylovna. Born 26 July 1949. Administration of Social Protection of the Population, Kamchatka Oblast Administration, deputy chief. Resides in the city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.

Kemerovo Oblast

Kemerovskiy Electoral District No. 88

Ovchenkov, Viktor Stepanovich. Born 1 September 1941. Kemerovo Medical Institute, head of chair. Resides in the city of Kemerovo.

Leninsk-Kuznetskiy Electoral District No. 89

Barbarash, Nina Alekseyevna. Born 19 March 1939. Kemerovo Medical Institute, head of chair. Resides in the city of Leninsk-Kuznetskiy, Kemerovo Oblast.

Novokuznetskiy Electoral District No. 90

Vostretsov, Oleg Aleksandrovich. Born 29 October 1947. Administration of Education, Novokuznetskiy Rayon administration, chief. Resides in the city of Novokuznetsk, Kemerovo Oblast.

Prokopyevskiy Electoral District No. 91

Ananina, Tatyana Grigoryevna. Born 20 January 1947. Mezhdurechensk City Administration, deputy head of administration. Resides in the city of Mezhdurechensk, Kemerovo Oblast.

Kirov Oblast

Kirovskiy Electoral District No. 92

Martyanov, Nikolay Alekseyevich. Born 5 May 1954. AOZT "Business-center 'Capital,'" director. Resides in the city of Kirov.

Sovetskiy Electoral District No. 93

Agafonov, Yegor Andreyevich. Born 10 December 1941. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the city of Kirov.

Kostroma Oblast

Kostromskoy Electoral District No. 94

Mamontov, Valentin Trofimovich. Born 15 March 1940. Sudislavskiy Rayon Administration, head of administration. Resides in the village of Fadeyevo, Sudislavskiy Rayon, Kostroma Oblast.

Kurgansk Oblast

Kurganskiy Electoral District No. 95

Mekhnina, Svetlana Georgiyevna. Born 9 March 1947. TV-Obzor association, Kurgansk Oblast State Television and Radio, director. Resides in the city of Kurgan.

Leningrad Oblast

Volkhovskiy Electoral District No. 98

Modestov, Sergey Viktorovich. Born 29 May 1958. Union of Farmers of Leningrad Oblast, president. Resides in the city of Tikhvin, Leningrad Oblast.

Vsevolozhskiy Electoral District No. 99

Stepanko, Vitaliy Maksimovich. Born 18 May 1941. AOZT Granit, director. Resides in the city of Priozersk, Leningrad Oblast.

Kingisppskiy Electoral District No. 100

Ismagilov, Rashid Flatovich. Born 8 October 1960. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the city of Gatchina, Leningrad Oblast.

Lipetsk Oblast

Yeletskiy Electoral District No. 101

Ivannikova, Galina Vasilyevna. Born 22 June 1955. Agricultural production cooperative Pervoye Maya, chairman of the board. Resides in the village of Pyatnitskoye, Izmalkovskiy Rayon, Lipetsk Oblast.

Lipetskiy Electoral District No. 102

Kurakova, Lyudmila Valentinovna. Born 24 June 1957. Administration of the city of Lipetsk, deputy head of administration. Resides in the city of Lipetsk.

Magadan Oblast

Magadanskiy Electoral District No. 103

Barlyayev, Vladimir Alekseyevich. Born 4 November 1947. Magadan Musical-Dramatic Theatre, actor. Resides in the city of Magadan.

Moscow Oblast

Istrinskiy Electoral District No. 105

Levitskiy, Yuriy Ivanovich. Born 30 March 1950. Moscow Oblast administration, administrator of affairs. Resides in Moscow.

Kolomenskiy Electoral District No. 106

Kovalev, Oleg Ivanovich. Born 7 September 1948. Kashirskiy Rayon Administration, head of administration. Resides in the city of Kashira, Moscow Oblast.

Mytishchinskiy Electoral District No. 108

Polovnikov, Stanislav Petrovich. Born 26 April 1937. NPO [scientific production association] Kompozit, general director. Resides in the city of Mytishchi, Moscow Oblast.

Noginskiy Electoral District No. 109

Pashin, Nikolay Petrovich. Born 26 November 1949. Shchelkovskiy Rayon Administration, head of administration. Resides in the city of Shchelkovo, Moscow Oblast.

Podolskiy Electoral District No. 112

Fedik, Ivan Ivanovich. Born 2 January 1936. NII NPO [Scientific-Research Institute Scientific-Production Association] Luch, director. Resides in the city of Podolsk, Moscow Oblast.

Pushkinskiy Electoral District No. 113

Kurtashin, Vladimir Yegorovich. Born 2 September 1932. AO Kriogenmash, general director. Resides in the city of Pushkino, Moscow Oblast.

Serpukhovskiy Electoral District No. 114

Kabanova, Valentina Viktorovna. Born 10 October 1951. Builders trade union oblast committee, chairman. Resides in Moscow.

Murmansk Oblast

Monchegorskiy Electoral District No. 115

Pobedinskaya Lyudmila Vasilyevna. Born 15 March 1949. Oblast administration. Resides in the city of Kola, Murmansk Oblast.

Murmanskiy Electoral District No. 116

Kozyrev, Andrey Vladimirovich. Born 27 March 1951. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, minister. Resides in the city of Moscow.

Nizhegorodsk Oblast

Avtozavodskiy Electoral District No. 117

Veselkin, Pavel Mikhaylovich. Born 8 August 1948. AO Gaz, deputy general director. Resides in the city of Nizhniy Novgorod.

Arzamasskiy Electoral District No. 118

Voronov, Sergey Vasilyevich. Born 12 July 1967. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the city of Nizhniy Novgorod.

Dzerzhinskiy Electoral District No. 119

Seslavinskiy, Mikhail Vadimovich. Born 28 February 1964. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the city of Dzerzhinsk, Nizhegorodsk Oblast.

Kanavinskiy Electoral District No. 120

Kruglov, Nikolay Konstantinovich. Born 31 January 1950. Sports-health club Ski Club, trainer. Resides in the city of Nizhniy Novgorod.

Semenovskiy Electoral District No. 121

Sochnev, Dmitriy Vasilyevich. Born 20 June 1958. Nizhniy Novgorod Law Institute, MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Russia, instructor. Resides in the city of Nizhniy Novgorod.

Sergachskiy Electoral District No. 122

Bushmin, Yevgeniy Viktorovich. Born 4 October 1958. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the city of Nizhniy Novgorod.

Novosibirsk Oblast

Babarinskiy Electoral District No. 124

Nozdryukhin, Viktor Mikhaylovich. Born 28 November 1938. Kolyvanskiy rayon administration, head of administration. Resides in the city of Kolyvan, Novosibirsk Oblast.

Zavodskoy Electoral District No. 125

Pugachev, Gennadiy Aleksandrovich. Born 19 July 1937. Novosibirsk State Academy of Construction, prorector. Resides in the city of Novosibirsk.

Zaeltsovskiy Electoral District No. 126

Ivankov, Vladimir Ivanovich. Born 18 September 1947. Interregional association Sibirskoye soglasheniye, [Siberian Agreement], general director. Resides in the city of Novosibirsk.

Iskitimskiy Electoral District No. 127

Krasnikov, Nikolay Grigoryevich. Born 11 April 1955. Administration of Koltsovo, head of administration. Resides in the village of Koltsovo, Iskitimskiy Rayon, Novosibirsk Oblast.

Omsk Oblast

Bolsherechenskiy Electoral District No. 128

Baranov, Gennadiy Vasilyevich. Born 1 February 1943. Tyukalinskiy Rayon Administration, head of administration. Resides in the city of Tyukalinsk, Omsk Oblast.

Omskiy Electoral District No. 129

Sokolova, Valentina Nikolayevna. Born 2 April 1949. Theatre for Children and Young People, director. Resides in the city of Omsk.

Central Electoral District No. 130

Kirilenko, Galina Pavlovna. Born 24 March 1947. AO Siluet, general director. Resides in the city of Omsk.

Orenburg Oblast

Buzulkskiy Electoral District No. 131

Bolshakov, Viktor Fedorovich. Born 20 February 1939. Novosergieyvskiy Rayon Administration, head of administration. Resides in village of Novosergiyevka, Novosergiyevskiy Rayon, Orenburg Oblast.

Orenburgskiy Electoral District No. 132

Kanyukov, Vladimir Nikolayevich. Born 14 November 1941. Orenburg branch of the MNTK [not further identified] Mikrokhirurgiya Glaza [Microsurgery of the Eye], director. Resides in the city of Orenburg.

Orskiy Electoral District No. 133

Selifanov, Aleksandr Grigoryevich. Born 22 October 1942. Orsk TETs-1 AO Orenburgenergo, director. Resides in the city of Orsk, Orenburg Oblast.

Orel Oblast

Orlovskiy Electoral District No. 134

Golenkov, Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich. Born 6 January 1948. Orel State Technical University, rector. Resides in the city of Orel.

Penza Oblast

Zheleznodorozhnyy Electoral District No. 135

Zatsepin, Yuriy Mikhaylovich. Born 22 July 1961. Bessonovskiy Rayon Administration, head of administration. Resides in village of Bessonov, Bessonovskiy Rayon, Penza Oblast.

Pervomayskiy Electoral District No. 136

Yeroshin, Gennadiy Leonidovich. Born 3 January 1947. Oblast children's hospital, chief physician. Resides in the city of Penza.

Perm Oblast

Kungurskiy Electoral District No. 138

Fedorov, Valeriy Ivanovich. Born 1 August 1943. UVD [Internal Affairs Administration] of Perm Oblast, chief. Resides in the city of Perm.

Leninskiy Electoral District No. 139

Kuzmitskiy, Gennadiy Eduardovich. Born 12 September 1949. NPO imeni S. M. Kirova, general director. Resides in the city of Perm.

Pskov Oblast

Pskovskiy Electoral District No. 141

Vasenkin, Viktor Leonidovich. Born 2 January 1947. Pskov Oblast Administration, deputy head of administration. Resides in the city of Pskov.

Rostov Oblast

Volgodonskiy Electoral District No. 143

Bova, Ivan Filippovich. Born 4 August 1931. Agroindustrial concern Aksay, general director. Resides in the city of Rostov-on-Don.

Kamenskiy Electoral District No. 144

Yermolenko, Vitaliy Petrovich. Born 14 January 1942. NPO Don, general director. Resides in village of Rassvet, Aksayskiy Rayon, Rostov Oblast.

Proletarskiy Electoral District No. 145

Pogrebshchikov, Yuriy Borisovich. Born 23 March 1945. Association of Privatized and Private Enterprises, executive director. Resides in the city of Rostov-on-Don.

Rostovskiy Electoral District No. 146

Vodolatskiy, Viktor Petrovich. Born 19 August 1957. Administration of the city of Azov, first deputy head of administration. Resides in the city of Azov, Rostov Oblast.

Taganrogskiy Electoral District No. 147

Shapovalov, Sergey Aleksandrovich. Born 19 June 1951. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy, committee chairman. Resides in the city of Rostov-on-Don.

Shakhtinskiy Electoral District No. 148

Linnik, Vitaliy Viktorovich. Born 30 April 1949. Department of Social Protection of the Population, Rostov Oblast Administration, director. Resides in the city of Rostov-on-Don.

Ryazan Oblast

Ryazanskiy Electoral District No. 149

Voblenko, Sergey Vladimirovich. Born 19 March 1955. AOOT Ryazan-Avia, president. Resides in the city of Ryazan.

Shilovskiy Electoral District No. 150

Groshev, Vladimir Pavlovich. Born 20 January 1940. Shareholder's bank Inkombank, chairman of the board. Resides in the city of Moscow.

Samara Oblast

Novokuybyshevskiy Electoral District No. 151

Lekareva, Vera Aleksandrovna. Born 4 January 1948. Samara Oblast Administration of Sports Structures, director. Resides in the city of Samara.

Promyshlennyy ["Industrial"] Electoral District No. 152

Shorin, Vladimir Pavlovich. Born 17 July 1939. Samara State Aerospace University, head of chair. Resides in the city of Moscow.

Samarskiy Electoral District No. 153

Tarachev, Vladimir Aleksandrovich. Born 23 April 1953. Samara Province Duma, deputy chairman on finance, budget, and taxes. Resides in the city of Samara.

Syzranskiy Electoral District No. 154

Beresnev, Igor Leonidovich. Born 31 July 1961. Syzran Municipal General Hospital, chief physician. Resides in the city of Syzran, Samara Oblast.

Togliatti Electoral District No. 155

Morozov, Anatoliy Timofeyevich. Born 12 February 1950. City of Togliatti administration, first deputy head. Resides in the city of Togliatti, Samara Oblast.

Saratov Oblast

Balakovskiy Electoral District No. 156

Nikiforov, Igor Vladimirovich. Born 14 July 1960. Saratov Oblast newspaper ZARYA MOLODEZHI, editor. Resides in the city of Saratov.

Balashovskiy Electoral District No. 157

Kurnayev, Valeriy Ivanovich. Born 14 October 1941. City of Balashov administration, deputy head of administration. Resides in the city of Balashov-3, Saratov Oblast.

Saratovskiy Electoral District No. 158

Rossoshanskiy, Andrey Vladimirovich. Born 6 March 1982. Andrey firm, general director. Resides in the city of Saratov.

Engelsskiy Electoral District No. 159

Karpov, Oleg Igorevich. Born 13 October 1964. Saratov Oblast Duma, deputy chairman of the Committee on Legality, Combatting Crime, Security, and Protection of the Rights of the Individual. Resides in the city of Saratov.

Sakhalin Oblast

Sakhalinskiy Electoral District No. 160

Tretakh, Boris Nikitovich. Born 12 February 1938. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the city of Okha, Sakhalin Oblast.

Sverdlovsk Oblast

Artemovskiy Electoral District No. 161

Korotkovskiy, German Eduardovich. Born 24 June 1934. Territorial intersectorial association Mayak, vice-president. Resides in the city of Yekaterinburg.

Verkh-Isetskiy Electoral District No. 162

Zyablitsev, Yevgeniy Gennadiyevich. Born 21 June 1965. Urals representation of the AO Interugol, general director. Resides in the city of Yekaterinburg.

Kamensk-Uralskiy Electoral District No. 163

Ivanov, Lyudang Grigoryevich. Born 13 August 1949. City of Bogdanovich Administration. Head of administration. Resides in the city of Bogdanovich, Sverdlovsk Oblast.

Nizhne-Tagilskiy Electoral District No. 164

Kulish, Nikolay Nikolayevich. Born 30 November 1953. Prigorodnyy Rayon Administration, head of administration. Resides in the city of Nizhniy Tagil, Sverdlovsk Oblast.

Ordzhonikidzevskiy Electoral District No. 165

Ponomarev, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich. Born 19 October 1946. AOOT NPO Uralproyektavtomatika, (Promavtomatika plant), chairman of the board of directors. Resides in the city of Yekaterinburg.

Pervouralskiy Electoral District No. 166

Nekrasov, Leonid Vasilyevich. Born 28 September 1958. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the city of Yekaterinburg.

Smolensk Oblast

Vyazemskiy Electoral District No. 168

Demidova, Inna Vasilyevna. Born 22 April 1969. Vyazemskiy Rayon Administration Committee on Affairs of Youth, chairman. Resides in the city of Smolensk.

Smolenskiy Electoral District No. 169

Plyaskin, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich. Born 24 December 1946. Department of educational work v/ch No. 44134, chief. Resides in the city of Smolensk.

Tversk Oblast

Bezhetskiy Electoral District No. 172

Lebedev, Vladimir Vasilyevich. Born 13 January 1950. AO Kalashnikovskiy Electric Lamp Plant, director. Resides in village of Kalashnikovo, Likhoslavlskiy Rayon, Tversk Oblast.

Tverskoy Electoral District No. 173

Kharchenko, Aleksandr Vasilyevich. Born 17 January 1951. City of Rzhev Administration, head of administration. Resides in the city of Rzhev, Tversk Oblast.

Tomsk Oblast

Tomskiy Electoral District No. 174

Zhidkikh, Vladimir Aleksandrovich. Born 11 November 1961. Tomsk Oblast Administration, deputy head of administration. Resides in the city of Seversk, Tomsk Oblast.

Tula Oblast

Novomoskovskiy Electoral District No. 175

Shedenkov, Stanislav Alekseyevich. Born 4 September 1951. City of Novomoskovsk and Novomoskovskiy Rayon Administration, head of administration. Resides in the city of Tula.

Tulskiy Electoral District No. 176

Tyaglivyy, Nikolay Yegorovich. Born 27 January 1947. City of Tula Administration, head of administration. Resides in the city of Tula.

Shchekinskiy Electoral District No. 177

Panarin, Nikolay Vasilyevich. Born 20 February 1936. Oblast Internal Affairs Administration, chief. Resides in the city of Tula.

Tyumen Oblast

Ishimskiy Electoral District No. 178

Shcherbakov, Gennadiy Aleksandrovich. Born 14 September 1951. Representation of the President of the Russian Federation in Tyumen Oblast, official representative. Resides in the city of Tyumen.

Tyumenskiy Electoral District No. 179

Chebotarev, Gennadiy Nikolayevich. Born 19 October 1948. Tyumen State University, pro-rector. Resides in the city of Tyumen.

Ulyanovsk Oblast

Ulyanovskiy Electoral District No. 181

Makhlova, Vera Alekseyevna. Born 12 December 1946. Ulyanovsk Oblast House of Children, director. Resides in the city of Ulyanovsk.

Chelyabinsk Oblast

Zlatoustovskiy Electoral District No. 182

Altynbayev, Zhakslyk Kuvytayevich. Born 7 September 1945. Department of Agriculture of oblast administration, general director. Resides in the city of Chelyabinsk.

Kalininskiy Electoral District No. 183

Vyatkin, German Platonovich. Born 1 May 1935. Chelyabinsk State Technical University, rector. Resides in the city of Chelyabinsk.

Kyshtymskiy Electoral District No. 184

Lezhnev, Mikhail Aleksandrovich. Born 21 December 1946. AOZT Ravis Company-Poultry Farm Sosnovskaya, president. Resides in village of Roshchino, Sosnovskiy Rayon, Chelyabinsk Oblast.

Magnitogorskiy Electoral District No. 185

Safkullin, Dinus Nurimanovich. Born 20 July 1949. Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine, deputy general director on legal questions. Resides in the city of Magnitogorsk, Chelyabinsk Oblast.

Sovetskiy Electoral District No. 186

Klyuyev, Fedor Nikolayevich. Born 15 September 1943. Chelyabinsk Oblast Duma, first deputy chairman. Resides in the city of Chelyabinsk.

Chita Oblast

Borzinskiy Electoral District No. 187

Varyamov, Anatoliy Ivanovich. Born 14 June 1946. Chita Oblast Administration of Employment and Labor Relations, chief. Resides in the city of Chita.

Chitinskiy Electoral District No. 188

Tsybikov, Namzhil Namzatovich. Born 24 June 1949. Chita State Medical Institute, professor. Resides in the city of Chita.

City of St. Petersburg

Eastern Electoral District No. 207

Khalanskiy, Viktor Petrovich. Born 4 August 1937. Main Administration of the Bank of Russia in St. Petersburg, chief. Resides in the city of St. Petersburg.

Northern Electoral District No. 209

Deremyanko, Yuriy Dzhanovich. Born 21 November 1960. Commercial Astrobank, president. Resides in the city of St. Petersburg.

Northwestern Electoral District No. 210

Aleksandrov, Aleksey Ivanovich. Born 3 May 1952. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the city of St. Petersburg.

Central Electoral District No. 211

Narusova, Lyudmila Borisovna. Born 2 May 1951. St. Petersburg Academy of Culture, docent, history department. Resides in the city of St. Petersburg.

Southwestern Electoral District No. 212

Yagya, Vitanir Samdovich. Born 18 September 1938. St. Petersburg City Administration, chief adviser to mayor. Resides in the city of St. Petersburg.

Aga Buryat Autonomous Okrug

Aginskiy Buryatskiy Electoral District No. 215

Zhamsuyev, Bair Bayaskhalanovich. Born 29 January 1959. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the village of Aginskoye, Aga Buryat Autonomous Okrug.

Komi-Permyak Autonomous Oblast

Komi-Permyatskiy Electoral District No. 216

Savelyev, Gennadiy Petrovich. Born 11 November 1945. Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug administration, first deputy head of administration. Resides in the city of Kudymkar.

Koryak Autonomous Okrug

Koryakskiy Electoral District No. 217

Kotlyarov, Yevgeniy Vasilyevich. Born 16 May 1945. Okrug administration, chief of Administration of Public Education. Resides in the village of Palana, Koryak Autonomous Okrug.

Taymyr (Dolgano-Nenets) Autonomous Okrug

Taymyrskiy (Dolgano-Nenetskiy) Electoral District No. 219

Nasednik, Viktor Vitalyevich. Born 7 September 1950. State Scientific-Production Enterprise Yenisey, general director. Resides in the city of Dudinka.

Ust-Ordynsk Buryat Autonomous Okrug

Ust-Ordynskiy Buryatskiy Electoral District No. 220

Boskholov, Sergey Semanovich. Born 6 July 1950. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the city of Moscow.

Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug

Nizhnevartovskiy Electoral District No. 221

Medvedev, Vladimir Sergeyevich. Born 21 January 1948. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the city of Tyumen.

Khanty-Mansiyskiy Electoral District No. 222

Aypin, Yeremey Danilovich. Born 27 July 1948. State Duma of the RF Fedral Assembly, deputy. Resides in Moscow.

Chukotsk Autonomous Okrug

Chukotskiy Electoral District No. 223

Bukharovskiy, Igor Nikolayevich. Born 26 April 1956. Anadyr Wholesale Trade Enterprise, chief. Resides in the city of Anadyr.

Evenki Autonomous Okrug

Evenkiyskiy Electoral District No. 224

Gayulskiy, Viktor Ivanovich. Born 25 November 1957. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. Resides in the village of Surinda, Baykitskiy Rayon, Evenki Autonomous Okrug.

Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug

Yamalo-Nenetskiy Electoral District No. 225

Komarova, Natalya Vladimirovna. Born 21 October 1955. City of Novyy Urengoy Administration, head of administration. Resides in the city of Novyy Urengoy.

[Signed] Chairman of the Congress L.B. Vid
Secretary of the Congress N.D. Golovnin

Regional Activities

Zorin: Chechnya Preparing for State Duma Elections

LD0810201195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1941 GMT 8 Oct 95

[By Sergey Ostanin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY October 8 (ITAR-TASS) — The election to the Russian State Duma, or the lower house, to be held on December 17 is in preparation in Chechnya, Vladimir Zorin, acting chief of the territorial federal executive administration in Chechnya, told reporters today.

He said a total of 35 parties and public groups had registered for the election and started to pool in electoral blocs.

Struggle for electorates is already in progress, although it is still much debated whether Chechnya should take part in the State Duma election, Zorin said.

He voiced confidence that Chechnya's candidates would run for the State Duma.

"We may not refuse (this) to people who want to run in the election," Zorin said.

He said six candidates are being nominated in Chechnya as a territorial constituency and seven-eight candidates are to run on territorial lists on parties and groups.

Local rule should be elected in Chechnya simultaneously with the State Duma election, Zorin said, adding that a key prerequisite for this is the laying down of arms by rebel factions and the population.

Communists Deny Ties to 'Russia Is Our Home' Movement

964F0010E Nalchik GAZETA YUGA in Russian 29 Sep 95 p 1

[Report by Zarema Khadartseva, Sergey Pavlov: "The Communists Will Support Magomet Magometkhanov"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Communist Party of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic Executive Committee Secretariat has adopted a special statement, in which it emphasized that the party "has nothing in common with the Russia Is Our Home movement" and other election blocs. The statement was adopted in response to the assertion of the president of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic that the Communist Party also was prepared to support the candidacy of Vladimir Sokhov, who is running as candidate for deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation in single-member Electoral District No. 13.

Yet the statement does not indicate for whom the communists will campaign in the majority-vote district. But our GAZETA YUGA correspondents have learned from informed sources that a Communist Party plenum recommended the candidacy of Magomet Magometkhanov, a member of the staff of the president of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, who was nominated per place of residence (GAZETA YUGA No. 36).

Communists Better Organized Than Democrats in Amur Oblast

MM1010092995 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 6 Oct 95 p 2

[Report by Nikolay Belyy under the "Elections-95" rubric: "While the Democrats Squabble, the Communists Are Having a Field Day"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Blagoveshchensk — The election campaign has even gripped the distant regions of Russia. Away from the capital, a large number of people wanting to take up their own seats in the Moscow's Duma have also suddenly emerged.

In Chita Oblast, some 15 candidates are vying for one statutory seat in the Russian Parliament, while there are just as many in neighboring Amur Oblast. Military personnel of various ranks, civilians from a whole range of mainly official occupations — everyone has suddenly wanted to devote themselves to the noble pursuit of composing state laws for their compatriots to live by in the future. Parliamentarians, who are already prospering and who, it seems, have taken a liking to the easy and nowadays lucrative work in the State Duma, have appeared on the lists of candidates. They want to render still more service to the poor Russian people.

To all appearances, the Duma deputies from Amur Oblast, who had in the past, or who are currently being put forward by the communist party, will have no difficulty in fulfilling their intention of remaining under the roof of Russia's supreme legislative assembly for a second term. First, the situation in the provinces, first and foremost the economic situation, is working in their favor. Second, the heirs of "honor and conscience" are much better organized and more determined than their political opponents. In alliance with the agrarians and trade unions, the communists nominated a single candidate for the single-seat 58th Blagoveshchensk electoral district and placed obedient old men and women and ideologically sound activists in all corners both of Amur Oblast's capital and outlying areas. Their efforts to collect signatures are flourishing. As the regional communist party branch so emotionally informed me, it has almost finished collecting signatures both in support of the "party," that is for the federal list of candidates of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and in support of the local candidate. The communists even collect spare votes in case of an emergency with ease.

The situation is completely the opposite for the democrats. A single candidate, to suit all the whole assortment of directions within the region's democratic movement, has not been found. Within the camp of the oblast branch of "Russia's Democratic Choice" scores are being settled, public statements are being made about members leaving, and accusations of corruption and some or other dirty tricks are being made. It even turns out that things are being thieved from the tiny cash office of the small regional branch of "Russia's Democratic Choice." The search for the miscreants is being passed off as a struggle to purge the party ranks. The man on the street is, however, simply shocked by the internal party squabbles, which have, moreover, started when an election campaign is in full swing. Even with his passport, he cannot get into the place to which the democrats are inviting him to go. The headquarters of the Amur Oblast branch of "Russia's Democratic Choice" is deserted. The office's sole occupier says that the collection of signatures "in support of Gaydar" is proceeding with difficulty and that the results even of the election race's first leg are difficult to predict.

Moreover, spokes are, as always, being put in the democrats' wheel. Supporters of Gaydar in Amur Oblast set up their premises in the Blagoveshchensk tax police's building, renting a room there. A burly guard inside the police building barred the way to me, having demanded my papers and interrogated me about the purpose of my visit. If you do not have the documentation, you cannot get into the public organization which calls itself a people's organization, even with an ID card. One luckless supporter of "Russia's Democratic Choice" phoned the ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI office and reported that the guard at the [tax] police [premises] did not let him in to see the democrats even with his passport, having showed him a note on which was written in a clear hand: "Visitors not to be admitted to office 315!"

At my question about who had issued the censorial political directive, the uniformed guard shrugged his shoulders. The note itself disappeared as documentary evidence. Meantime, here in the police building, not far from the vigilant guards, an old man and supporter of Zyuganov collected signatures in support of the communist party and its resolute candidates. No passes were demanded in order to get to see him him.

Forecasts & Commentary

Daily Examines Election Prospects of CPRF

MM1010113895 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 Oct 95 p 5

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences Sergey Vasiltsov and Candidate of Economic Sciences Sergey Obukhov of the Center for the Study of Russian Political Values: "The Communist Party of the Russian Federation's Voters: The 'Communist Threat' Since the 'Burial of Communism'" — first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Recently Andrey Loginov, one of the president's chief analysts, rebuked the mass media: "By hyping the theme of communist revenge," he stated agitatedly, "political commentators and journalists are — wittingly or otherwise — disorienting voters and thereby indirectly helping to increase the political weight of procommunist electoral associations." As if carrying out instructions "from above," one of the capital's pro-government research foundations immediately reported its poll findings: Communists are supported by no more than 10 percent of voters. However, the recent local elections in Volgograd — former bailiwick of the radical democrats — clearly showed the tunnel vision of the official pollsters. Therefore, the editorial office again asked the specialists of the independent Center for the Study of Russian Political Values to provide its analysis of the development of mass attitudes in Russia and the changes in the position held by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF] among the Russiawide electorate. [passage omitted]

The last two years (1993 through 1995) have seen the voters of all the other parties devastated. All of them, that is, save the CPRF. More than 80 percent of the CPRF's former voters confirm their loyalty. The CPRF has conceded virtually nothing to other electoral associations. At the same time one-fourth of the former supporters of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, 9 percent of former supporters of Yabloko, 13 percent of the old Russia's Choice electorate, and 18 percent of former Agrarian Party of Russia voters stated their preference for the Communists.

But this is no way means the automatic conversion of former supporters of other parties into real voters.

According to a poll carried out by the center in September, 18-20 percent of the national electorate are ready to vote for the CPRF. The backbone — around three-fourths of them — are "veterans" of the 1993 election. One-tenth is made up of those who did not vote in 1993. The remainder are former supporters of other parties, but there are fewer of them now than during a poll carried out at the start of the summer.

The poll data of that period show that 5 percent more voters were ready to vote for the CPRF at that time than now. Of course, measurements of voting intentions carried out earlier also showed large fluctuations in support for the CPRF during the year. Yes, the party can bank on its 1993 voters, but they are not enough to ensure the electoral breakthrough which is being prophesied for Zyuganov's party from all sides. The campaign to win over other parties' voters and floating voters will clearly be difficult.

Let us remember what happens when you celebrate victory prematurely. You get the breakup of Russia's Choice, which turned the "political New Year" into a fiasco. The same thing happened to the Chernomyrdin bloc, which, having peaked too soon, is now on the verge of collapse. And something akin — congratulations on a victory not yet won — is happening with regard to the CPRF. And yet we are only observing society at the stage before the election race begins, and another two event-packed months remain before the finishing straight is entered.

Danger, Impact of Loss of CIS Markets Weighed

MM1110111695 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Oct 95 pp 9, 10

[Article by Vladimir Kucherenko: "The Near Abroad Must Not Become the Far Abroad"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Government is making efforts to restore its lost ties with the CIS countries. To that end targeted, tied credits of 200 billion rubles [R] have been included in the 1996 budget. But these funds, apparently, satisfy few people.

Breaking Up Was Easy

Russia has failed to become a full-fledged link in the international market — not a raw materials-producing appendage of the developed West but a supplier of finished output. In these conditions the CIS remains almost the only market for the sale of our machine building and high-technology output.

Meanwhile, Russia remains dependent on the import of nonferrous metals, rare-earth elements, cotton, and food from the CIS. At the same time our neighbors' production is dependent on the export of energy sources from the Russian Federation.

Despite all that, however, the highly unfavorable trends in the Russian Federation's trade and economic ties with the CIS countries are becoming stronger. Reciprocal trade volumes are falling.

Of course, the decline in production in all countries of the ex- USSR plays its part. Overall CIS GDP fell by 39 percent in 1992-1994, although the decline in GDP in Russia (25 percent in 1992-1994) noticeably lagged behind the fall in commodity turnover with the CIS neighbors (almost half).

Energy sources are playing an ever-increasing role in the Russia's trade with the CIS, rising from one-third of the 1992 volume to one-half in 1994. In turn, Russia's imports increasingly consist of food and food raw materials.

Meanwhile, Russia has been charged with the "duty" of financing its neighbors' independence. It is no exaggeration to say that the Russian Federation is the major sponsor of the "new abroad." The CIS countries' debts to Russia for Russian credits in 1992-1994, which have now become state debts, have reached $5.8 billion (Ukraine — R9.7 trillion; Belarus — R2.2 trillion; Kazakhstan — R1.4 trillion; Moldova — R1.2 trillion).

To the huge debt for energy sources you have to add arrears of R1.6 trillion on direct economic contracts. The enormous debts of Ukraine and Kazakhstan have placed "Roskontrakt" in a difficult position. However, those CIS countries' debts to the developed countries are 2.4 times higher than their debts to Russia.

Experts from the Ministry for Cooperation with Member-States of the CIS noted bitterly that the CIS countries are reorienting themselves toward the far abroad. Russia has ceased to be the technological and financial center of the CIS. The developed countries are actively trying to force Russia out of its traditional sales markets. It may be boldly asserted that the Russian Federation has generously funded the first two years of the new countries' independence but that the latter are now actively switching to ties exclusively with the "far" abroad.

Thus Russia is also being deprived of real levers of influence over the noneconomic processes in the CIS, and this is fraught with unpleasant surprises of a geopolitical and strategic defense character for the Russian Federation.

All this is very unpleasant for Russia. For example, despite the fact that 80 percent of the military industry is concentrated here, the Russian Federation can produce only 17 types of arms and military hardware without regular supplies of components from the CIS. With the further alienation of the former republics of the USSR the army runs the risk of being left with unreliable outmoded weapons which will constantly break down. It is hard to manage without cotton and food too.

What is the solution to this situation?

Fuel and Energy Factors

Let us address a specific question — the trade in energy resources. The time for the primitive cry "Let's sell our oil to the West, we'll manage without the Ukrainians and the Uzbeks!" has gone. The prices at which the CIS countries buy energy sources from us are rapidly catching up with the world level, and this has boomeranged back on Russia by disrupting the manufacturing chains and causing a further decline in our production.

On the other hand, the CIS countries have begun frenziedly seeking their own energy reserves and switched their attention to other producer states.

The Russian Federation Ministry for Cooperation with Member-States of the CIS believes that on this issue the aim must be not only to obtain money for energy supplies but also to switch to joint programs in the fuel and energy complex. That is especially important now that the Russian fuel and energy complex has been hit by an investment crisis, with capacities being decommissioned three to four times faster than new ones are being commissioned.

That is why it is advisable to draw up a common energy resource supply program for the CIS while working as actively as possible to involve our neighbors in fuel and energy projects in Russia and ensuring the greatest possible participation for the Russian Federation in projects on CIS territory, such as in the Caspian consortium.

The creation of transnational financial-industrial groups would considerably ease the problem (we will talk about the difficulties in this regard later). Enterprises of this kind could receive local assets of the CIS states in payment of their debts to Russia. This process got under way with the agreement between the "Gazprom" Russian Joint-Stock Company and Ukraine (20 March 1995) and the Russia-Moldova protocol on the payment of "gas" debts signed two days later.

Let us note that the Russian Federation Committee for the Chemical and Petrochemical Industry tried to "force through" a similar model in trade with the CIS although it was keenly opposed by Russian Federation Economics Ministry leaders Ye. Yasin and Ya. Urinson.

There is another way to settle accounts for Russian energy systems — the construction of housing for the West Siberian oil and gas complex. That model is due to be tried out with Belarus. This could include the supply of provisions and industrial goods to the Russian North.

Financial-Industrial Groups — More on Paper at the Moment

For almost three years now there has been talk about another form of mutually beneficial cooperation — financial-industrial groups — whereby enterprises from various republics could join forces and pool their raw materials, finances, and technology which are currently divided by the new borders.

However, there are counterarguments here. For financial-industrial groups you need if not a common system then at least a highly homogeneous system of taxation, legislation, and property relations. Things that would be easy to do in the framework of a single union state are not easy to do when you have a cluster of different states, parliaments, and presidents. When the USSR disintegrated the common currency and common credit-finance and insurance systems disappeared too. Consequently there must be painstaking work to coordinate reform programs in the CIS countries, standardize laws, and create mechanisms typical of a single state.

Furthermore, complex constructions can easily disintegrate if there are unpredictable changes of political course in two or three CIS countries. In addition, the Russian Federation itself does not yet have a full normative base for financial-industrial groups.

As a result the agreements on the creation of such groups with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, and Ukraine are marking time. Work with Kyrgyzstan is also in jeopardy. Projects for financial-industrial groups which have already been founded remain on paper. This applies, for example, to the "Nizhegorodskiye avtomobili" financial-industrial group involving five CIS countries and Latvia. Or the "Sokol" financial-industrial group which is unable to attract colleagues from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The "Interros," "Skorostnoy flot," and "Eksokhim" groups are unable to attract partners from the CIS at the moment even though they want to.

From the Files: The "Gazprom" Russian Joint-Stock Company has joined with Donbass enterprises to form the "Stal-Truby-Gaz" concern.

The "RUNO" transnational Ukrainian-Russian oil corporation has been founded.

The formation of the "Rogunskaya GES" Joint-Stock Company is being planned with Tajikistan.

Thus the existing opportunities are currently being hampered by legal factors and political fragmentation. At the same time the financial-industrial group is virtually the only way to save certain sectors of our industry. And not just a textile industry which has been left without cotton.

This applies to an even greater extent to the nuclear industry. After all, six of the [USSR's] 15 nuclear electric power stations are now outside the Russian Federation, along with 75 percent of the commercially viable uranium stocks, monopoly holders in the extraction and processing of zirconium, beryllium, and rare-earth metals, and the experimental base for completing the development of nuclear engines.

The Problem With Credits...

Credits are another powerful lever for consolidating and expanding the Russian economy's positions within the CIS. Without credits we could lose sales markets for our machine building industry.

You do not have to look far for examples. Georgia and many other "new sovereign states", for instance, would like to acquire trolleybuses produced by the Uritskiy plant. (Let us note that Greece and Colombia are happy to buy them.) But our neighbors do not have the means to pay — they have no money.

Thus it is necessary to issue credits. Not ordinary credits but tied credits. In this way they do not leave Russia but go directly to the supplier enterprise instead. If we do not give them these credits then Germany, the United

States, Turkey, and Japan will. But that will be for their output. And we will be forced out of our traditional markets for decades to come.

But who in Russia is going to give them these credits? The Ministry for Cooperation with Member-States of the CIS, the State Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry, and the directors of the Mytishchinskiy machine building plant and the trolleybus plant in Engels point to the 1996 budget and complain of the meager figure envisaged there — R200 billion. But Vice Premier A. Chubays counters that by saying: Tell me what to cut in order to increase this item of expenditure.

Premier V. Chernomyrdin's proposal is this: Enlist the commercial banks and the business sector in cooperation. That makes sense. Indeed, the bankers could give Georgia the credit that it needs for trolleybuses by financing production and in turn could demand a surety from Tbilisi in the form of land, a sanatorium, or gold reserves (if it has them).

But there are many obstacles here. For example, our banks are working to achieve high interest rates at the moment (as their depositors demand). But the West can offer Georgia loans at far lower rates.

Second, in the new states the idea of surrendering local property to settle debts to Russia is arousing fierce opposition from the radical nationalists ("Russian imperialism!"), which means that this option is extremely risky for Russian lenders in view of the political instability in the CIS countries.

Furthermore, the kind of property that could be used as a surety is often a key asset for the new sovereign states and a source of foreign currency revenue for their governments. This can only increase the risk of losing newly acquired property. Even the accords already reached with Moldova on the settlement of debts using property have now been placed in jeopardy.

Third, the acquisition of attractive facilities in the CIS in settlement of debts will entail investments in those facilities. However, Russia itself does not have enough investment funds of its own, the potential of Russian enterprises is limited, and a considerable proportion of the potential investment money is going into state securities.

Thus the huge number of questions created by the disintegration of the USSR remains unresolved. It is an extremely important task for Russia to hold on to the CIS markets, but at the moment they are continuing to fall into our world competitors' hands. It is impossible to repair in an instant something which was smashed in an instant, so this will require long-term, painstaking work. First of all the mechanisms of interstate integration must be bedded in. The rapprochement with Belarus offers us a unique opportunity. It is probably only then, relying on well-tried cooperation techniques, that we will be able to build on success. And even then only after the meticulous elaboration of integration programs with each of the CIS countries.

Air Defense System Holds First Joint Exercise

LD1010154395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1526 GMT 10 Oct 95

[By Mikhail Shevtsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 10 (Itar-Tass) — The CIS integrated air defence system has first held a multi-national command and staff exercise.

The exercise was conducted under command of Russian air defence troop commander, air force Colonel-General Viktor Prudnikov, who is also chairman of the air defence coordinating committee under the CIS Council of Defence Ministers.

The exercise was carried out under a programme of joint operational exercises of the Russian and CIS air defence forces.

Prudnikov told Itar-Tass that the CIS integrated air defence system had improved the level of training of its personnel and command.

The exercise involved operational forces and commanders of CIS air defence troops.

The exercise was a drill of interactive hunt of border-trespassing aircraft, anti-hijacking operations and rescue of distressed and disoriented aircraft.

Control centres of the CIS air defence troops and some 30 target- acquisition and fighter planes were used in the exercise.

General command was carried out from a control centre of Russian air defence troops.

The CIS integrated air defence system was set up under an agreement which was signed by CIS heads of state at the Almaty summit on February 10, 1995.

Moldavia and Azerbaijan stay out of the agreement.

Signatories to the agreement have contributed funds and manpower to the integrated system.

Pakistan Releases Planes Suspected of Carrying Weapons

LD0910130295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1103 GMT 9 Oct 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Shvedov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Delhi, 9 Oct — Pakistani authorities forced three cargo aircraft of Ukrainian, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen aviation companies to land in the city of Lahore, according to an informed source in Islamabad.

According to the source, a spokesman of the Pakistani civil aviation said this step was taken last week "in line with international legislation and on the suspicion that the aircraft, on charter flights from Delhi to Kabul, carried cargo of a military nature destined for the Army of Afghan President Borhanoddin Rabbani." After all the aircraft were checked, they were allowed to continue their flight to the Afghan capital.

Meanwhile a spokesman of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Pakistan told an ITAR-TASS correspondent by telephone from Islamabad that at the moment the Russian authorities do not have any official information about the incident. He acknowledged the presence of reports in the local mass media about India possibly rendering military assistance to formations supporting the Afghan president.

India has on several occasions categorically refuted allegations about supplying arms to the Afghan leadership. In response to a question from an ITAR-TASS correspondent, an official spokesman of the Indian Foreign Ministry said that Delhi "does not render any kind of military support to any of the Afghan formations." He expressed regret at "Pakistan spreading slanderous assumptions to create a false impression of India in the minds of the friendly Afghan people and to distract their attention from Islamabad interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan."

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 11 Oct

LD1110070995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0604 GMT 11 Oct 95

["Press Review" — ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 11 (Itar-Tass) - "Rossiyskiye Vesti" ponders over "pros and cons", commenting on a possibility of imposing a state of emergency in Chechnya. The newspaper quoted opinions expressed by political leaders, including Interior Minister Anatoliy Kulikov and chairman of the State Duma Ivan Rybkin. Presidential chief of staff Sergey Filatov says that "one must think hard before taking this step". In his pinion, under the present conditions there is a possibility to more strictly ensure law and order in the republic and take the necessary measures to defend the population from bandit formations. Political expert Emil Payin is confident that imposing a state of emergency under the present conditions will be to no avail since terrorist acts are aimed against definite people. Besides, Payin thinks that the move will foster the positions of radical forces in Chechnya. The expert does not rule out a possibility that forces opposing political settlement of the Chechen crisis exist in Moscow as well. In another article "Rossiyskiye Vesti" carries an interview with lieutenant-general Anatoliy Romanov who had talked to journalists a week before a terrorist against him was committed.

"Izvestiya" writes that "fearing the return of communists to power, the people have been buying lots of cereals, sugar and canned food." The newspaper says that alongside numerous forecasts predicting a possible victory in the elections to the State Duma by left-wing parties and blocs, including the Communist party led by Gennadiy Zyuganov, a parallel tendency appeared in the country whose population is buying plenty of basic foodstuffs which might be stored for a long time. "The memories of overall shortages in the period of the CPSU rule are still fresh despite four years of reforms which have passed since then", "Izvestiya" said. The newspaper comments on an intention of Duma lawmakers who are plann ing tomorrow to overrule a veto imposed by the Federation Council on a draft bill amending the federal law on compulsory military service. Incidentally, the problem of the enrollment of the personnel have been resolved by the military on their own, who pay no attention to lawmakers who are unable to come to terms on the problem of reforms in Armed Forces.

"Izvestiya" says that the mayor of Groznyy, Beslan Hantemirov, might turn into "another Dzhokhar Dudayev" opposing Moscow. Hantemirov's biography traced since 1991 gives grounds to consider him a person guided by his own ambitions only, regardless of the posts he occupies. "Hantemirov might create problems for Russia much worse than Dudayev did if he takes the upper hand in Chechnya," the newspaper said in an article entitled "A criminal track left by the Groznyy city mayor".

"Rossiyskaya Gazeta" and "Argumenty I facty" weekly attempt to analyse the reasons why communists won the elections of the head of the Volgograd administration and lawmakers of the State Duma. Rossiyskaya Gazeta believes that economic hardships faced by common people who turned "leftist" weary of hopeless existence play into the communists' hands.

"Argumenty I Facty" says that the communists have given up the majority of radical slogans for the time being and intend to help the lowest income groups of the population. However, the newspaper warns that a sharp increase in welfare benefits will inevitably lead to curtailing other projects. The newspaper cautions investors who bought securities issued by the Russian state bank since September 27 from pinning hopes on being paid high interest rates. "The past experience shows that the Russian Finance Ministry and the Central Bank of Russia easily change interest rates to meet their own interests," the weekly said.

The "Red Star" [Krasnaya Zvezda] daily publishes in article entitled "The hunt for Russian servicemen continues". The newspaper published a list of Russian soldiers and officers who were killed in Chechnya following a terrorist act against general Anatoliy Romanov. "The number of the killed resemble a death toll recorded during a period of active military operations," the newspaper said.

"Trud" carries an interview with general Lebed, currently a leader of the "Congress of Russian communities" who declared that the army had not been and was not being reformed. "It is not the reform, but rather the formation of the army which is at issue today," Lebed said, putting the blame on Defence Minister Pavel Grachev. Lebed denied allegations about his differences with "the number one" of the bloc, Yuriy Skokov.

Problems of combating organized crime are raised by the "Moya Gazeta" newspaper, which publishes commentaries made by ex-KGB chief Vadim Bakatin, acting prosecutor general Oleg Haidanov, first deputy Interior Minister Vladimir Kolesnikov.

Talks Begin in Moscow on Payments for Sarajevo Gas

LD1010123795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1217 GMT 10 Oct 95

[By Igor Ivantsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW October 10 (ITAR-TASS) — Talks on the terms, amounts and payments for Russian natural gas deliveries to Sarajevo began in Moscow Tuesday [10 October] between the Gazexport foreign trade company and representatives of Bosnia and Serbia.

On Monday evening the representatives signed an agreement with the Gazprom concern regarding the transit of the Russian gas via their respective territories to Sarajevo. On Monday night Russia began to pump the fuel into the pipeline going to the Bosnian capital.

A Gazexport spokesman told Tass there were no technical problems in delivering gas to Sarajevo. "The talks will focus, first and foremost, on the time and form of payments for the shipments", he said.

The debt for the Russian fuel delivered to Sarajevo has amounted to 100 million US dollars since 1991.

Russians, French Dispute Responsibility in Sarajevo

LD1110130895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1241 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By Andrey Naryshkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ZAGREB, October 11 (ITAR-TASS) — A group of Russian officers at the headquarters of the U.N. force in the Sarajevo sector are concerned over the situation developing in the responsibility zone of the Russian peace-keeping battalion.

It is the only subunit of "blue helmets" stationed in "Serb Sarajevo", which controls, from the Serb side, the confrontation line dividing the capital. All other battalions (Egyptian, Ukrainian and French) divide responsibility for the Moslem sectors of the zone.

Such a division suited all when it was "hot" in the Bosnian capital, and nobody tried to claim rights on the Russian sector. The situation is now changing, which was told to ITAR-TASS with concern by Russian officers.

In their opinion, the matter in question is an attempt by Frenchmen who occupy key positions at the sector's headquarters, to oust Russians from some areas of the responsibility zone and "to shoulder" some functions which are under the competence of Rusbat-2", ranging from escorting humanitarian convoys to Gorazde to questions of water supplies.

Tension between the battalions are rising, since the French, without asking anybody, started patrolling independently some routes in the Russian sector and hold separate meetings with local Serb authorities.

To justify their actions, they use a far-fetched pretext that Russians are short of technical means to cover the sector completely.

According to some information, they have remapped zones of responsibility, slashing considerably the Russian share.

The above prompts an idea that decisions are being hatched at the end of the operation being carried out under the U.N. flag, decisions which are aimed at ousting Russia from a new stage of the peace-keeping mission where the key role will be given to contingents from NATO countries.

UN Envoy on Multinational Peacekeeping Force for Bosnia

LD1110103995 Moscow World Service in Russian 2050 GMT 10 Oct 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb, 10 Oct (ITAR-TASS) — Given the collective will, there is a possibility that the Bosnia peacekeeping operation could be continued on a multinational basis, and not under the sole leadership of NATO. Indeed, a majority of the countries which have sent contingents to Bosnia would be interested in that, ITAR-TASS was told by Sergey Lavrov, Russia's permanent representative at the United Nations, who is back in the Croatian capital from Sarajevo. "There is no doubt that the problem of finance is going to be the key issue in moving from a UN peacekeeping operation to anything else," he said.

The high-ranking diplomat has come to the conflict zone with General Valeriy Demin, his military adviser, to study the most acceptable options for continuing Russian participation in the peacekeeping operation when the present mandate expires. They have had talks with the leadership of the Bosnia contingent of the "blue helmets" and met the command of Russian No. 2 battalion, deployed in Sarajevo.

"At the moment I am unable to give a final answer to the question of under what conditions and in what form Russia will take part in the new phase of the operation. We cannot say in advance how big the peacekeeping force will be or anything about Russia's part in it until a peace agreement is signed and the demarcation line around Sarajevo and in other areas is set," Sergey Lavrov said. "There is no doubt about the need for a

Russian presence in Bosnia, but it is not only Russia which is asking how to 'marry up' NATO and the troops from outside the bloc. We should proceed on the basis that almost all the countries with contingents in the region want to remain in the new operation. A majority of them would prefer not to come 'under NATO,' but to find an acceptable form of cooperation. The political and military leadership of the UN mission also have an interest in that."

Moscow Urged To Veto NATO's Bosnia Plan

MK1110142095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Oct 95 p 2

[Report by Semen Vasilyevskiy under the "Carte Blanche" rubric: "The Last Nail. Russia Can Itself Hammer It Into the Coffin of Its Interests in the Balkans"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Americans, who have long been choosing between the military or negotiated way of imposing their solution on Bosnia, appear to have opted for the latter. This choice was influenced by fears lest the conflict spill over into neighboring countries; by the pent-up displeasure of the West Europeans, who have been pushed aside from the Bosnian settlement; by an unwillingness to risk a further heightening of tensions in relations with Russia; and, most importantly, by the Bosnian Serbs' ability to stabilize the front line after massed NATO air strikes.

In the current circumstances, when the Americans have all the trump cards in their hand, a decision appears to have been made provisionally to put purely forcible methods on the back burner, while not forswearing them altogether; for what is effectively left to be resolved are just the two interrelated problems of ensuring a constitutional arrangement in Bosnia-Herzegovina that would be suitable for the United States, and legalizing NATO's long-term presence in this former Yugoslav republic. If we do not delve into nuances, the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance onto the Balkan region has been precisely the objective of U.S. policy in southeastern Europe at least since 1993.

Active steps have already been taken in the two aforementioned areas. At meetings in Geneva, New York, and Rome, representatives of Croatia, Yugoslavia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina — in fact, only its Muslim part — sponsored by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, effectively discarded the principle of equal rights for the two opposing Bosnian sides — the Muslim-Croatian federation and the Serb Republic. Instead of the initially expected union of the two entities, what is at issue at the negotiations now is a state made up of three — Muslim, Croatian, and Serb — parts. Instead of 50 percent of the rights the Serbs will be given just one-third. One should not be deluded by the fact that all decisions are to be made by consensus. The prewar arrangement of Bosnia-Herzegovina was absolutely the same, which did not prevent the world community, disregarding the results of a Serb referendum, from recognizing the republic as an independent state and declaring the Serbs barbarians and aggressors.

The stance of Russian diplomacy is still full of surprises. It would seem that it should have insisted at least on two points. The first point is the right of the Serb Republic to a confederation with Yugoslavia. This springs from the principle of the equal rights of the warring parties in Bosnia, which has repeatedly been upheld by the world community, particularly, the right to establish parallel relations with neighboring countries. It would be pertinent to recall that 18 months ago, under an agreement signed in Washington, the Muslim-Croat federation was already given the right to a confederative association with Croatia. The second point is that in two or three years' time after signing the agreement the Bosnian Serbs must be given the right to hold a referendum on their attitude to the newly-created union. This matter has also been widely discussed at various meetings and sessions. In particular, this is what Jimmy Carter promised the Bosnian Serbs. But, as the saying goes, things are still right where they started.

Unfortunately, not only is the Russian Foreign Ministry absolutely passive and devoid of backbone, but, to all appearances, despite all presidential statements, it is continuing its line toward isolating the Bosnian Serbs. Although representatives of the Foreign Ministry have recently resumed meetings with them after a long pause, their real actions tell a different story. Take, for instance, the recent vote by Sergey Lavrov, Russian representative to the UN Security Council, in favor of sanctions against the Serb Republic. It's beyond all understanding how one can extend sanctions with one hand — and provide humanitarian aid with another! Nor can one understand the timing of opening a Russian diplomatic mission in Sarajevo to the Muslim-led government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, something Haris Silajdzic, premier of this government, who visited Moscow the other day, was swift to announce.

Preparations for a NATO operation are also in full swing. The council of this alliance has already drawn up its key parameters, the map of carving up Bosnia into spheres of influence of the United States, Britain, France, and so forth. About 50,000 servicemen (half of them Americans) are expected to be subordinate to a single NATO command and to have "a flexible mandate," that is, the right not only to self-defense, but also to the suppression of those who may defy their orders. Obviously, the issue is the Bosnian Serbs alone. UN Secretary General Butrus-Butrus Ghali, citing a lack of funds, also said that a replacement of UNPROFOR by NATO forces would be desirable. The new operation is expected to be financed from a specially created international fund money for which will be given primarily by Muslim countries.

In order to secure passage of the requisite resolution through the UN Security Council, the token participation of Russian forces, first of all in the area of Sarajevo, is provided for. After the "peacekeeping" — or, effectively, occupation — NATO forces are brought in, the demilitarization of Bosnia (read, the Serbs) will probably be announced, and it will be as good as done. NATO's de facto presence will also be formalized de jure.

Judging by the latest statements of Andrey Kozyrev and other high-ranking Russian diplomats, there is a realistic possibility that the old, familiar scenario may recur: Initially certain doubts and concerns will be expressed, then — since the West will allegedly give us the requisite assurances and take our demands into account — the UN Security Council will once again give the "green" or "yellow" light to NATO's expansion. Metaphorically speaking, after adopting anti-Serb sanctions, allowing NATO aviation to fly over Bosnia, and authorizing the deployment of ground rapid-reaction forces there, we will thus with our own hands hammer the last nail into the lid on the coffin of Russian interests in the Balkans. Afterward we will be effectively unable to have any influence in the region.

The options announced by Pavel Grachev — a modern NATO-Russia operation on a parity basis, with both parties alternating in command; the creation of multinational forces from among the troops of NATO, other countries, and Russia, provided decisions are made unanimously at all levels — are unfeasible. Not only because NATO servicemen will never forswear the unity of command or, moreover, agree to operate under provisional Russian command, but also because, as experience has shown, presently the Russian Foreign Ministry is unable to secure fully equal conditions in carrying out such an operation. It will once again be "taken in," all the more so because, to all appearances, it "is itself glad to be deceived."

Matters of financing have also been factored out. Grachev's scenarios, however, will be a good bargaining chip if the Americans forgo the continuation of a purely UN operation, and will also give a pretext finally to use the right of veto should they be rejected.

It seems that only after the use of a veto will they start talking with us in earnest and searching for a compromise. Only through a veto can we seize our last chance to remain in the Balkans. By exercising the right of veto we will also make it clear to the Serbs — both in Yugoslavia and in the Serb Republic — that they can count on us and resolutely oppose the NATO presence. This would preempt NATO countries' possible attempt to come to Bosnia "at the invitation" of the warring factions, not according to a UN mandate.

The hypothetical option to which both NATO and Russia can agree after a series of consultations is as follows: completely separate — that is, each under its own command — NATO and Russian contingents on the territories of the Muslim-Croatian Federation and the Serb Republic respectively. Therefore, NATO countries will be mostly on one side of the international demarcation line, while the Russian contingent will be on the other. The UN must continue exercising overall control over the entire operation and financing it. Money to finance the operation may be contributed by any organizations or specially created funds, but the money must, again, be distributed through the UN. The figure of 50,000 servicemen requested by NATO in order to carry out the operation should be slashed considerably, because in peacetime the main functions of the multinational forces will boil down to control and oversight. At the same time, in order to maintain relative parity, our contingent could be increased somewhat.

Typically, a few days ago, when asked a specific question about his attitude to the just described hypothetical scenario of "Russia and NATO" as opposed to "Russia within NATO," Nicholas Burns, official spokesman for the U.S. State Department, made it clear that he does not rule out such an option.

Karasin: NATO Airstrike Near Tuzla Causing 'Concern'

LD1010155795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1538 GMT 10 Oct 95

[By Valeriy Sevryukov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 10 (ITAR-TASS) — A report about another NATO air strike on Bosnian Serbs positions in a secure area near Tuzla on Monday evening caused concern in Moscow.

In this connection a Russian delegate to the United Nations requested a detailed information on this matter through the Security Council, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigory Karasin told a briefing on Tuesday.

Karasin said the concern of the Russian side is explained by the fact that "in conditions when the effort of international mediators brought the sides toward achieving a ceasefire agreement and putting it into operation, any military activity, also by NATO aviation, may reduce what has been achieved to naught."

The Russian Foreign Ministry urges all the sides to refrain from any military activities which could torpedo the negotiation process in Bosnia and Herzegovina aimed at political settlement, Karasin said.

Yeltsin Envoy Wants Pressure Put on Bosnian Muslims

LD1110111295 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1033 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 11 (INTERFAX) — Aleksandr Zotov, the Russian president's special envoy in charge of settlement in former Yugoslavia, believes that "Muslims are advancing more and more terms for concluding the ceasefire agreements and are in fact blackmailing the world community."

"Political pressure must be put on Muslims and other conflicting sides to ensure that the cease-fire agreements go into effect," he told INTERFAX in Moscow Wednesday.

He said the U.S. and Russia's other western partners which influence the Muslims, bear special responsibility in this context.

He categorically denied the assertion that the cease-fire agreements failed to go into effect at 00:00, October 10 through Russia's fault. "By agreeing to resume gas supplies to Bosnia, Russia played the key role in achieving the cease-fire agreement," he said.

He pointed out that the political decision on the resumption of gas supplies to Bosnia was taken before the terms of payment were coordinated.

"This is Russia's noticeable contribution to the settlement process. It overweights what has been done by other countries which boast of their generosity in relation to Bosnia," said Zotov.

Kozyrev Upbeat About Bosnian Cease-Fire

LD1010185495 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1723 GMT 10 Oct 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 10 (INTERFAX) — Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev expressed optimism on Tuesday about a cease-fire reached by the parties to the Bosnian conflict.

Russia has already started pumping natural gas to Sarajevo, which is the Bosnian Muslims' condition for putting the cease-fire into effect, Kozyrev said in a statement delivered to a news briefing in Moscow by Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin.

"It will take some time, of course, for the gas to reach Sarajevo, but that is a technical matter," the minister said.

"Although specialists from Sarajevo arrived in Moscow only by evening on October 9, the Russian side succeeded in persuading them to begin negotiations the same day," he continued. "As a result, at one o'clock in the morning on Tuesday (Russian gas monopoly) Gazprom and the Bosnians signed an agreement on technical questions relating to the resumption of the delivery of gas. Immediately after that a directive was given to open the valve in Hungary."

This means Russian President Boris Yeltsin's initiative for an immediate cease-fire is going into practice, Kozyrev said.

"It is the task of all Contact Group members to ensure that by October 10 the parties to the conflict put into effect the truce agreement, which must open the way to the political settlement of the conflict and grow into a definitive end to the war. No one must be allowed to block this historic opportunity," said Kozyrev, currently on a routine visit to Finland.

During the night of October 9 Russia resumed gas supplies to Bosnia, a high-ranking Russian diplomat told INTERFAX Tuesday. He said this became possible following the solution of a number of technical problems.

On Monday evening, shortly after arriving in Moscow, a delegation of Bosnian gas-industry experts held talks with the managers of Russia's joint-stock company Gazprom, as a result of which the pipeline leading to Sarajevo was opened, he said.

According to his sources, Russian and Bosnian experts reached agreements on the volumes of gas supplies and on the terms of payment. "The Bosnian side agreed to partially pay for the gas," said the diplomat.

He said he did not have information on whether the gas had reached Sarajevo. "Even if it has not, it will in a couple of hours. Pressure must be raised in the pipeline and corresponding services are busy doing this," he said.

He pointed out that Gazprom is not a state-run organization. "Only previously did the government issue orders which were instantly fulfilled," he said. He also said that this particular circumstance explains why the resumption of gas supplies to Bosnia was delayed.

He said the connection between the resumption of Russian gas supplies and cease-fire in Bosnia was absolutely incorrect.

"It is immoral to blame Moscow for the failure of cease-fire which was to go into effect beginning 00:00 am October 10," he said.

Moscow hopes that the cease-fire agreement will go into effect exactly on October 10," said the diplomat.

'Dissatisfied' Over Bosnia Cease-fire Delay

LD1110105595 Helsinki Suomen Yleisradio Network in Finnish 1000 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Russia is dissatisfied over the delay in the Bosnian cease-fire. Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said Russia has done everything possible and even impossible in order to provide gas for Sarajevo and to bring about the cease-fire.

[Begin Kozyrev recording in English] From our part we have done everything possible and even impossible to provide gas to Sarajevo and to exercise our influence and our pressure on (?the parties) to encourage them to an immediate cease-fire. [end recording]

In Kozyrev's view, the Contact Group formed by the leading Western countries and Russia, should use its influence to persuade the sides in Bosnia to agree to a cease-fire.

In Bosnia, the Muslims and Croats scored fresh victories over the Serbs. The victories are seen as slowing down the desire for a cease-fire.

In his statement on arriving in Helsinki for a working visit, the Russian foreign minister was not, however, prepared to accuse any single party in the Bosnian war for the delay in the cease-fire. [passage omitted]

Urges Further Efforts Toward Bosnian Truce

LD1110124895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1227 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By Yuriy Kozlov and Vladimir Mostovets]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] HELSINKI, October 11 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev on Wednesday said that further efforts are needed to achieve a ceasefire and then, the final termination of hostilities in Bosnia.

Speaking to reporters upon his arrival in Helsinki, Kozyrev expressed Russia's disappointment over the postponement of the truce and stressed the importance of further negotiations.

According to the minister, Russia has done everything possible to exercise its influence in the region to achieve the truce and "will do everything possible and even impossible to ensure gas deliveries to Sarajevo."

Kozyrev said that a Moscow meeting of the International Contact Group, scheduled for October 16 and 17, might become an important stage in preparations for an international peace conference on the former Yugoslavia.

Premier: Economics Must Determine Policy in Relations

LD0810082895 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 0600 GMT 8 Oct 95

[From the "Sunday" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We have taken another step forward in Russian-U.S. relations, said Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin following a meeting with U.S. Vice President Albert Gore.

We have just received this report from Bangor: [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Goryachev] Greetings, Viktor Stepanovich. There is a certain amount secrecy and very few details about what was discussed and agreed on.

[Chernomyrdin] First, there is no secrecy or lack of clarity in this matter. We agreed on many issues. We would very much like economics to determine policy in our relations. We are working together at present and advancing specific projects at a practical level and this will be the determining factor in our future policy. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Washington Talks on Third World Debts Reviewed

MM1110095695 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Oct 95 p 1

[Report by Irina Savvateyeva: "Russia Hopes To Recover Hopeless Debts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Washington — At the meetings Russian Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov has had within the framework of the latest IMF and IBRD session some progress has been made on the question of Russia's recovering developing countries' debts.

The total debt to the former USSR exceeds $160 billion. No progress has been made for some years on the question of the return of these sums. The stumbling block is the policy to be followed when calculating the amount of the debt.

Until recently the sides were reluctant to give ground on this question. The debtor-countries insisted that the debt should be calculated on the basis of the current ruble rate. Russia, for its part, regards the USSR State

Bank rate, at around 60 kopecks per dollar, as the only one that can be used.

But within the framework of recent meetings with the Nicaraguan foreign economic relations minister and the Algerian finance minister the foundation has been laid for an agreement in principle on the possible repayment of debts in accordance with the following plan. Algeria's and Nicaragua's debts will be calculated in accordance with the State Bank rate, but Russia will agree to provide these countries with favorable enough conditions for repaying the debts, in view of the fact that these debts are practically hopeless.

At the same time there was a discussion with Nicaragua of the possibility of issuing its debts as bills, which subsequently would be able to circulate freely on the secondary market.

Vladimir Panskov believes that the agreement with Nicaragua could actually be signed before the end of this year. The value of the agreements that has been reached, according to the finance minister, is that they could establish a precedent for other debtor-countries.

'Other Ways' May Be Used To Secure Pilots' Release

LD1010175395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1658 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 10 (INTERFAX) — Russia's Foreign Ministry will consider alternate means to secure the release of an IL-76 Russian commercial jet and its crew if negotiations continue to prove fruitless, a top ministry official told INTERFAX Tuesday.

The plane and crew of the Russian airline Aerostan have been held by the Afghan opposition movement Taleban for two months.

"If [negotiations] prove inadequate, then other ways will have to be considered," the ministry official said. However, he preferred not to answer when asked whether military action was implied.

He made it clear that another round of talks held on Monday in the Taleban-controlled Afghan city of Kandahar between Russian and Taleban representatives gave no hope for an early release of the Russian pilots, who have been held by the Afghan opposition for over two months.

"So far we have seen utter intransigence and a large degree of malevolence on the part of Taleban, and that shows that they are not prepared for purely humanitarian solutions," the source stressed.

When Islamic Conference and UN officials had met on October 9, they demanded freedom for two pilots whose health aroused fear. "But Taleban answered with refusal," the diplomat pointed out.

He reported that "one of the two pilots, whose condition aroused particular anxiety, has been discharged from hospital."

"Although conditions in local clinics leave much to be desired, doctors have helped the pilot, and his life is now out of danger," the source stressed.

He also reported that Taleban handed to the Russian side in Kandagar on Monday lists of about 6800 Afghan citizens, whose return is made by the opposition the major condition for the crew release.

According to the diplomat, Moscow expects to get these lists by Wednesday.

The source underlined the fact that "the protocol, which was drawn up during the lists transfer and signed by UN and Islamic Conference officials, refers to deported Afghans rather than to those listed as missing."

"Thus, Taleban drops its former claims," the diplomat said. Earlier, Taleban alleged that their compatriots had been moved into former USSR by force.

As the diplomat stressed, the Russian side will try to locate these persons by using all information at its disposal.

Daily Says Perry-Grachev Talks Clear Way for Summit

MM1010155995 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Oct 95 p 3

[Report by Vladimir Nadein: "Grachev and Perry Clear Way for Penultimate Meeting Between Yeltsin and Clinton"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Washington — This year's fourth meeting between the Russian and U.S. defense ministers took place in Geneva on the orders of the two presidents. Both Clinton and Yeltsin are very concerned at the state of bilateral relations. Of course, they cannot be described as poor. There is not the old enmity, but there is not the new friendship either. Relations are mediocre. And the most unpleasant thing is that both capitals simply cannot shake off the feeling that one day everything may suddenly become much worse because of some trifle.

Breaking the unpleasant trend by an entirely strong-willed step, Boris Yeltsin sent Bill Clinton several particularly cordial greetings messages. With a joy that some experts would deem excessive, the Russian congratulated his "friend Bill" on outstanding successes in both the Near East, where Russian cochairmanship is seen chiefly from the historical viewpoint, and Bosnia. Furthermore, Boris Yeltsin pretended he was in no way annoyed with the three Yugoslav presidents, who preferred the cozy Washington area to the cozy Moscow area as a venue for their talks.

Even the White House likes a kind word. William Perry, hot from chairing the annual meeting of NATO foreign [as published] ministers, was ordered to fly urgently to Geneva. There he was awaited by the benevolently disposed Pavel Grachev.

This time the ministers agreed on a great deal, but probably the most important thing was the clear idea of the partners' positions. The zones of agreement are clearly designated and the disagreements clearly visible after Sunday in Geneva.

The United States warmly welcomes participation by Russian troops in Bosnian peacekeeping. It is not a question of a symbolic contingent, of some auxiliary railroad or hospital and humanitarian role. The Western countries, which have just consulted at defense-minister level, are prepared to offer Russia something like Boris Yeltsin's old surprise offering to the local soviets: Take as much sovereignty as you can handle.

NATO is not restricting the Russians. Send as many troops for peacekeeping as you can maintain. The NATO ministers noted that "full Russian partnership in the Bosnian operation is vitally important to regional stability." In addition to the existing two battalions, President Yeltsin is offering a reinforced division for peacekeeping duties in Bosnia. This will bring the total number of Russian soldiers in Yugoslavia to 20,000. The United States will move exactly the same number of servicemen into Bosnia, provided, of course, the administration manages to win the tug-of-war with the Republican Congress. In all, the NATO countries are proposing to assign forces of 60,000 men for this operation.

That is about as far as the zone of agreement between the two ministers seems to go. The Americans are sternly insisting that NATO retain operational control. The Americans feel a strong aversion for the two-year "dual key" experiment whereby any action in Bosnia requires the "okay" of both UN representatives and NATO headquarters officers.

"I do not want to understate the spheres in which we were unable to reach agreement, where the main difficulty hinges on how operational control is to be implemented," William Perry said after the meeting. "This is also a question of political control. Our view assumes that political leadership of the operation should come from the North Atlantic alliance, and it is quite clear that the Russians disagree with this."

Emphasizing that Russia wants to see the international forces under a UN Security Council mandate, Pavel Grachev gave the following logical justification of this position: This will enable other countries that are not NATO members to detail troops for the noble purposes of peacekeeping. "We agreed that this must not be called a NATO operation," Pavel Grachev said. "But the name must reflect reality."

The Russian minister's position would have looked even more logical if he had been able to offer not only troops but the funds to maintain them. Here NATO holds all the trump cards. The UN treasury is empty, and this venerable organization is greeting its 50th anniversary on the verge of bankruptcy. Russia has no money.

At this point we should add: Luckily for NATO. Although the Cold War is long gone, Europeans fear the likelihood of a repetition of the former occupation zones. The Russian concept of democracy still does not match the Western concept. It may be better, but at any rate it is not the same. The West has different ideas about when to withdraw, how to withdraw, and what to take with you. Serious debates could have arisen in European parliaments if the heroes of the Chechen war had themselves decided how peace and tranquillity should best be brought to war-torn Bosnia.

However, this assumption is a long way from reality. The Americans will be prepared to make several further minor concessions to Moscow, but they will not countenance sharing influence with Russian generals. And this creates problems at the presidential level, in all probability. It is tempting for Boris Yeltsin to share the laurels of peace in Bosnia with the West. But poverty leaves him no choice. Because Russia's national interests are connected with its participation in the coming year's main international program — the Yugoslav settlement. Even if effective leadership remains with NATO.

The alternative is isolation in Europe, a missed opportunity to improve relations with the United States, and a slow drift away from the other CIS armies, which are showing increasing interest in the NATO "Partnership for Peace" program.

Pavel Grachev has helped his president to take the next step. After Geneva observers' attention has been riveted on the clear disagreements between the ministers. And the very important new agreements have been left in the shadows, so to speak.

First, a group of Russian generals is immediately going to Brussels. Officially in order to work on the problems of Bosnia. But that is not all. They will give specific expression to what Moscow calls the "special relationship with NATO." And despite everything Russians will fly to Fort Riley, Kansas, to take part in the first joint exercises.

And although Pavel Grachev again described as "unacceptable" the plans to enlarge NATO via the former Warsaw Pact members, in the spirit of the new conciliatory approach he added that this disagreement must not affect the mutual desire to seek closer military cooperation with the West.

The joint maneuvers in Kansas begin 23 October, the precise day that the next summit talks between B. Yeltsin and B. Clinton will be held in Hyde Park, New York. These will clearly be the penultimate talks. One more meeting in Moscow is likely in May of next year, then both presidents will have other things on their minds — elections!

Baturin: Balkans Threaten National Interests

LD1010141295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1312 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 10 (INTERFAX) — The Russian president's national security adviser Yuriy Baturin believes that developments in the Balkans threaten Russia's national interests.

"Russia has come too close to the limit after which it will even lose hope in maintaining its interests in the Balkans," Baturin told INTERFAX.

He spoke in favor of Russia's more active foreign policy in this region of Europe.

He believes that NATO's desire to expand its membership and sphere of influence is another manifestation of the external threat to Russia's national interests.

This, for example, also refers to the Balkan region, said Baturin.

At the same time, according to Baturin, in order to maintain equilibrium no return should be made to the relations of confrontation.

"Concrete work with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is our main task in this case. NATO is taking steps in this direction, Russia is not. This situation should be improved," said Baturin.

Moscow Wants Say in International Caspian Oil Deal

LD1010170395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1623 GMT 10 Oct 95

[By Arseny Mironov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 10 (ITAR-TASS) — Russia urges for a "northern," or Russia-traversing route of pumping Caspian oil to Europe, Russian Foreign Ministry senior spokesman Grigoriy Karasin told ITAR-TASS today.

The deal under which oil from Caspian offshore deposits is to be transported to Europe was signed in London by Azerbaijan and an international oil consortium.

The oil deal is of extreme importance for Russia, Karasin said.

"We still believe that the resources of the Caspian Sea belong to all Caspian (littoral) states, and their development should be carried out jointly on a long-term basis," he said.

He called the "northern" transportation route "most profitable," adding that this is not challenged by parties to the deal, but the issue involves interests of business circles and oil companies of other states, including multinationals.

The international oil consortium decided to use both Russia- and Georgia-proposed routes, which spells that crude oil from the Caspian deposits is to be transported via Russia.

Negotiations are in progress with Georgia on using a pipeline in its territory for moving petroleum products at a phase when the three Caspian deposits reach target outputs.

A high-placed official of the Russian oil company Transneft, an active negotiator of future transportation routes, told ITAR-TASS that delegations of Azerbaijan's State Oil Company and Azerbaijan's International Operational Company, which is the working body of the Western consortium, are to come to Moscow next week.

Russian and Azerbaijani delegations will draft a contract to renovate a Baku-Groznyy-Novorossiisk oil pipeline for pumping the oil.

The Transneft spokesman said Russia will be prepared to transport an annual 500,000 tonnes of the Caspian oil in the second half of 1996 and two times that amount two years later, building it to an annual five million tonnes by 2002.

The Russian Fuel and Energy Ministry declined to comment on the decision of the Western consortium to ITAR-TASS, saying that Russia had not been formally notified about it.

Komineft, Egypt Oil Ministry Reach Concession Deal

LD1010210695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1958 GMT 10 Oct 95

[By Georgiy Shelenkov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] CAIRO, October 10 (ITAR-TASS) — A concession deal was signed here today by the Russian oil company Komineft and the Egyptian Oil Ministry.

The contract leases to Komineft [Komi Oil concern] a 22,000 square kilometres area east of Cairo for 35 years, with a maximum of eight years granted for oil prospecting.

Komineft is to invest 3.5 million dollars within the first two years, with more funding of the prospecting project to be made thereafter in several disbursements.

Should oil be struck in this area, the Russian company will get 17.5 per cent of oil, on terms that the daily output is above 50,000 barrels.

Egyptian Oil Minister Hamdi al-Banbi, who is the signatory to the contract, stressed the good image and technical equipment of the Russian company. He voiced hope for success of the project.

The Russian signatory, Komineft's director-general Andrey Yakomov said the negotiations with the Egyptian side were not easy.

He said in an interview with ITAR-TASS that Komineft takes serious risks.

However, analysis holds out a promise that what oil the company extracts in the area will cover expenditure on the project and bring profit, Yakimov said.

Georgian Route May Not Deny Moscow Pipeline Control

MK1010141395 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 1

[Report by Rustam Narzikulov under the general heading: "International Consortium Opts for Transporting Oil Across Georgia and Across Russia. The Georgian Route Does Not Rule Out Russian Control Over Oil Transportation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The compromise reached by the international consortium can to some extent be interpreted as a Russian victory. The crux of the matter is that the United States could not push through a unilateral decision on transporting oil through Georgia alone, although U.S. companies in the consortium have slightly less than 44 percent against 10 percent for Russia's LUKoil.

The prospect is far from hopeless for Russia, even if one suggests that for well-known reasons pumping oil across Chechnya to Novorossiysk would scarcely be possible for God knows how many decades.

The reason is that the option calling for oil transportation across Georgia should not be characterized as exclusively "Turkish." Russia still has formidable geopolitical influence on the hotbeds of potential armed conflicts (Georgia versus Abkhazia, Azerbaijan versus Nagorno-Karabakh). Meanwhile, the "Turkish route" passes right across the territories of ethnic standoff.

The proof of Russia's considerable clout in the region are Georgian offers to the Russian Government to buy a 49-percent share in the "Turkish" oil pipeline. This percentage is extremely high, although certain sources assert that Russia demands 51 percent, that is, absolute commercial control over the oil pipeline.

Still, the consortium's current decisions are made rather for reconnaissance purposes and will not have a decisive impact on the development of Azerbaijani fields. For the time being it is a matter of not more than 2 million tonnes of so-called early oil that will be produced annually on the Chirag-1 platform. Azerbaijani oil production will not reach its peak for 10 years.

Barents Sea Council Elects 'Russia' as Chairman

LD1010195395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1832 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ROVANIEMI, October 10 (ITAR-TASS) — The third session of the Barents Sea Regional Council (BSRC) elected Russia its chairman.

The session was attended by foreign ministers of Russia, Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and by the European Union Commission's delegation.

Delegations from nine Western states were present as observers.

Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in his address to the plenary session said the council had emerged as a new reality, a new mode of economic cooperation and a factor in Europe's stability.

He said the economic line of the council's activities is of priority importance.

The BSRC's projects should focus on clean regional productions, radiation safety, and the fighting of crime, in particular drug trafficking, Kozyrev said.

He said a cooperation agreement signed earlier between Russia and the European Union, and the admission of Finland and Sweden to the EU would boost up economic developments in the region and incorporate it in European processes.

The session passed a resolution which outlines economic and environmental priorities, and problems of the region's native peoples.

The BSRC is to hold the next session in Moscow in 1996.

Shumeyko: 'No Reasons' for Haste in NATO Expansion

LD1010200595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1942 GMT 10 Oct 95

[By Lyudmila Yermakova and Gennadiy Temnenkov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BONN, October 10 (ITAR-TASS) — Russia and Germany have different attitude to NATO's eastward expansion. This has been confirmed again by a conversation on Tuesday between Speaker of the Russian Federation Council Vladimir Shumeyko and German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel.

"There are no reasons in the world at present that would warrant haste about NATO's expansion," Shumeyko told ITAR-TASS after the meeting. "We do not want the process of NATO's expansion beginning at all. Germany plays a huge role in this."

It is necessary to consider, without taking any steps, what happened after the disruption of the bi-polar system in the world and after the breakup of the USSR, he said. "Thank God, nobody threatens anyone now, and the question of security is not acute."

"NATO's expansion has been decided on," Kinkel believes. The point of the matter is who should be admitted into NATO and in what timeframe. A survey of prospects for NATO's expansion was submitted last week. "In that survey Russia, too, is shown how these processes may look," he said.

The West has been maintaining a dialogue with Russia after it signed the Partnership for Peace programme. This dialogue must lead to the establishment of special partnership with Russia, to its inclusion into the structure of European security. Germany also supports Russia's wish to enter the Council of Europe. "No new obstacles should be placed in this way," the minister said.

Shumeyko believes that there are military and economic rather than political differences in the debate on NATO's expansion. Russia which experiences economic difficulties at present and is short of cash for the investment into the military-to-civilian conversion is absolutely not interested in NATO's expansion and in the entry into it of former members of the East European bloc that used to be the main buyers of Russian military equipment and spares, Shumeyko said.

Russia needs the war industry now not as a means of arms manufacture in the struggle for the division of the world but as a base for preserving high technologies. This is important for the success of the economic reform whose objective is the raising of the living standards.

Shumeyko Describes 'Frank' Talks with Kohl

LD1010220695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2152 GMT 10 Oct 95

[By Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BONN, October 10 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian Federation Council Chairman Vladimir Shumeyko, on an official visit to Germany, described as "maximally frank" his Tuesday's talk with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

"I have told Helmut Kohl what I would not tell any other politician in the world," Shumeyko said.

He said Kohl is friendly towards Russia and has a very subtle understanding of its processes.

Shumeyko said he had passed to Kohl greetings from President Boris Yeltsin and would come home with a message of return greetings from Kohl.

However, Shumeyko declined to elaborate on details of his talks with Kohl, only saying that "the talk was about the situation in Russia and about how it could be influenced by the foreign policy, including that of Germany."

Summing up his meetings in Hamburg and Bonn, Shumeyko said "there are no serious controversies with the German side on the problems which were discussed."

He said Russian and Germany were on the common ground over some 70 per cent of issues.

As for Germany's possible aid to Russia, Shumeyko said Russia needs none.

"We need investment to maintain our reforms and a serious understanding of our problems," he said, adding that a strong Russia is in interests of Germany as much as Russia wants a strong Germany.

Relations With S. Korea To Have 'Stabilizing Impact'

LD1010152095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1458 GMT 10 Oct 95

[By Nikolay Geronin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SEOUL, October 10 (ITAR-TASS) — Further development of relations between Russia and South Korea will produce a stabilising impact on the situation in Northeast Asia, will contribute to the solution of many regional problems. This conclusion was drawn by the Russian and South Korean scientists and diplomats, who attended the two-day seminar on the political situation in Northeast Asia and on relations between the Republic of Korea and Russia, which ended here today. Its participants focused attention on problems linked with the policies of the Russian Federation, the United States, China, and Japan vis-a-vis the Korean peninsula. They also discussed problems linked with the relations between South Korea and the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

"The main conclusion, drawn by the participants of the seminar," ITAR-TASS was told by Vladlen Martynov, Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, is that cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea will meet the interests of peace and security in Southeast Asia and, especially, on the Korean peninsula. They stressed the need and importance of Russia's participation in the processes pertaining to the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, they acknowledged the correctness of Moscow's equally distanced policy in respect to Seoul and Pyongyang.

The Russo-South Korean scientific forum was timed for the fifth anniversary of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Seoul, which was marked on September 30. It was organised by the Institute of External Policy and National Security of the South Korean Foreign Ministry with the help of the Russian Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

Spokesman Karasin on Nigerian Transfer of Power

LD1010214095 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1526 GMT 10 Oct 95

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Vladimir Korochantsev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 10 Oct (ITAR-TASS) — Today in Moscow, an official spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry presented a view on the detailed plan for the transfer of power to the legally elected civilian government in Nigeria. The plan was set out in the program statement by General Sani Abacha, the head of the Nigerian military regime, in connection with the 35th anniversary of country's independence.

Grigoriy Karasin, the director of the information and press department of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry, said that the transitional program covers a three-year period. A new constitution will have to be approved, the presidential system will have to be changed, and a multiparty system will have to be introduced. By the end of this year, the ban on political activities will be lifted. It has also been announced that sentences imposed on the participants in the conspiracy against the military regime in March, including Olusegun Obasanjo, the former Nigerian president, will be alleviated. Recently world public opinion, including Russia, spoke out actively in the latter's defense.

When the plan for the democratization of Nigeria, which was made public, is analyzed, one can see on the whole its positive nature, the official spokesman of the Foreign Ministry stressed. Political goals which are vitally important for Nigeria have been set and specific decisions and dates for their implementation have been adopted.

G. Karasin said that, according to the international response already heard, the timescale appears too long. Incidentally, Moscow believes that the transition of such a gigantic country as Nigeria to democracy is a complex process. The fact that the military regime has publicly undertaken to bring this process to a successful conclusion is a really important fact.

Political Issues

Yeltsin, Aides Discuss Foreign Ministry Activity

LD1010170595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1630 GMT 10 Oct 95

[By Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 10 (ITAR-TASS) — The exchange of opinions on the activity of the Russian Foreign Ministry at a meeting of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his aides on Tuesday was marked by "much concern," Viktor Ilyushin, first aide of the Russian President, told ITAR-TASS.

Asked if this discussion will be followed by prompt reshuffle of chiefs of the foreign policy agency, Ilyushin said that "The President never makes any rash decisions regarding personnel."

Commenting on the conference in the Kremlin on Tuesday in which all aides of the Russian president participated, Ilyushin said that attention had been concentrated on the preparation for the President's forthcoming visits to France and to New York, for the celebration of the United Nations 50th anniversary.

Yeltsin 'Concerned' Over Government Situation

LD1010173295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1703 GMT 10 Oct 95

[By Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 10 (ITAR-TASS) — "A broad range of domestic and foreign issues of the Russian policy was discussed in an open atmosphere at a meeting of the Russian president with his aides in the Kremlin of Tuesday," Viktor Ilyushin, Boris Yeltsin's first aide, told ITAR-TASS.

"The dynamics of the socio-political process in Russia makes us compare our attitude to the president's. We should know the views of the head of state and refine our assessments," Ilyushin said.

He said the president heard opinions of his aides and "stated his opinions on the economic situation, the foreign policy activity, the situation on Chechnya in light of the latest aggravation, the course of the election campaign, prospects for advance on forming the Federation Council."

Yeltsin closely follows the activity in the State Duma aimed at starting the procedure of impeaching the president and passing a no-confidence vote for the government. "The president objects to any attempts to destabilise the situation. It is necessary to work instead," Ilyushin said.

"The president is concerned over the situation regarding the government, and aides spoke very critically of the activity of a number of ministries and agencies, of serious drawbacks in executive discipline in some structures of the government," Ilyushin said. He said virtually all aides had the opportunity to speak at the meeting. The president faced them with the main short-term tasks. Ilyushin said that "the aides and the President were satisfied with the talk they had."

Yeltsin Signs Law on Referendums

LD1010152295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1402 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 10 (ITAR-TASS) — President Yeltsin signed today the federal constitutional law "On a referendum in the Russian Federation," adopted by the State Duma on July 7, 1995, and approved by the Federation Council on October 3, 1995, a spokesman for the press service of the president told Tass.

The law says that a referendum, together with free elections, is the supreme and direct manifestation of people's power and is held on the basis of universal, equal and direct expression of their will by secret ballot. All Russian citizens above 18 years of age, with the exception of those who were recognized as incapable by a court ruling or are kept in prison, have the right to take part in a referendum.

Under the law, problems dealing with the changing of the status of subjects of the Russian Federation, the termination or prolongation of the term of office of the president, the Federation Council or the State Duma, the introduction and lifting of federal taxes and dues, as well as some other problems, may be put up for a referendum. Referendums cannot be held in conditions of martial law or a state of emergency.

Referendums can be initiated by Russian citizens of the Constitutional Assembly.

The federal constitutional law becomes effective from the day of its promulgation, says a report of the president's press service. After the adoption of the constitutional law, a number of legal adts adopted before, specifically the law "On a referendum in RSFSR" dated October 16, 1990, and the resolution of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet "On the procedure for putting into effect the RSFSR Law 'On a referendum in RSFSR'", dated October 16, 1990, become invalid.

Yeltsin Aide Interviewed on Legal Reform Needs

MM0610120395 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 6 Oct 95 p 1

[Interview with Russian presidential aide Mikhail Krasnov by Dmitriy Orlov; place and date not given: "The Legislators Are Trying To Harness a Young Horse to an Old Wagon, Creating New Laws Without Changing the Legal System at the Same Time. Russian Federation Presidential Aide Mikhail Krasnov Claims in an Exclusive ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI Interview That the Solution of This Acute Problem Is Possible Only by Means of Legal Reform" — first paragraph is ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] A three-day scientific and practical conference devoted to drawing up a blueprint for legal reform in Russia, with the participation of representatives of the Russian Federation Presidential Staff, the Federal Assembly, the Government of Russia, the legal system, and leading scientific institutions, has been held outside Moscow.

[Orlov] Mikhail Aleksandrovich, which structures will bear the heaviest burden in the implementation of legal reform?

[Krasnov] All state institutions which come in contact with the law must implement legal reform. Namely, the Presidential Staff's State Law Administration, the Ministry of Justice, and the federal parliament. And, of course, the reform must be implemented under the auspices of the president.

Many people have misunderstood the thrust of legal reform. The point is not so much to come up with a host of new laws as to replace one legal system with another. The system which should prevail is a system based on political and economic freedom.

As far as the methods of implementing the transformations are concerned, it is primarily a matter of clearing up and systematizing legislation. The piles of departmental acts which are at odds with the Constitution and the laws generate problems in the practical application of the law. The link between the laws and the provision made for them in terms of finance and resources is weak. The constitutional provision which states that there must be a government ruling [zaklyucheniye] on budget-related draft laws is not being implemented in full: Deputies treat it in a purely perfunctory way, merely taking account of negative government rulings.

Moreover, there is no system of accountability for specific individuals for failure to execute a particular normative act, nor any system of monitoring institutions, and there is a lack of legislative guarantees for the activity of professional experts. In short, there is no system, whereas I see our salvation as lying precisely in having a system.

[Orlov] The notion that Russian legislation is incomplete is a familiar one. What, in your view, are the most substantial gaps in our laws?

[Krasnov] I have already mentioned the absence of a system of accountability. Moreover, there is no normative basis for monitoring the activity of the Federation components. In general, in the defense of the public interest (as distinct from the defense of private interest) there is an enormous gap. For example, the law on the general principles governing the organization of power in the Federation components has still not been adopted, and this poses a substantial threat to the functioning of its institutions. In France, for example, observance of legality in the departements is ensured by prefects; we have no such institution.

[Orlov] What, from the legal standpoint, could stymie the State Duma elections?

[Krasnov] Back in the spring I said that the president did not intend to oppose the elections to the lower chamber of parliament. No matter how bad the election law may be, elections are the only real lever of control over power. Abandoning them would be tantamount to plunging headlong back into Soviet power, in the worst sense of that term. Thus virtually nothing, from the legal standpoint, can block the holding of elections.

The fact that you could get a situation as a result of the failings of the law whereby a faction which wins 20 to 30 percent of the votes will obtain two-thirds of the seats in parliament is another matter. A deposit to be paid for participants in the election would therefore be a more acceptable option. But, I repeat, the election legislation has already been adopted.

As far as the possible criminalization of deputies is concerned, here something must be done with regard to the rules governing deputies' immunity. A whole system of measures is required, in particular more careful vetting of prospective deputies by the law enforcement agencies. And this is no return to totalitarianism: Because the danger of the criminalization of power is very great today, the fight against this tendency has to become a priority. I fervently support Sergey Shakhray's initiative on the mandatory declaration of prospective deputies' incomes.

[Orlov] Recently many people have been saying that the possible confederal union of the Russian Federation and Belarus will lead to the abrogation or postponement of the presidential election. How do you regard such views?

[Krasnov] A confederal system does not abrogate the existence of the organs of power of the constituent parts of the confederation. The process of creating a confederal union is not a process which can be achieved overnight. Nor can a referendum on union be held right away, even leaving aside the fact that it will be very difficult to carry out changes to the fundamental laws of the states in question even if a referendum produces a pro-union result.

[Orlov] The Federation components have differing views on the head of state's edict advising the rescheduling of the elections to organs of state power and local self-government. What can you say on this score?

[Krasnov] Refraining from long commentary here, I would simply say that I am not enraptured with this proposal which has been put to the president.

Chernomyrdin: Gas, Electric Charges Not To Rise Before Jan

LD1110075695 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0700 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received a report from Ufa:

Charges for gas, electricity and transport services will not go up before the beginning of 1996. This has been stated by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. He was speaking in Ufa at a meeting attended by heads of administration of Districts and towns in Bashkiria.

The prime minister stressed that this position of the government had been cleared with Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

Chernomyrdin sees it as one of the most important tasks of the cabinet in the short term to raise the standards of manufacturing technology in Russia. The country cannot live without this, the premier observed. He is convinced that enhancing the standard of output, which ought to meet the demands of the domestic consumer, is a vitally important task.

Author Urges Patriotism To Unite Russia Against West

MM1110092595 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Oct 95 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Bolshakov: "Before the 'Dash to the East.' View from Paris"]

[FBIS Translated Text] People in our country know what "Drang nach Osten" means without it having to be translated from the German. Hitler's "drive to the east" devastated half of Russia and rendered it lifeless. Every family lost someone close in that terrible war.

Therefore, no matter how much NATO Secretary General Claes assured the Russians at this bloc's recent forum in Brussels that a "Drang nach Osten" from Europe no longer threatens us, we know from our historical experience that the West has always feared a strong Russia, but waged war on it as soon as it became weak and represented easy prey.

The present situation is at first sight completely different. Russia is weak, but the West is cooperating with it with all its might, even when Russia does not want to cooperate. But the question is, why has it been deemed necessary to surround Russia again, and draw former USSR republics and East and Central European countries into the military bloc originally created to prepare for war against the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries? Historical parallels suggest themselves here of their own accord. Remember how consistently — by their being conquered by the "Third Reich" — the countries of West and East Europe joined Hitler's "axis." In the Soviet years we did not recall this often, but it is after all a fact that it was not just volunteer formations from France, Belgium, Italy, Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Slovakia, and many other countries, but also national-fascists from the former USSR countries that frequently fought within the SS troops on the Eastern front, and indeed under the banners which have now become their state banners. Do we have the right in this case to act on the basis of the principle "it's best to bury the past"!? After all we might be buried ourselves.

The West is bearing in mind of course that despite their present cowed situation, the Russians, who are paying with their own dignity and purse for the "democratic" experiments of the nouveaux riches from the former and present nomenklaturas, have nevertheless not lost their historical memory and will not give their motherland away for bribes and handouts. Furthermore, they could forget their differences and unite in the name of saving Russia not on an ideological basis but on a purely patriotic basis. Then the overt and covert quislings of the West in Russia could lose the levers of power. That is if, of course, Russia is given the possibility of voting in a truly democratic manner and the results of the people's will are not dishonestly rearranged. It is well known how attentively the West is tracking the preparations for the imminent elections in the Russian Federation and how many professional advisers and election campaign specialists it has already sent there. Clearly they are not serving the left-wing forces or the patriotic forces. Obviously NATO strategists on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean will not be sparing in their expenditure on maintaining the "democratic" status quo in Russia.

The mass indoctrination of public opinion in the Russian Federation is going on at the moment. "How can the Russians be persuaded that the West does not intend to drive Russia into a 'den'"? Irina de Tchikoff, the French LE FIGARO's Moscow correspondent, who, incidentally, is of Russian origin, asks this by no means rhetorical question.

The objective rise in anti-Western moods in Russia, which numerous visitors to Moscow, from the U.S. secretary of state to professional propagandists, are trying to shatter, is by no mean generated by the fact that "the West is not compensating Russia for its efforts in democratization sufficiently," as one pro-Western Russian of Georgian origin expressed it. It is generated by the fact that the West, on the pretext of "democratization," has devastated and humiliated Russia with the help of the shady businessmen whose slogan is "We will Sell the Motherland! At a Cheap Price!" And they really will sell at a cheap price everything that is sacred and priceless to us!

Only true Russian patriots can stop this sell-off. If they unite and save Russia from NATO proteges, then it will not be NATO that will be dictating its conditions on us, but we will be dictating our conditions on NATO, and not from a position of weakness, but from a position of strength. This, incidentally, is an American principle, which has long been worth learning in the name of Russian national interests.

It is the natural state of mind for a Russian to be a patriot. This is the most powerful weapon of the Russian nation, and the West, armed to the teeth, is powerless before it.

Duma Member Claims Government Falsified Crop Figures

LD0610133995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1153 GMT 6 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 6 (INTERFAX) — Communist member of the State Duma and the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences Viktor Shevelukha suggests that the federal government explain why it falsified grain production reports and torpedoed this year's plans for grain production.

In a memo distributed among Duma members Friday, Shevelukha accused the Deputy Prime-Minister in charge of the agricultural complex Aleksandr Zaveryukha of "repeatedly telling citizens that at least 78 million tonnes of grain would be harvested this year" while experts assessed the condition of the sown areas only to decide that Russia would harvest no more than 65 to 67 million tonnes of grain. Three times running Shevelukha briefed the government on the experts' forecasts for 1995, the memo said. (Russia produced 81.3 million tonnes of grain in 1994 and 116.7 million tonnes in 1990.)

Shevelukha shared his view of the situation with Prime-Minister Chernomyrdin, Deputy Prime-Minister Zaveryukha, Food and Farming Minister Nazarchuk and the Duma. The realization of suggestions voiced by farming experts would have enabled Russia to harvest up to 85 million tonnes of grain but "the government refused to heed and meet those suggestions," Shevelukha said.

At present, Food and Farming Minister Aleksandr Nazarchuk admits that 65 to 67 million tonnes of grain were to be harvested this year. He explains the poor crops by a drought.

Shevelukha blames the poor crops on "something that has been forcibly imposed on the agricultural complex under the name of a reform." The so-called reform brought the Russian agricultural complex to ruin, he said.

White Paper on Russian Secret Services Published in Moscow

LD1110084295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0824 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By Olga Semenova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW October 11 (ITAR-TASS) — A book containing information about problems and accomplishments of the Russian secret services and about their role in modern society and in ensuring the country's security has been published in this country for the first time. The book, entitled "White Paper on Russian Secret Services," was presented to journalists and the public today by the all-Russian public and political movement Cultural Heritage, the international non-governmental research and educational organisation RAU-Corporation and the information and publishing agency Obozrevatel (observer).

The 270-page book contains comprehensive information about the secret services and various aspects of their work, including in the law-making and legal spheres. The preface to the book is a short review of the history of secret services in Russia, beginning with the reign of Peter the Great.

"White Paper on Russian Secret Services," written by joint efforts of many scientists and workers in the field from the Federal Security Service, the Interior Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Tax Police Department and specialised research institutions, is the first attempt to give an impartial analysis and generalisation of various documents and scientific papers without trying to give some ideological colouring to them.

Media Issues

Daily Outlines Provisions of Yeltsin Broadcasting Edict

MM1110102795 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 2

[Article by Nikita Dubnov: "Our Comments on Presidential Edict. Sword of Damocles No Longer Hanging Over Television"]

[FBIS Translated Text] What constituted the sword of Damocles were financial difficulties and the television companies' constant nonpayment of bills to the communications industry, which in turn threatened a broadcasting blackout and in places carried out its threats. The situation became intolerable, especially on the eve of the elections. Quite a few other problems connected with broadcasting also built up. Then Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin signed an Edict "On the Improvement of Television and Radio Broadcasting in the Russian Federation" 6 October. As it says, its aim is to make state support for the electronic mass media more effective. Three radio [as published] broadcasting companies — Russian Public Television, the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company ("Ostankino"), and "Peterburg-5 Channel" and three radio stations — "Radio-1," "Mayak," and "Yunost-Youth Channel" are receiving all-Russia status. This concept is being introduced for the first time and means that these broadcasting organizations, whose signals reach more than half of the Russian Federation's components, receive a series of benefits. In particular, they are exempted from the obligatory payment of part of their foreign currency earnings on the condition that this capital is channeled into the development of their materials and technical base. All state television and radio broadcasting organizations — both all-Russia and regional ones — will pay for the services of the communications industry according to tariffs stipulated for budget-funded organizations. Regional state television and radio companies are moreover being given a status equal to that of cultural institutions, which also gives them considerable benefits, including tax concessions.

The government is being given the task of completing work on the draft federal program for the development of television and radio broadcasting in the Russian Federation. The program's main areas should be the establishment of regional networks for the broadcasting of programs using federal and local budget money, the attraction of foreign investment to bring on stream the new Program Production Center at Shabolovka which is as yet unfinished, construct a station in Klin for the reception and broadcasting of programs, and to reconstruct the Space Communications Center in Petushki. The government should also ensure that treaties are concluded as quickly as possible with CIS countries and Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia on the procedure and conditions for broadcasting all-Russia television and radio broadcasting organizations' programs on their territories.

Listeners to "Orfeya" need no longer worry about their favorite radio station: It and a number of broadcasting organizations are receiving the status of state institutions. But with regard to "Mayak," "Yunost," and the "Peterburg-5 Channel" company, the Edict orders examination of the possibility of their being transformed into joint-stock companies with 51 percent of their shares in federal ownership.

The Edict approved the Russian Federation Government's proposal to abolish the Russian State Television and Radio Company ("Ostankino"). This will permit the protracted structural changes on the first channel to be completed.

Military & Nuclear Issues

Yeltsin Seen Taking Direct Control of Arms Trade

MK1010145095 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Yeltsin Changes the Procedure for Selling Arms"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Boris Yeltsin appears to have gotten down to the arms trade in earnest. The other day he signed the edict "On Military-Technological Cooperation of the Russian Federation With Foreign Countries" and a corresponding statute. In fact, the president effectively moved to take control over any decisionmaking regarding the export and import of weapons, military hardware, and military-related works and services.

From now on, cooperation with any countries will be "established, suspended, stopped, or resumed" only on the basis of Boris Yeltsin's edicts. The president's main arms trade adviser will be the Russian Federation State Committee on Military-Technological Policy. It is this agency that will submit to the president proposals on military cooperation matters and will also draw up draft laws on all problems relating to the arms trade.

In addition, the State Military-Technological Policy Committee will devise together with the Foreign Ministry proposals on compiling lists of countries cooperation with which should be banned or drastically restricted.

This agency was also given other exclusive rights. For instance, the export of spare parts and components for military products will be licensed by the State Military-Technological Policy Committee and will not need any extra government authorization. The committee will also deal with requests by the governments of foreign states regarding arms deliveries.

At the same time the president tasked Russian special services with ensuring security within their jurisdiction. The most interesting mission was entrusted to the Foreign Intelligence Service [SVR]: From now on it will check the creditworthiness of those who buy our weapons.

As a matter of fact, the Defense Ministry was given the right to carry out exercises and test-firing involving subunits of foreign armies on its test ranges.

Border Service Director Nikolayev Interviewed

MM1110092995 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 5

[Interview with General A. Nikolayev, director of the Russian Federal Border Service, by Valeriy Yakov in the general's aircraft while flying abroad and in general's office in the Lubyanka; date not given: "General Nikolayev's Bailiwick" — first two paragraphs are IZVESTIYA introduction]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] For almost two years now, almost from the moment that A. Nikolayev, deputy chief of the General Staff, a man then not well known to the wider public, was appointed deputy minister of security and commander of the Russian Federation Border Troops, there has been no let-up in press interest in this figure. In numerous forecasts he is destined now for the post of defense minister, now for chief of a reformed General Staff, then again, in the long term, for the vice presidency...

Nikolayev has periodically denied these predictions and occupied himself with setting up Russia's new border service. Where he has succeeded, and where has he not, whether he intends to make a career in politics — about this and much else I spoke to him on board plane during one of his routine visits abroad; we also spoke for more than two hours in the autumnal evening in his official office in the Lubyanka...

[Yakov] Andrey Ivanovich, during your visits to "hot spots," you are invariably accompanied by a bodyguard. You have strong young men at your side in Moscow as well. Please tell me who they are — officials of the Main Security Directorate or the president's Security Service?

[Nikolayev] We have our own security service which safeguards our security during the leaders' business trips, especially on visits to the Tajik-Afghan border, the Caucasus.... These are specially trained border guards officers. We have never been guarded by Main Security Directorate staffers.

[Yakov] That is to say, the fears characteristic of Kremlin functionaries — that Korzhakov's or Barsukov's people could be listening in to their conversations — are unreal for you?

[Nikolayev] I have never spoken with my colleagues in this office about anything that should be hidden from the services you mention, still less from the president. Our position is well known — we are servants of the state, and we do not propagate two opinions, one for internal use and one for official consumption. And we see the supervision which the Federal Security Service [FSB] exercises over the border troops along with its counterintelligence functions as perfectly normal. It is essential. Just as collaboration with the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the foreign intelligence service is essential.. Everything intersects at the border — politics, economics, and security questions.

[Yakov] So the rumors that the new chief of the FSB is beginning to make attempts to take back the border troops under the wing of his own department have no truth in them?

[Nikolayev] I have known Mikhail Ivanovich Barsukov since I was appointed commander in chief of the border troops. And not once has there been an occasion where disagreements have arisen between us. I think that all this talk is no more than rumors deliberately initiated by those who would like to create some kind of tension in our relations.

[Yakov] Right now, in the run-up to the elections, when the most unexpected teams are beginning to be formed and many people have to choose to whom to give their preference, what choice are you making?

[Nikolayev] Let me say frankly — I do not have to choose. I do my job, and for me, as a military man, there are the Constitution and the duties of a serviceman, defined by the law, which clearly prescribes our tasks and treats the role of the supreme commander in chief. If a serviceman wants to run for parliament, he may — let him suspend his service and exercise his civil rights. If he wants to get involved in politics or participate in the activity of some bloc, there is nothing wrong in this, only he must leave the service. I apply all this to myself in full measure. Therefore, I can state absolutely definitely — I will remain director of the Federal Border Service.

[Yakov] At a certain Security Council Session, when the question of dismissing the power ministers was discussed, you voted for Grachev's' dismissal. Information from these sessions does not usually filter through, and only the official version is circulated. Do you not think that on this occasion a deliberate leak was allowed?

[Nikolayev] The results of the ballot became known from those who failed to fulfill the Security Council's decision, according to which everything that takes place in the council should remain privy to the session's participants. We know who spilled the beans on this occasion.

As for the ballot, it is necessary to take account of a certain subtlety in the Security Council's standing orders. Decisions are adopted by permanent members of the Security Council; the rest have the right to participate in the discussion, to express their opinion, and defend it. But it is the president, the premier, the secretary of the Security Council, and the chairmen of the upper and lower houses of parliament who vote on the final decision. However, in this case the president put the question to the vote of all participants in the Security Council in order to ascertain the general opinion. And I voted, knowing full well that my vote would decide nothing, but at the same time not wanting to be hypocritical toward Pavel Sergeyevich [Grachev], or hide my opinion from him. In my view, this is an honest stance.

[Yakov] In numerous forecasts you are destined for certain new posts. Six months ago I myself wrote that you were the most serious contender for the post of defense minister. Now that the reorganization of the General Staff into a single coordinating organ for all military-related departments, including the Ministry of Defense, is an entirely real prospect, you are being spoken of as a possible leader of this organ. What do you yourself think about such an appointment?

[Nikolayev] All good military men have a fine rule — do not fish for a job, but do not run away from it either. That is to say, if you have been entrusted with a share in a task — do it. And do not seek a more comfortable position. Everything will come in its own good time if you work properly.

[Yakov] But there is a certain vulnerability in this attitude. It is as if you opt for a wait-and-see tactic from the very start.

[Nikolayev] I consider it improper to propose myself for any leading role. But why do you think that I do not have specific suggestions, or that I do not voice them? As the leader of one of the military departments and a member of the Security Council, I have expounded my opinion, including in written form, on military reform not simply of the Army — that is, only an individual institution — but of the state [ya svoye mneniye po povodu voyennoy reformy ne prosto armii — eto lish otdelnnyy institut, — a gosudarstva izlozhil, v tom chisle i pismenno.]. So that the country's leadership knows about it.

[Yakov] Two years ago, in your first interview with IZVESTIYA, immediately after your appointment to the post of commander in chief of the Border Troops, you said that you would have to not simply reorganize the Border Troops, but create a new Russian Border Troops Service. Have you succeeded?

[Nikolayev] If I were to answer affirmatively, that would be incorrect.

Next year, 1996, should be the last year of the "transitional" period and the first year of the implementation of the federal border program, which we elaborated and presented to the country's leadership 1 September and which was approved the president. Moreover, I would like to stress that this is not a departmental document, but a program coordinating the efforts of all structures working on the border — the customs, the MVD, the FMS [Federal Migration Service], and the FSB.

We face the task of creating or restoring the system for safeguarding the border and returning, figuratively speaking, to the old borders, but this time in the framework of interstate agreements with the CIS countries. Such agreements on joint border security exist with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Armenia, Georgia, and Belarus. We have coordination structures with Uzbekistan for the organization of border security on the Amu-Darya river and have signed an agreement on cooperation with Ukraine.

[Yakov] Those who follow the situation in the Federal Border Service can see with the naked eye the dynamic transformations, and it is perfectly clear that reform is in full swing in your department. But how then are we to understand, on the one hand, the successful reform, and on the other — such tragic events as the shooting on the island of Popova and the similar tragedy which preceded it?

[Nikolayev] The Russian Federation president made a decision to staff the Border Troops with the best cadres as a matter of priority. But we are not receiving draftees of this caliber. Year by year the number of mentally disturbed people and people who are underweight by up to 30-40 kg is growing in our country. The standard of education of draftees has dropped dramatically. That is not to mention the people with convictions or with police records who have appeared in the troops. And after all, a border troops detachment is not simply a workplace; it means living together and keeping house together... In short, it is a typical joint household, where everyone knows everything about everyone.

[Yakov] And have you considered the fact that you have not been allotted all that much time. After the election of the new State Duma there will be a change of government. It is possible that Yeltsin's presidency will end in 1996... This will probably affect your future also...

[Nikolayev] My task, irrespective of the political situation, is to see that the transformations carried out in our service become irreversible. Even at home I often say: Live every day as though it were your last. You must get everything done in good time, and this is the only option. After all, as a rule, in the majority of cases, it is not given to us to see the final result of our labor, therefore it is so important to choose the correct path.

[Yakov] Every day you work late, you spend Saturday at work, and sometimes you encroach on Sunday as well, thus forcing your entourage to adopt the same routine also. What is this — elements of disorganization, or a lack of trust in the apparatus, in your subordinates?

[Nikolayev] Every day approximately 500-600 documents pass through my hands — that is about 2,000 pages. See this callus I have on my finger — that is from the sheer number of resolutions and from what I have to write myself. And after all, it impossible just to sign mechanically, you have to delve into every document. In addition, the situation is a simpleton, you yourself can understand that, and there is no time for days off. And people understand, I think, that they are exerting themselves not for Nikolayev, but for the sake of the state.

[Yakov] For all the obvious changes that you have managed to bring about, you have never been rewarded or promoted, like some of your colleagues in the Security Council. How do you explain this to yourself?

[Nikolayev] I don't. For me it is more important that this year alone more than 3,000 of my subordinates have been rewarded. After all, this means that I am working with people of merit — you do not need much intelligence to lead fools. To manage people who could be your potential rivals is extremely difficult, but at the same time, rewarding. As for titles, I prefer not to discuss this topic because general's stars are the president's prerogative.

[Yakov] Your father also served up to the rank of colonel general and became one of the leader of the General Staff. Tell me, how many times did he help you to move up the ranks?

[Nikolayev] All the time. He has never exerted influence, and you had to know my father to understand this. But his example was a real boon and support to me in life. I always compared myself with him. He was very chary of praise, and for me his high opinion meant very much.

[Yakov] Did he dream of your reaching the rank of general?

[Nikolayev] Never. He wanted me to develop as a full human being. And mom wrote in a poem in 1949: "Whoever you become, may your intentions and your deeds be pure. May the heart which I gave you be honest and unselfish."

[Yakov] You have already had to deny rumors that your family lived on the same landing as Yeltsin in the Urals, and that you called him "Uncle Borey" [affectionate diminutive of Boris]... Nevertheless, what lies behind these rumors?

[Nikolayev] A pure fabrication. Boris Nikolayevich was a member of the Ural Military District Council and, as a division commander I knew him in that capacity. But no more than that. He lived in Sverdlovsk, while we lived in Chelyabinsk Oblast. He never knew me on a personal level. Before that, my father did not serve in the Ural Oblast at all. So this talk is utter rubbish.

[Yakov] You recently moved house from Rublevka to Smolenka. Why was that?

[Nikolayev] Because the former home lacked special communications facilities. They are available here, at the place I have moved to. But the apartment on Rublevka was in no way inferior to the present one.

[Yakov] You had the opportunity to move to the president's building in the Krylatskiye Hills district, where Barsukov, Filatov, Gaydar and others moved?....

[Nikolayev] There was never any talk of this. And I would not have taken that sort of initiative; I think that by now you will have been able to realize that. The block that I am living in suits me perfectly.

[Yakov] What is your dacha like?

[Nikolayev] It's an ordinary panel house built in 1954. There is nothing special in it and I go their quite rarely because I finish work late and start early. It is more convenient to travel from my apartment.

[Yakov] Do you consult with your wife on any official issues?

[Nikolayev] Never. From the outset we have had this understanding that my work does not come within her field of competence. And she does not interfere in my affairs.

[Yakov] Has she ever been, even just once, in this office?

[Nikolayev] Yes, just the once. I showed her were I work. I have always done that when I move to a new place of work, so that she can visualize under what kind of conditions I work. [passage omitted]

[Yakov] I have had occasion to hear that you are a rancorous man and never forgive an insult?

[Nikoalyev] I am not rancorous, but have a retentive memory [his answer puns on zlopamyatnyy — rancorous — and pamyatlivyy — having a retentive memory], and I never show forgiveness if I have been betrayed, deceived, or let down. Any base behavior has to be punished, but if my service or the cause requires that I have to associate with such a person, then I do so. To the degree necessary. [passage omitted]

Zherebtsov Comments on Army Manning Levels, Fall Draft

MM1110090595 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 3

[Report by Oleg Falichev: "Draft-95: Who Will Serve and for How Long?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As is already known, the Russian Federation president's Edict No. 971 of 27 September this year announced the next draft of citizens for military service. It will take place from October through December. Over 200,000 new recruits will come into the troops and fleets. According to estimates by specialists of the General Staff Organization and Mobilization Main Directorate, this will make it possible to significantly improve the situation with regard to the Armed Forces' strength level. For the shortfall today stands at over 300,000 (!) men.

But something else is more important. It is the change in the very ideology of the draft — which we have arrived at after several years of democratic euphoria. What do I have in mind?

The point is that this fall the switch to two-year draft service has been made, and a number of unsubstantiated deferments, more than 20 of which had accumulated — something that exists in no other country — have been abolished.

"As a result, we used to succeed in drafting just 20-22 percent of those on the books," Colonel General Vyacheslav Zherebtsov, chief of the General Staff Organization and Mobilization Main Directorate, said, "whereas in the FRG this figure stands at 50 percent, and in Italy up to 80 percent. This figure is even higher in other countries, where the only people not drafted are those who are unable for health reasons to fulfill the responsibilities of service."

To what did this lead? Figuratively speaking, to the gradual weakening of the Armed Forces. Many units had sufficient forces only to guard themselves. Officer guard details even appeared. There was a sharp drop in combat readiness.... Today it seems that awareness of the entire catastrophic nature of the situation has gradually started to get through to politicians and deputies. Many of them are starting to realize that the Army just must not continue to be treated in this way.

There has also been a sobering up with regard to contract service. The slogan "Onward to a professional army!" did not, alas, reflect quite accurately the potential of our society and economy. This task could not be resolved hurriedly. As is known, the times of bare slogans have now vanished into the past. The true military professional today wants a worthy assessment to be made of his difficult and sometimes deadly dangerous work. For the time being our state is patching the holes in the budget with difficulty and is crudely violating laws which it drew up itself. As a result, last year 15,000 contract servicemen left the Armed Forces last year alone because of low pay. Therefore in the immediate future we will be left with the mixed principle for manning the Army and Navy.

All the aforesaid was the reason why the new law "On Making Changes and Additions to the Russian Federation Law 'On Military Service Obligation and Military Service'" was drawn up. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already written about the changes in the terms of service resulting from it. But since the editorial office is continuing to receive questions in this connection, let us repeat the main points. So, who retains the right to a deferment, and who will serve and for how long?

No students are drafted into the Army. Those who study at a higher educational institution [VUZ], a secondary educational institution, or a vocational and technical school are not drafted until they have completed their studies and received their diploma. Nor are persons who continue their post-VUZ education, for example as a postgraduate.

Pedagogues and physicians working in a rural locality are not drafted. Nor are citizens who have two children or one child under the age of three years, as well as a child without a mother. Nor those who care for a family member who is in need of outside assistance and who is fully provided for by the state. There are a number of other deferments too. For example, a youth whose brother was killed or died while serving may not be drafted.

The principle of drafting VUZ graduates has been altered somewhat. They serve, as a rule, for one year as privates or sergeants. But after the military department they can also serve for two years, albeit as officers. It is up to the VUZ graduate himself to decide which option to prefer. He has to report his choice to the drafting commission.

The law sets the term of service for all others at 24 months. This also applies to those who were drafted previously for 18 months and who were to have been discharged this fall. Demobilization is being deferred for them. Only those who were drafted in the fall of 1993 will be discharged in the fall of 1995. And, of course, citizens with higher education drafted in the fall of 1994.

A special approach is taken to participants in the combat operations in Chechnya. Col. Gen. Vyacheslav Zherebtsov said that the minister of defense has signed two directives in this connection in October. Their essence is that servicemen must serve no more than six months in areas of armed conflicts. They will finish serving the two-year term established by law in other places. The personnel serving in the Chechen Republic will be replaced literally during November-December. Taking the prescribed leave into account, the servicemen who are in Chechnya will still be discharged earlier than all the rest by decision of the minister of defense.

Missile Forces Fire Inter-Continental Ballistic Rocket

LD1010183895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1801 GMT 10 Oct 95

[By Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 10 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian missile forces fired an inter-continental ballistic rocket today in progress of their command and staff exercises.

The exercises, which were conducted between October 4 and 10, drilled control of Russian strategic nuclear forces.

ITAR-TASS was told in the press centre of missile forces that the RS-12M Topol rocket blasted off from the testing ground of the Plesetsk space port.

Missile force commander Colonel-General Igor Sergeyev told ITAR-TASS that the rocket hit the target with exquisite precision.

Sergeyev said the exercises were to check the level of combat readiness of duty personnel and missiles of the strategic nuclear forces, and technical reliability of the Topol booster carrying the RS-12M rocket.

All tasks of the exercises have been successfully fulfilled, Sergeyev said.

MVD General Reports No Theft of Nuclear Weapons Materials

LD1010140795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1312 GMT 10 Oct 95

["No Military Nuclear Materials Stolen in Russia" — INTERFAX headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 10 (INTERFAX) — General Andrey Terekhov of the Russian Interior Ministry [MVD] on Tuesday told a news conference at the Interior Ministry that no cases of theft of radioactive materials for making nuclear weapons have been registered in Russia.

According to him, there are no organized mafia structures in Russia which specialize in stealing radioactive materials. The general said that the investigation of criminal cases shows that sources of ionizing radiation which are used in insignificant quantities in different technical devices, in anti-fire transducers, in other equipment and installations are the main objects of theft. The general said that these radioactive substances by their physical characteristics cannot be used for making nuclear weapons.

He also said that the system of registration and protection of special materials existing at defense and nuclear-energy enterprises, excludes the possible theft of uranium and other components of nuclear weapons.

According to the Interior Ministry, in 1993 there were detected 27 cases of illegal handling of radioactive substances. In 1994 56 crimes were disclosed out of which substances were stolen in 16 cases. There have been nine cases of theft of radioactive materials over nine months of 1995.

According to Interior Ministry's spokesmen, the large portion of thefts are made from Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry facilities. As a rule, thefts are made by personnel working on the sites, with 90% made by ordinary workers.

Interior Ministry's experts believe that the hullabaloo around allegedly high prices for radioactive substances at the black market is one of the reasons for the theft.

At the same time, a Nuclear Energy Ministry spokesman has said that his department sells radioactive materials for reasonable prices and there is no sense in stealing them and gaining profit from their re-sale.

The media campaign on the alleged "Russian connection" concerning radioactive substances found in the West is described by experts as an attempt by some "Western countries to contrive reasons for penetrating defense enterprises and taking control of their production."

The spokesman for the Interior Troops Commander, General Sergey Korolev said that in 1994-95, the Ministry sent an additional 6,000 servicemen and many pieces of armored technology to better protect the nuclear sites. He said that due to the difficult crime situation in the country, interior troops focus their main efforts on the safer protection of nuclear sites for them to be invulnerable for terrorists.

Federal Assembly

Duma Rejects President's Federation Council Varient

LD1110111695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1033 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 11 (INTERFAX) — The Russian State Duma rejected today the presidential variant of a law on the formation of the upper parliament chamber, the Federation Council.

According an INTERFAX correspondent's report, the law variant proposed by Chairman of the Duma Committee for Legislation Vladimir Isakov was adopted in three readings. Under this variant, the Federation Council should have as its members only elected heads of executive power bodies from Russian regions and territories.

This variant was supported by 242 deputies, 13 voted against and four abstained.

Defense Committee Wants Military Budget Increased

LD1010190095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1658 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 10 (INTERFAX) — The State Duma Defense Committee decided at a closed session Monday night that the 1996 draft budget appropriates too little for defense and so should be rejected, committee chairman Sergey Yushenkov, Russia's Choice, told INTERFAX Tuesday.

According to Yushenkov, defense spending has to be increased by at least 30 trillion rubles. The draft provides for nearly 80 trillion.

Yushenkov explained that committee experts were presuming that the size of the armed forces will remain unchanged, even though he is convinced that the army should be cut from 1.5 million to 1 million as should other armed services such as the border guards, ministry for Emergencies units etc.

Yushenkov admitted that reductions in armed forces also result in increased spending because compensation payments to officers and other expenses. He said that direct payments could be replaced by state bonds or allocation of landlots.

Further on Zadornov Budget, Bank Crisis Comments

MM1110091595 Moscow TRUD in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 2

[Report by Igor Ostrovskiy: "Where Has the Money Gone? Parliament Criticizes Government Draft Budget for 1996"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "For the first time since the reforms began the draft budget provides for a reduction of 5 percent in the population's real incomes. I am sure no deputy would vote for such a draft."

That was how Mikhail Zadornov, chairman of the State Duma Budget, Taxes, Banks, and Finance Committee, began his press conference held on the first day of the parliamentary hearings on the government draft budget.

According to M. Zadornov, the draft not merely repeats, but aggravates the shortcomings of the current year's budget. It is unrealistic in revenue terms. The deputies do not like its structure, that is, the reduction of appropriations for the social sphere and investments. The new budget, like the old one, enables the government to spend money without controls and accountability. M. Zadornov regards as uncontrolled expenditure the money spent on Chechnya and also the credit of 4.5 trillion rubles [R] to certain enterprises and territories, which is not provided for in the budget. The parliamentarian is concerned about government officials' unwarranted optimism. Many of them consider the August banking crisis to have been successfully overcome, whereas, according to M. Zadornov, it is only just beginning. Many, even the completely reliable banks, are experiencing a shortage of spare funds. This is resulting in the flight of capital from the economy, it means that enterprises are being refused credit, and payments are being delayed. The "domino effect" could come into operation at any moment after the bankruptcy of any bank, and this could lead to a payments crisis and the threat of the total collapse of the economy. The deputy is also averse to the policy of the Central Bank and the government, which have attracted a group of court banks. He believes that the right to manage budget funds should go to all banks that have won that right on as competitive basis and that are making a contribution to the treasury for the right to use budget funds.

Zadornov believes that the situation in the banking sphere is aggravated by the fact that several months have gone by and the president has not signed the laws adopted by both chambers of the Federal Assembly "On Banks and Banking Activities" and "On The Securities Market." Any further delay means the banks are in danger of bankruptcy and of losing private investors tens of millions of rubles.

"The government first of all has to answer the question: 'Where has the money gone?'" M. Zadornov said, concluding the press conference. "Finance Minister V. Panskov said that the revenue part of the budget will be implemented by 120 percent. Moreover budget spheres are 80 percent funded and the military-industrial complex is 50 percent funded. If the money exists, where is it, what has it been spent on?"

A conciliation commission has been set up comprising representatives of the government and both chambers of the Federal Assembly. Whether the country enters the new year with an approved budget depends on its work.

Duma's Burkov on 'Prohibitive' State Property Law

MK1110064995 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 2

[Report by Tatyana Romanenkova under the "Privatization" rubric: "One Cannot Make Much Money by Sales. Selling Shares in Russia's Key Enterprises for a Song Is Impermissible"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sergey Burkov, chairman of the State Duma's Committee on Property, Privatization, and Economic Activity, called the presidential edict "On the Procedure for Making Decisions on the Management and Disposal of Federally-Owned Shares" fairly dubious in legal terms.

Upon issuing the edict the president takes over management of the blocks of shares in enterprises that are vital for the Russian economy. In Burkov's view, although this may make it possible somehow to supervise the government's policy of across-the-board privatization in strategically important sectors, the president may not appropriate the management functions that, under the Constitution, are still the Government's prerogative — all the more so since he has no right to dispose of state property.

Sergey Burkov thinks that only on the basis of laws passed by the State Duma can one exercise effective supervision over privatization in strategically important sectors of Russian industry. This is precisely what prompted the Duma committee chairman's prompt and fairly well-planned reaction to the aforesaid edict.

"At a time when market conditions are extremely unfavorable, we should not allow the sale of Russia's key enterprises before year's end," Burkov said at the State Duma session on 6 October, introducing the federal law "On Disposing of Federally-Owned Shares in Joint-Stock Companies Set Up in the Process of Privatization."

The law is prohibitive in nature, which elicited doubts from a number of deputies, but Sergey Burkov said that the legislators had no option in the current situation. For the sake of implementing the budget's revenue part the government is ready to sell for a song even enterprises on which the strategic independence of our country depends. Russian entrepreneurs and bankers clearly do not have enough money to buy these blocks of shares, and they are set to be bought by speculative foreign capital by proxy.

The law that the State Duma passed at Sergey Burkov's initiative in three readings at once prohibits such uncontrolled sales and is designed to help the key sectors of Russian industry keep up their production potential.

Duma Aide Regrets Rejection of Lobbyism Bill

MM1010134595 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 7 Oct 95 p 5

[Report by Olga Burkaleva under "Juridical Monitoring" rubric: "Attempt To Narrow Scope for Corruption Fails"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At its first session 4 October the State Duma rejected the draft law "On Regulating Lobbying Activity in the Federal Organs of State Power," which was aimed at defining the mechanism governing the interaction between society and the authorities at the decisionmaking stage.

The Russian Federation Constitution guarantees citizens the right to exercise their power directly (through elections and referenda), but also through the organs of state power and self-government. They can appeal through their representatives personally and send individual and collective appeals to the state organs and organs of local self-government. In addition to these methods of interaction, there is also the path of putting pressure on the representatives of power and establishing business contacts with them. This is lobbying activity. The law defines this as activity by individuals vis-a-vis the federal organ of state power aimed at exerting influence on behalf of and in the interests of specific clients on the elaboration, adoption, and implementation of legislative acts and administrative decisions. A lobbyist is classed as an independently acting citizen representing on the basis of a contract or agreement the interests of a client of the federal organs of state power. These clients can be either Russian or foreign citizens and commercial or noncommercial organizations, defending their own individual and group interests. However, foreign citizens and organizations have the right to defend their interests in the federal organs of state power only through Russian Federation citizens registered as lobbyists according to the legally established procedure.

The draft law establishes the methods of lobbying activity, the procedure for registering lobbyists, and the mechanism for recording and monitoring their activity.

Restrictions on engaging in lobbyism are also stipulated. In particular, deputies of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly and their assistants, officials of the Russian Federation legislative, executive, or judicial federal organs, elected or appointed officials of the Russian Federation components, and experts and consultants appointed or invited by the Russian Federation federal organs of state power cannot be lobbyists. It was this stipulation, in the opinion of Vladimir Lepekhin, deputy chairman of the Committee for the Affairs of Public Organizations, who presented the draft law, which was the cause of its rejection. Despite the fact that deputies' speeches were mainly positive, only 119 deputies voted for the draft law. Practically no one voted against the draft law, but the remainder preferred not even to abstain, but not to vote at all. Vladimir Lepekhin told ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI's correspondent that this demonstrates that deputies are not interested in adopting this law, since at the present time they can engage in lobbying activity completely unchecked. The law is designed to "illuminate" the lobbying process and give it a civilized and accountable form. That is to say, to narrow the scope for corruption. Today's lobbying machinery by which groups of citizens influence the authorities is chaotic and blatantly fraught with corruption. In these conditions the stronger and more organized structures that have connections and financial resources have the advantage in interacting with the authorities. At the same time groups of citizens and a whole series of public movements have no access to the decision-making process. In Lepekhin's opinion, some lobbyist clans now have far greater influence than political parties and movements. The Duma's failure to adopt this draft law, the deputy believes, clearly proves the correctness of the accusation of lobbyism and corruption leveled at some deputies.

And although this draft law was three years in the making, although it has been discussed by experts and representatives of the federal organs of state power, by human rights campaigners, representatives of public associations, and by entrepreneurs, and although it has been presented at the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, and so forth, the process of its adoption will most likely be just as difficult as that of laws relating to the sphere of interaction between the authorities and society — such as the laws on state service, on organized crime, and others.

Deputy Regrets Human Rights Commissioner Law Delay

MM1010143295 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Oct 95 p 3

[Letter from Lyudmila Zavadskaya, State Duma deputy, member of the "Women of Russia" faction, and chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and Federal Legislation: "We Should Like Champions of Human Rights"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The draft law on a human rights commissioner in the Russian Federation has been under consideration in the State Duma for more than a year now. It is one of 12 constitutional laws which will lay the constitutional and legal foundations of Russian statehood and supply the missing link in the mechanism for protecting human rights and freedoms.

This institution has been introduced in more than 100 countries all over the world and has demonstrated its effectiveness in restoring violated civil and human rights.

The draft passed its first reading on 21 July 1994. No one doubted that it should be adopted as soon as possible. The way people voted at the time speaks for itself. Only one State Duma deputy voted against. The basic concept and idea enshrined in the draft law were approved by a qualified majority.

The idea is simple: A human rights commissioner will restore and protect the violated rights of Russian citizens and people in Russian territory.

Human rights in the Russian Federation are in a state of crisis. They are not only violated by officials, but also by citizens themselves. The combat operations in the Chechen Republic called into question the right to life itself. Anyone mindful of this right would never take up arms or set out to kill.

The human rights standards enshrined in the Russian Federation Constitution are now only observed to the extent that the current political situation and real economic relations allow. We must be aware of one simple rule: The violation of human rights leads to the disintegration of Russian statehood and the breakdown of stable relations in civil society.

We have inherited political, social, and economic problems from the Soviet Union in such numbers that no state in the world could hope to resolve them without tackling the key problem — human rights.

Society's economic problems must not be ignored. They concern everyone. But we must consider them from the point of view of human rights.

There is one thing we must do — create the conditions for the right to work. It is a right that must not be taken away by the state itself. Only on the basis of the right to work can we raise the question of social standards: pensions, benefits, and payments.

Returning to the draft law on a human rights commissioner, we should point out that its fate on the second reading has been unfortunate. Four times now it has been rejected by State Duma deputies for reasons unconnected with its content.

I put it to you: Who will protect the rights of Russian citizens?

Legislative, Regulatory Documents 1 - 7 Oct

96P50002

[FBIS Media Note] The following is a listing of Russian legislation recently published in the press of the Russian Federation compiled by FBIS. Numbers within parens indicate approximate wordage. Entries followed by the notation "Text" have been translated into English and are available in FBIS publications.

SECTION I: ECONOMIC LEGISLATION (EXPORT-IMPORT, BANKING, PRIVATIZATION, AUCTIONS, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT)

Government 26 August Directive No. 1225 Authorizing Vice Premier Zaveryukha To Sign Appended (But Not Published) Draft Agreement On Government's Relations With Tsentrosoyuz. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Oct 95 p 6) (200)

Government 6 September Decree No. 897 Approving Appended (But Not Published) Statute On Licensing Activity For The Maintenance And Use Of Fuel Storage Facilities And Service Stations Plus Grafov Commentary. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Oct 95 p 3) (100/400)

Government 19 September Decree No. 935 On Confirmation Of V.A. Pavlov As Replacement For Chairman Of Interdepartmental Commission On Control And Cash Registers. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 4) (100)

Government 19 September Decree No. 942 On Targeted Contract Training Of Specialists With Secondary And Higher Vocational Education, Plus Commentary By Goskomvuz Aide Balashov. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Oct 95 p 3) (200/400)

Government 21 September Directive No. 1318 On Submitting 1996 State Employment Fund Budget To Duma, Appointing Employment Service Leader Prokopov Representative In Debate. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Oct 95 p 4) (100)

Government 23 September Decree No. 950 Assigning Premises At 47 Myasnitskaya Street To CIS Economic Union's Interstate Economic Committee. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Oct 95 p 3) (400)

Government 25 September Directive No. 1325 On Submitting 1996 Mandatory Medical Insurance Fund Budget To Duma, Appointing Fund Director Grishin Representative In Debate. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Oct 95 p 4) (100)

Government 25 September Directive No. 1328 On Restructuring Of Shareholding In Industrial Automation Design Bureau Joint-Stock Company. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Oct 95 p 3) (200) (Text)

Chernomyrdin 25 September Directive No. 1330 Authorizing Placement Of Treasury Bill In Order To Fund Food Supplies For Armed Forces. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Oct 95 p 3) (100) (Text)

Government 26 September Decree No. 961 On Appointment Of S.D. Shatalov As Government's Official Representative When Parliament Is Examining International Treaties On Tax Issues. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 4) (100)

Government 26 September Directive No. 1336 Opening Certain Sections Of Air Routes Over Russian Territory To International Flights. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Oct 95 p 6) (200) (Text)

Government 26 September Directive No. 1343 Approving Amendments To 1946 Whaling Conventions Adopted At Whaling Commission's 47th Session. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Oct 95 p 6) (100)

Government 27 September Decree No. 969 On Liquidation Of Vorkutaugol Production Association's Promyshlennaya Coal Mine. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 4) (200)

SECTION II: POLITICAL (INTERNATIONAL AND CIS AFFAIRS, ELECTIONS, CRIME, POLLUTION)

Government 26 August Decree No. 836 On Application Of Soviet-U.S. Agreement On Cooperation In World Ocean Studies. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Oct 95 p 3) (150) (Text)

Government 6 September Decree No. 888 Extending Term For Utilization Of Credit For Building Cuban Power Stations. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Oct 95 p 3) (300) (Text)

Government 7 September Decree No. 903 On Signing Of Protocol Between Russia, Greece On Basis For Bilateral Relations. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 4) (200)

Chernomyrdin 17 September Decree No. 920 On Concluding Agreement With Tajikistan On Cooperation In Culture, Science, Education, Etc. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Oct 95 p 5) (200) (Text)

Chernomyrdin 18 September Decree No. 925 On Signing Agreement With Tajikistan On Basic Principles For Setting Up Financial-Industrial Groups. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Oct 95 p 5) (200) (Text)

Government 19 September Decree No. 939 On Formation Of 'Rossiyskaya Federatsiya' Journal. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Oct 95 p 3) (300) (Text)

Government 25 September Decree No. 951 On Creation Of Conditions For Implementing Program For Provision Of Legal Information. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Oct 95 p 3) (400)

Chernomyrdin 26 September Directive No. 1338 Accepting Communication's Ministry Proposal On Using German Credit To Fund Purchases Of Equipment To Modernize Communications Sector. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Oct 95 p 4) (200)

Yeltsin 29 September Edict No. 977 On Transformation Of State Enterprises Into Penal Institutions. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Oct 95 p 3) (400)

Yeltsin 30 September Edicts 989, 990, and 991 On Establishing State Universities In Tyva, Kurgan Oblast, Buryatia. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Oct 95 p 3) (150/150/150)

Government 4 October Directive No. 1361 On Siting Of Central Electoral Commission's Computer Center. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 4) (150) (Text)

SECTION III: SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL

RF Government 26 August Decree No. 847 On Ratification Of Statute On Licensing Topographical-Geodesic And Cartographic Activity Plus Commentary By Ye. Skukin. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 4) (550)

Government 18 September Decree No. 928 On Conclusion Of Agreement Between Russian And Azerbaijan Governments On Scientific And Technical Cooperation. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 4) (150)

Government 19 September Decree No. 943 On 41st Russian Antarctic Expedition, With Commentary By S. Khodkin. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 4) (850) (Text)

Yeltsin 29 September Edict 981 Appointing V.A. Sadovnichiy (Moscow State University Rector) And K.V. Frolov (Vice President Of Russian Academy Of Sciences) To President's Council On Scientific And Technical Policy. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Oct 95 p 3) (200)

Regional Affairs

Chechnya Reportage; Negotiations, Politics, Military

Chechens Withdraw From Peace Talks

LD1110110795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1033 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Oct 11 (INTERFAX) — The Chechen State Committee for Defense, which is chaired by Dzhokhar Dudayev, has announced that fulfillment of the military agreement will be suspended.

A Committee statement circulated in Groznyy Wednesday says this is connected with the "on-going missile strikes, bombings and artillery shelling of populated localities, numerous civilian victims, permanent provocations on the part of Russian troops, and gross violations of obligations by the Russian side."

The Committee "put all the responsibility for further escalation of military tension in the Russian-Chechen war on heads of the Russian Federation."

"The Chechen side suspends its participation in negotiations till the arrival of international observers and UN security forces to guarantee the fulfillment of international norms and obligations," says the document signed by Dudayev on October 9.

Head of the Chechen delegation to negotiations with Russia Khozh-Akhmed Yarikhanov conveyed the document text to correspondents in Groznyy.

Moscow's Talks Position Unchanging

LD1110110295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1028 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 11 Oct (ITAR-TASS) — The position of the Russian side at the Groznyy talks remains the same: There is no alternative to a peaceful settlement of the situation in Chechnya, acting head of the territorial administration Vladimir Zorin believes. He told ITAR-TASS in a telephone conversation today that the Russian side has not been officially informed about a statement by the Chechen side to pull out of the talks. It was reported that, following a decision by Dzhokhar Dudayev, the Chechen side suspended its participation in the talks on a peaceful settlement in Chechnya and on implementation of the military agreement signed in Groznyy on 30 July.

Zorin said that the mechanism for a settlement in Chechnya should remain the same: the implementation of accords on a package of military issues, the disarming of illegal units, and the handover of weapons. Zorin believes that the tactics require some adjustment because "terrorist acts in Chechnya, constant attacks on federal forces, and the failure to follow the schedule for disarming and the handover of weapons put the Russian side in a difficult position."

Volskiy Favors Talks' Continuation

LD1110143195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1413 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By Sergey Ostanin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW October 11 (ITAR-TASS) — Today's statement of the Dudayev side on the suspension of participation in the negotiating process and in the fulfilment of the package of military agreements is a response to the statement of the Russian side, made on October 6, Arkadiy Volskiy, member of the Russian delegation at the talks, told TASS. On the day when the act of terrorism was staged against Lieutenant General Anatoliy Romanov, commander of the federal army group in Chechnya, the Russian side announced that it was suspending for the time being its participation in the work of the Special Monitoring Commission.

The decision was made public at a special meeting of the Chechen Committee for National Accord, the National Revival Government and the staff of the Territorial Branch of Federal Executive Authorities in Chechnya. The meeting was attended by Deputy Representative of the Russian President in Chechnya Vladimir Rubanov.

At the same time, the federal and Chechen authorities began to analyse a possibility of imposing a state of emergency on Groznyy and some other areas of Chechnya. Yeltsin formulated his stand on Tuesday. He stressed at his meeting with Viktor Chernomyrdin that "any steps, taken in the Chechen Republic, should be careful and well-considered." The president expressed concern over the heightening of tension in the republic, but said that the federal authorities had not exhausted all possibilities of stabilising the situation.

"Talks on a peaceful settlement in Chechnya should go on, but in the current situation some elements of the talks should be changed," Volskiy believes.

'Toughest Measures' Against Militants Urged

LD1010115695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1022 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 10 (INTERFAX) — Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev supports the idea of a state of emergency in Chechnya. In a Tuesday interview with INTERFAX he spoke for tougher actions by federal troops against militants throughout the republic.

He believes that the question of the immediate surrender of arms by unlawful formations must be resolved fast. Grachev said that in the event of disobedience they must be destroyed.

In his opinion the assassination attempt on the commander of federal forces in Chechnya Anatoliy Romanov was organized by supporters of Dzhokhar Dudayev.

"This was a purposeful action. Now the Dudayev leadership is trying to demonstrate that their units have recovered from failure, they are organized, controllable and adopt guerilla warfare methods. The main forms of their operations are acts of sabotage, ambushes, night attacks on federal troops and acts of terrorism," the minister said.

In his opinion hostilities in Chechnya will intensify in late autumn. "Under the cover of fog and rain, with a better knowledge of the locality militants will step up guerilla warfare throughout Chechnya," he said.

Grachev spoke for the toughest measures against militants.

"What other country would permit federal troops to be attacked every night and soldiers die? No country would permit that. Therefore we should evidently switch to more energetic actions parallel to negotiations," he said.

"I do not belong to the much talked of party of war. I am simply a realist because I know the situation in Chechnya. Talks between two delegations alone can hardly resolve the entire set of problems," Grachev said.

Premier Against 'Emergency Measures'

MM1110110895 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Oct 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "V. Chernomyrdin on Situation in Chechnya"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is for the moment no need to impose a state of emergency in Groznyy, "I do not think that a state of emergency will be imposed," Russian Government Head Viktor Chernomyrdin stated yesterday after arriving in Ufa to participate in the celebrations of the fifth anniversary of the declaration of Bashkortostan's sovereignty within the Russian Federation.

Viktor Chernomyrdin said in reply to a question on the possibility of the imposition of a state of emergency in Groznyy and on the situation in Chechnya: "It is necessary to learn to keep our emotions in check, or to at least take emergency measures a little less often." "We will manage without such measures for the time being."

Apart from this, the prime minister said, the president and I discussed Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, and other components of the Russian Federation before my trip to Ufa.

Lobov Backs State of Emergency

LD1010212095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1658 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Oct 10 (INTERFAX) — The Russian president's special envoy in Chechnya, Oleg Lobov, has described as "very tense" the situation in the republic following terrorist acts in Groznyy. He made this statement on Tuesday in an exclusive interview with INTERFAX right after the meeting of federal command leaders in Khankala near Groznyy.

"More active efforts should be made by all participants in the current developments," including by the republic's law-enforcement and state power bodies.

Asked by INTERFAX about what he thinks of the idea to introduce a state of emergency, Lobov said that his interpretation of the state of emergency differs from that declared on Channel One of the Public Russian Television, when it was said that he was against it. "I am not against it, I am against haste in introducing it, bypassing the procedures envisaged by the Russian Constitution."

Lobov said that the republic's national revival government, the national accord committee, and the Groznyy Mayor's Office should be the first to have their say, because the issue involves their city. "Then they should appeal to the Russian president," said Lobov.

Later, according to Lobov, "the president is to address those who violate law and order, commit terrorist acts and do not disarm."

"The president is to set the deadline, as envisaged by the Constitution, before the introduction of a state of emergency and, if his demands are not met, the president is to introduce a state of emergency on the territory where the demands are not being met," said Lobov.

According to Lobov, "the presidential decree together with the request by the local authorities is to be handed over to the Federation Council, which is to take a decision within 72 hours."

Lobov Agrees With Commission's Suspension

LD1010212495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1648 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Oct 10 (INTERFAX) — The Russian presidential envoy in Chechnya and secretary of Russia's national security council Oleg Lobov agrees with the suspension of the special observer commission in Groznyy.

In an interview with INTERFAX in Khankala (eastern suburb of Grozny) on Tuesday, he said "the key political figure, general Anatoliy Romanov", was in a critical state after last Friday's bomb attack and that it would be immoral to replace him at this stage.

Lobov said only the investigation could establish who exactly was behind the latest terrorist attack. However, he believes the main culprits are those illegally seizing weapons, standing up in arms against Russia and trying to bring it down. "It is they who must take a step in the process talked about so much in negotiations with Romanov", he said.

He accused the rebels of delaying the implementation of the military accord, adding that decommissioning weapons would be a humanitarian act on the part of pro-Dudyaev supporters.

Lobov described as unsubstantiated the rebels' attempt at accusing Russia of violating the accord.

Meszaros Refutes Groznyy Disinvitation

LD1010180295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1744 GMT 10 Oct 95

[By Ruslan Maisigov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, October 10 (ITAR-TASS) — There is no truth to press releases of Chechen information chief Movladi Udugov, who alleged that the federal command in Chechnya formally proposed to the Groznyy mission of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to move out of the Chechen capital, the mission's leader Sandor Meszaros told ITAR-TASS.

He said the OSCE mission's officials did not attend the Tuesday meeting of the joint Russian-Chechen commission monitoring the July 30 military accord.

Meszaros said the OSCE mission today received a letter from Chairman of the Chechen National Revival Government Salambek Khadzhiyev to the effect that the government overturned the order of Groznyy's Mayor Beslan Gantemirov, who demanded on September 29 that the OSCE mission quit Grozny.

Meszaros described the situation in Chechnya as complex.

He said he was is in dialogue with both the command of federal troops and the Russian leadership.

With the troublesome situation in place, it is crucial not to depart from the logic of searching a peaceful solution to the problem towards the logic of war, Meszaros said.

He expressed the hope that the conflicting parties would put the work of the Russian-Chechen commission and the implementation of the July 30 military accord on the track.

Meszaros neither confirmed nor denied the Chechen claims that federal troops bombarded the villages of Rochni-Chu and Mesker-Yurt on Sunday.

He said he did not go to those sites because he was attending to security of the Groznyy OSCE mission these days.

Khasbulatov Says Russia Must Arbitrate

AU1010181095 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 10 Oct 95 p 5

[Interview with Ruslan Khasbulatov, mediator in Chechnya, by Elke Windisch; place and date not given: "If the People Want It, I Will Go Into Politics"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Windisch] The Russian press is already celebrating you as a hope for Chechnya. They are recommending Yeltsin to let Khasbulatov do as he pleases. Does he allow you that?

[Khasbulatov] The objective of my trip to Chechnya was the continuation of my peace mission last autumn — before the invasion of Russian troops — where I had already tried to achieve a consensus between Dudayev and his opponents, without taking sides with either of them. I have not done anything else now, but this time with the approval of the Kremlin. This week I will summarize the results in a memorandum for Boris Yeltsin.

[Windisch] Experts assess Yeltsin's about-face regarding Khasbulatov rather as an act of despair. Is the Kremlin at its wit's end regarding Chechnya?

[Khasbulatov] The cardinal mistake in Chechnya is that Yeltsin is trying to do the splits there — to create peace and, at the same time, to back the politicians who support Moscow's power. An absurd situation has developed. Russia is negotiating with the Dudayev government, which is illegitimate according to the official interpretation and which has refused to tolerate that the Khachiyev government, which was appointed by Moscow, participates in these negotiations. I want to force Russia to finally set priorities in Chechnya.

[Windisch] What do you propose in concrete terms?

[Khasbulatov] From time immemorial, occupiers have first taken over the power and thus also responsibility in the territories subjugated by them. Precisely that is also contained in my memorandum. Until the elections, Russia must take over on a trust basis and, as an arbiter, be above the parties to the conflict. And it must immediately start the reconstruction work. In this way, Russia could create the basis in Chechnya that it currently does not have.

[Windisch] However, the majority of the Chechens wants the right to independence.

[Khasbulatov] Sovereignty cannot be achieved at once, first concessions are important as a gesture of good will. I have proposed that the taxes on oil exports be remitted for Chechnya in the next five years.

[Windisch] In order to push that through, you would have to go back into politics.

[Khasbulatov] If my compatriots want it, I will accept. However, it is still a long way to that because there are enough influential forces in Russia that want to prevent it with all their might.

[Windisch] Do you mean Yeltsin? More than once, you have called him your mortal enemy.

[Khasbulatov] At the moment, the Chechen crisis makes me his ally against my will. Russia's incompetence in solving the Chechen crisis is above all due to the fact that political and strategic interests of important groups within the leadership are no longer in agreement. Yeltsin himself is increasingly becoming inconvenient for the reactionary forces that are banking on a new war.

'Emergency' State Seen as Useless

MK1010153495 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 10 Oct 95 pp 1, 4

[Commentary by Yuliya Kalinina: "State of Emergency in Groznyy Is Already in Place, But This Does Not Impede Terrorists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Now in the wake of the assassination attempt on Romanov, the Russian authorities have been confronted with the question of what to do about Chechnya next — to impose a state of emergency or not to; will it help guarantee order and the safety of citizens or not? On Monday [9 October], the president and the premier discussed this problem with experts. They are supposed to exchange opinions in this regard when they meet on Tuesday.

In the meantime, experts' opinions are divided. General Kulikov, internal affairs minister, thinks it is necessary to impose a state of emergency; his deputy believes a state of emergency should be imposed only in Groznyy and Achkhoy-Martan Rayon where the crime situation is the worst, whereas the president's plenipotentiary Oleg Lobov speaks against the imposition of extraordinary measures.

The law "On the Legal Regime of the State of Emergency" calls for the following measures: a special entry and exit regime; restrictions on the freedom of movement; enhanced protection of public order; a ban on gatherings, meetings, demonstrations and strikes; restrictions on the movement of vehicles, and searches thereof. Additionally imposed could be a curfew; restrictions on freedom of the press; examination of papers in crowded places; and examination of personal possessions and homes. The operation of political parties and movements could be suspended, and sales of arms and alcohol could be restricted.

All these things are already in place in Chechnya, if only with the exception of the ban on meetings, the suspension of the operation of political parties, and restrictions of the sale of arms and alcohol. Gen. Kulikov evidently thinks that if parties, meetings, and alcohol are banned, this will make the internal troops' task in imposing law and order much easier.

In the meantime, the Russian special services working in Chechnya have had too many flops lately.

The tunnel where the terrorist act took place was not guarded despite its "strategic" significance. It was unguarded because it was difficult to ensure the safety of sentries. Roadblocks are always set up in the open so that no one can steal up to them in the dark undetected, and setting up such a reliable roadblock in the tunnel (or near it) was impossible.

For some reason, Romanov was moving about Groznyy in a jeep, although what he indeed needed was an armor-plated Mercedes.

There are no results of special services' work in evidence. Their latest achievement is a Basayev mirage appearing in Dagestan. At the same time, "Budennovsk" terrorists routinely come to Groznyy and nobody cares.

Either our special services are cool as a cucumber or, like the interior troops units, they are totally helpless in Chechnya. A state of emergency will hardly help them in either case.

On the other hand, if no state of emergency is imposed now, Gen. Kulikov will come out unscathed in any situation. Whatever happens, whatever further terrorist act takes place, the commander's responsibility will be minimal. It was he who insisted on imposing a state of emergency. They did not hear — what can he do now? Making his decision, the president evidently will have to take account of this tricky thing to the detriment of the position of Oleg Lobov, who has already had some experience of the Chechnya reality.

Anyone with similar experience cannot help realizing that no state of emergency can rectify the situation and ease the work of the interior troops' units; on the contrary, it will cause yet another outburst of anger and, correspondingly, more provocations, bombings, and shots from behind the corner, which will have to be answered by the military. Thus, the goal pursued by the criminals who made the assassination attempt on Gen. Romanov will be solved: The peace process will be comfortably derailed; the elections will have to be postponed; and the present state of "neither war nor peace" will drag out indefinitely.

'Emergency' State Seen as Foregone Conclusion

MK1010141495 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 1

[Report by Georgiy Bovt and Dmitriy Kamyshev: "The Worse, the Better. The Only Question Is for Whom"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to his press service, Boris Yeltsin spent the greater part of the past weekend and of yesterday thinking about the possibility of introducing a state of emergency in Groznyy and consulting his aides on the issue. Even so, according to well-informed sources, within the next few hours no decision is likely to be made: The Russian leadership does not want to "act rashly." However, given that the "power" structures and members of Chechnya's pro-Moscow government have already supported this measure in no uncertain terms, an edict on a state of emergency will probably appear sooner or later — unless it transpires that the attempt on General Romanov's life was the work of "friends of Russia." Thus, for a second time in the past year in Chechnya, Moscow is facing a Rubicon separating a "poor peace" from a "good war."

The delay over the decision to impose a state of emergency may be due to the fact that Yeltsin has decided to hedge things by forming a certain collective opinion, although, according to his aide Leonid Smirnyagin, there is no consensus among the presidential analysts: The correlation between those who believe that this move is expedient and those opposed to it is approximately 3:2. True, people whose opinion Yeltsin heeds above all spoke up promptly. The tone was set by the government, saying on Saturday [7 September] that it considers it necessary to introduce a state of emergency in Groznyy and ordering the federal forces command to take "all measures with respect to illegal armed formations destabilizing the situation in Chechnya." Defense Minister Grachev also sent word all the way down from Geneva, proposing that negotiations with the Dudayevites be stopped.

Internal Affairs Minister Anatoliy Kulikov, in an interview with ORT, said approximately the same thing, although not with such a soldier's straightforwardness. He accused the Dudayevites of scuttling the military agreements and attempting, before the elections, to change the balance of forces in their favor by force. The "power" people were also supported by Nationalities Minister Vyacheslav Mikhaylov, who said that the introduction of a state of emergency not only will not harm the peace settlement, but will in fact "create a basis for addressing many problems." Mikhaylov's deputy in the Russian delegation, Arkadiy Volskiy, explained that the state of emergency has long been in force de facto and that it should have been given a de jure basis immediately after federal troops were brought into Chechnya.

Apparently in order to facilitate the president's choice, direct participants in the events have joined the "emergency agitation" drive. The first agitation event was the Saturday grenade-launcher attack on the OSCE mission in Groznyy. Then came a report about a four-hour nighttime fight for the Russian troops' headquarters in Khankal, considerately blown up by official "military sources" from "routine firing" on a Russian checkpoint. The latest information salvo came yesterday from members of the National Salvation Committee and the Chechnya national revival government, who supported the idea of introducing a state of emergency not only in Groznyy but also in Achkhoy-Martan Rayon, where "the emerging crime situation is the worst." Against the backdrop of such a harmonious chorus of the advocates of a "state of emergency," the president's silence appears stoic.

What is bothering Boris Yeltsin? Why is he hesitating in such a clear-cut situation? Apparently his inborn intuition tells him that in a situation when so many are persistently prompting him to introduce a state of emergency, he should look very carefully indeed before leaping. After all, the attack on Romanov followed the same pattern as the attack on Lobov. It looks too much like a provocation. The classic question arises: Who could be acting according to the "the worse, the better" principle? The Dudayevites? Yes. Yet they are far from unanimous: There are intransigents like Basayev and there are those with whom Romanov has come to terms more than once, like Maskhadov. The intransigents could stand to gain from a scuttled peace process. But in the present day "neither war nor peace" situation the implacable have enjoyed a number of obvious advantages: They have been creeping back to power. And they did not really need to provoke the Russian military monster into a showdown. Noteworthy is the position of the "pro-Moscow opposition:" They might be discontented with the sluggish negotiating process: The final word in the emerging so-called self-defense detachments would, in all likelihood, belong not to Khadzhiyev, Gantemirov, Labazanov, and others of their ilk, but to the Dudayevites.

Could there have been interest in the assassination of a high-ranking Russian official as a cause for resuming the war on the "Russian side of the barricade"? After all, it cannot be ruled out that the attack on Lobov could have been inspired by those who did not like the way he has directed the money flow going for the restoration of Chechnya. There are too many of those seeking to cling to this "life-giving stream," which is almost impossible to monitor. Then it should be assumed that the attack on Romanov was a provocation so as, in the ensuing bloody mess, to replay the game called "the restoration of Chechnya." Very many stand to gain from the war in Chechnya. And there is something for the president to think about.

Chechen Pilots Said Training in Azerbaijan

LD1010185995 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1658 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 10 (INTERFAX) — In an interview with INTERFAX Tuesday Russian military sources confirmed that several military air crews from among Dudayev supporters had been trained in Azerbaijan.

"There are training planes at their disposal and they drill air combat tactics," said a military source with access to intelligence. He also said that training flights are carried out from an airfield in the north-west of Azerbaijan.

He refused to disclose details, but said that the available information was reliable and based on "solid evidence."

The Russian military circles also have information that Azerbaijani territory is still being used to supply Dudayev supporters with weapons, including surface-to-air missiles, said the source.

Reportage on Premier Chernomyrdin's Visit to Bashkiria

Promises No Rise in Energy Prices This Year

LD1110110595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1047 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By Gennadiy Yezhov, Raul Tukhvatullin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] UFA, October 11 (ITAR-TASS) — The Russian government will retain the current prices for transport, electricity and gas till the beginning of next year, Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin told a meeting of the heads of the city and regional administrations and enterprises of Bashkiria on Wednesday.

The Russian Autonomous Republic of Bashkiria is suffering from a serious shortage of gas, though several main gas pipe lines run through the republic. Gas enterprises have cut off the supplies of the fuel both for Bashkiria's industry and its essential needs because the republic is in debt for the gas. The prices for the fuel are continuing to rise in the republic. Bashkiria has to use fuel oil, thus yet more deteriorating the unfavourable ecological situation. This causes protests among the four-million population of the republic.

Chernomyrdin instructed the leadership of the gas sector to take urgent measures to rectify the situation in Bashkiria. The premier proposed resuming stable gas supplies to the republic and settling the debt by writing off mutual non-payments.

Sees Power-Sharing as Expanding Sovereignty

LD1010192295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1806 GMT 10 Oct 95

[By Raul Tukhvatullin and Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] UFA, October 10 (ITAR-TASS) — The Russian government is firmly against any plans of splitting Russia into governorships, that is against turning ethnic formations into administrative districts. "We are for federalism in our country," Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said on Tuesday in Ufa at the celebrations devoted to the fifth anniversary of the passing of the declaration on Bashkiria's state sovereignty within the Russian Federation.

Chernomyrdin said the federal authorities now work out a plan for nationalities policy of the Russian Federation. The drafting of the document is supervised by President Boris Yeltsin. Subjects of the Federation are involved in the effort.

In addition, the Russian government is drafting a federal programme for the development of Turkic peoples and a federal draft law on national-cultural autonomies which will help preserve the right of cultural communities to develop regardless of where their members live. The Russian premier said a nation's right to self-determination is recognised by the federal authorities in the country with taking into account specific conditions, but still with preserving united Russia.

Chernomyrdin conveyed to the participants in the celebration meeting in Ufa the congratulatory message of Russian President Boris Yeltsin on their national day, the Day of the Republic, October 11.

This date is an important milestone in the establishment of new federal relations in Russia, the presidential message says. Chernomyrdin recalled that in the 16th century Bashkiria voluntarily joined Russia. The events of the past five years showed again that our peoples should live side-by-side, he said, reading out the presidential message.

A number of matters of fundamental importance regarding the destiny of the unified Russian federal state were resolved in the five years since the proclamation of Bashkirian sovereignty, Chernomyrdin said. Russia's federal structure has passed the test for durability. This was largely promoted by the signing by the Russian federal authorities and Bashkiria of the package of documents on power-sharing. This actually expanded Bashkiria's sovereignty.

Similar documents were signed with Tatarstan, with the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), with Kabardino-Balkaria.

Chernomyrdin said that the federal authorities, specifically the government, are now engaged in vast work with other regions of the Russian Federation to sign similar documents with them.

Regarding the state of affairs in the Bashkirian economy, Chernomyrdin pointed to the stabilisation in the area, which is promoted by lawmaking of local authorities.

They have passed of late more than 150 documents regarding local legislation, also economic. On the other hand, the package of documents on power-sharing expanded the rights of the local authorities in property, granting tax privileges and conducting the local tax policy, as well as the policy to attract investment into the republic's economy.

The only thing that Bashkiria lacks now is the presence of qualified experts in the market economy, the Russian premier said. He suggested that a department of managers be open at a local high educational establishment and that Bashkirian representatives be trained in management in Moscow.

Chernomyrdin will hold a meeting with heads of Bashkirian cities and districts on Wednesday. The implementation of the federal programme of Bashkiria's development will be one of the main items to be discussed. Then the prime minister plans to fly to Moscow.

Local CPRF Leader Interviewed on Volgograd Elections

MM1010145995 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Oct 95 pp 1, 2

[Interview with State Duma Deputy Alevtina Viktorovna Aparina, first secretary of the Volgograd CPRF Oblast Committee, by Valentina Nikiforova, under the "Events and Comments" rubric; place and date not given: "Stalingrad Breakthrough" — first two paragraphs are introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] So we now know that at the elections to the Volgograd City Duma candidates from the oblast CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] organization won 22 of the 24 deputies' seats.

Evidently people thought hard before the present elections to the city Duma. To the Communists' credit, they were able to divert the people from rally verbiage about human rights toward specific implementation of these rights. State Duma Deputy Alevtina Viktorovna Aparina, first secretary of the Volgograd CPRF Obkom [Oblast Committee], spoke about this.

[Aparina] Before we had even had time to count up, I heard it on the Russian Television Channel: The Communists have come to power in Volgograd! They account for 80 percent of the seats. That's not bad, I thought. But, knowing their uncertain arithmetic, I checked their statistics just in case. It turned out that the figure was not 80 percent, but 92 percent. And another amendment: not Communist deputies, but CPRF oblast organization members. Some of our deputies do not belong to the party.

But that is not the main thing. The deputies include specialists, production organizers, and administrators. The future of the million-strong city will be determined by two directors of major enterprises — "Medtekhnika" and a shipbuilding company, heads of workshops at the tractor plant and the "Barrikady" plant, and engineers from the "Avrora" motor plant. There are also teachers and representatives of commercial structures, as well as former servicemen.

Our candidates won in an honest struggle. This was not easy. But tell me, was it easy for L. Rokhlin, hero of the Chechen war? He has an armed personnel carrier, a guard of honor company, and a whole army of officers and men. They distributed packages around apartments day and night. And they arrived at the "Barrikady" plant in the armed personnel carrier — they threw everyone into a panic: It is a defense plant.

They overdid it. The people, yearning for order and a firm hand, had a good look at this hand in front of their own faces for 100 days before the elections, and did not vote for it. Did people become frightened? Did they see a threat of a military dictatorship? In my opinion, no. They realized that the military will defend their own corporate interests. L. Rokhlin's participation in Chernomyrdin's "Home" in particular generated concern. On the day of the elections, people said to me: "Let the Army stick to its own matters." And not a single candidate from the military got through, although no doubt there were some worthy candidates.

The mass media are now attributing our success to the fact that "the Communists did not have any decent rivals." This is not true. Several heads of rayon administrations and chiefs of police precincts took part in the elections (they were very active in seeking power, as it happens), as well as public figures and leaders of major organizations.

The competition was not easy. But we created an election headquarters, and Nikolay Ivanovich Bogomolov became its chief. The public university of socialism, democracy, and human rights, formed on the initiative of Obkom Secretary Lidiya Vasilyevna Vorobyeva, took an active part — it involves over 50 students, mainly young people. We are very grateful to our public assistants: They went around apartments, handed out leaflets and newspapers, and spoke to people. They wrote down, remembered, and passed on their instructions and requests to the analytical group at the obkom.

Another group spent some time at enterprises. I personally met with people at 20 enterprises. This is what we would do: We would go to four or five plants in a rayon in a day, and then in the evening we would conduct rayon meetings with the electorate. And what I noticed was that young people were keen to come to the meetings. Maybe because they were being personally addressed. Or maybe the fact that their peers were taking part in our team interested them.

As a result, people voted for our candidates. A funny thing happened. In one okrug we did not put forward a candidate. People arriving at the polling place were asking for the ballot papers "naming Chekhov (candidate for the city hall whom we supported) and the Communists." And when they did not obtain any, they left — without voting.

We may rejoice at our success, and this will do us no harm. But we understand the difficult position we have found ourselves in: A Communist Duma under an anti-Communist regime. Some people are already predicting that the duma will only be involved in politics.

Nothing of the sort! We understand how great our responsibility is. That is why the day after the elections we held a sitting of the Obkom Secretariat, and stated officially that we are assuming responsibility for the deputies' work. We have created an organizational committee to prepare the first session. Our analytical center has prepared proposals for the work schedule. We have reached agreement with Yuriy Chekhov, who has been elected mayor, that we will hold a city assembly for the electorate in the near future, and invite bosses of enterprises and municipal services to it so that we can discuss and organize a schedule together. Obviously providing the Volgograd inhabitants with food, preparing for the winter, and creating the right conditions for the local commodity producers will be the main problems.

Of course, this is an excessive burden for 24 deputies. Therefore we would like to suggest that specialists should also join the sectoral commissions in addition to the deputies, — that is, we will expand the number of people answerable for life in the city. Incidentally, it has been decided to teach the deputies and their assistants twice a week. It is possible that the proposal of the Volgograd inhabitants to name their elected organ a city soviet rather than a duma will thus be realized. We are not here to dictate, but to create.

Novosibirsk Passes Decisions To Elect New Governor

964F0024B Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 2 Oct 95 p 1

[Article by an unidentified correspondent: "Will We Elect a Governor?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The 14th Session of the Oblast Soviet was held the other day. The deputies at it finally adopted the Law on the Elections of the Head of Administration of Novosibirsk Oblast in the second reading. Thus, a four-month fight in the Soviet was concluded, about which our newspaper reported in detail. It can now be said with confidence that the governor will be elected by all of the citizens of the oblast by a direct secret vote. It is not clear yet when the elections will be held: Although a recent edict of the president did move the elections of the governor to December of next year, in the words of Ivan Indinok, an exception can be made for our oblast, and elections are possible already on 17 December of this year. For more details on the session, read about it in one of the forthcoming VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK issues.

Economic Issues

Duma Budget Chairman Zadornov on 1996 Draft Budget

MM1110109395 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Oct 95 pp 1, 3

["First Person" stenographic account by A. Yevgenev of meeting between Mikhail Zadornov, chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee for the Budget, Taxes, Banks, and Finance, and ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA Editorial Office journalists chaired by Chief Editor A. Yurkov; place and date of meeting not given: "Mikhail Zadornov: '1996 Budget Will Not Clear Duma Hurdle'" — first paragraph is ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] When Mikhail Zadornov was elected to the State Duma he could scarcely have believed that he would end up in the hottest seat — the post of chairman of the Committee for the Budget, Taxes, Banks, and Finance. How crucial the budget is — all the contradictions and incredible tension of the transitional period are encapsulated in it. The 1996 budget is no exception. The Federation Council has already announced the formation of a conciliation commission. Most likely the same will happen in the Duma. That means that hard, painstaking work to find agreement lies ahead.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Mikhail Mikhaylovich, while most State Duma members were making the most of their carefree summer vacation the budget committee's work was well under way. The main financial document of next year — the federal budget — was being studied. First of all I would like to know how the current draft differs from the preceding ones? What are its special features?

[Zadornov] There are few differences. The working group of the Committee for the Budget, Taxes, Banks, and Finance, which, incidentally, includes representatives of various factions, reached at least two conclusions at the very fist session. The budget presented by the government is essentially a continuation of the previous economic policy. That is the first thing. Second, in all probability the Duma will not be able to agree to this draft.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] But the government did not promise a change of economic policy.

[Zadornov] Look, any budget is formulated on the basis of a forecast of the country's socioeconomic development. The forecast for 1996 incorporates the inflation indicator of 1.2 percent per month. We consider it to be absolutely unrealistic. Let me remind you that a year ago we were originally promised 1 percent by December, but during debates with the government we got the average to 3 percent.

What do we have today? In the first half-year the average monthly inflation was 10 percent and throughout the year as a whole it will at best be 7-8 percent. What has this led to? The defense order, fuel to be transported to the North, budget-funded employees' wages — everything has been calculated on the basis of this overoptimistic forecast. Consequently we have fallen behind with indexing. The population's real monetary incomes have decreased by 10 percent over seven months. The same defense order is twice as expensive as envisaged by the budget. It has been placed but there is nothing with which to pay for it. It is the same in any other sphere.

If you look, all the main items of the budget have apparently been funded, but everywhere there is insufficient money — because of accelerated inflation it has lost one-third of its value. This situation cannot be repeated next year, that would be fraught with social consequences that are too grave. Especially as the toughness of financial policy has an election air about it. It is being applied above all to the defense industry, health care, education, science, and investment.

At the same time there are sectors which are not paying full taxes — because of nonpayments [illegible] some other reason — but they are having quite a reasonable life. The shortfalls have already reached 28 trillion rubles [R], which is mainly attributable to a clearly defined range of self-managing economic components — the oil and gas industries, metallurgical enterprises, and railroad transport. Over one-half of underpayments are associated with the activity of 46 enterprises. No serious sanctions are being applied to them, they are not going bankrupt. So this is the kind of unhealthy polarity that has developed. On the one hand budget-funded employees have been squeezed extremely hard, and on the other hand there is a group of untouchables inhabiting a completely different dimension. In these conditions the government is finding it possible, without bothering with explanations, to give tax deferments and budget loans to the chosen few.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] But surely strategic, promising areas must be supported somehow. Current taxes are crippling everybody.

[Zadornov] Taxes are another thing causing objections to the budget. You know that in spring the State Duma passed a law on the principles of a tax system. According to our estimates it eases the tax burden by approximately 10 percent of an enterprise's gross income, reduces the number of actual taxes, and changes the relationship between the taxpayer and the tax organs. But the government, through the Federation Council, blocked it. What is being offered in its place? In place of the abolished tax on the above-norm wages fund, what is being introduced is not even a tax but a system of collecting fines for letting wage increases outstrip inflation. It is bad enough that nobody could explain to us how such a mechanism could work in reality. In our view it is also inherently flawed in that it will precipitate a reduction in production volumes and force enterprises to get out of debt by hook or by crook. Or there is this scenario: The special tax is abolished but at the same time value-added tax is increased by 1 percent. Where is the logic here?

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Does it not seem to you that we are going round in circles on the tax question? There are several schemes for a tax structure. In 1992 we chose one of them, an entirely civilized one, and we are currently following it. Yet we cannot collect taxes in full, they are slipping through our hands in various ways. In that case is it not better to change the model — to levy taxes on what cannot be hidden: resources used in production, land, real estate, and so on?

[Zadornov] I would like to remind you that it took seven to eight months to adapt to the current tax system. It was only after that that we started to collect something. So switching from one tax system to another is in itself an extremely painful act.

But in principle the process is moving in the direction you mentioned. Taxes on enterprise property, payments for natural resources, and payments for water, land, and so on are increasing. But let us look at things soberly: If we force a plant to pay three to five times more for its resources, will it be able to do this given the current financial situation? Do we stand to gain much? At the end of the day there is such a concept as a tax base. If in three years your production has halved, what are you in a position to collect? You can reduce the overall level, simplify the tax system, and stimulate an increase in production. Then it cannot be ruled out that in two to three years we will receive some increase in tax revenues.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] What about the budget's expenditure element — what is new here?

[Zadornov] Funding of all spheres is being cut in real terms. The proportion of expenditure is effectively increasing for only three items — international activity, servicing the foreign and domestic debt, and expenditure on law enforcement organs. We cannot agree with this approach either. Especially as there lie behind this things which are not sufficiently explained. For example, the draft budget envisages an overall increase in the power structures' establishments. An extra 100,000 people are due to appear next year within the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] system alone.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] But this step can be viewed as a natural reply to society's demand to intensify the fight against crime.

[Zadornov] Any task can be tackled in two ways — either with brawn or with brain. Our MVD's current establishment level exceeds the establishments of the internal affairs organs of the former Soviet Union — that is, of countries with a population twice that of Russia's current population. This excludes the municipal police forces, which are funded from the local budget in Moscow and other cities. But you can see for yourself that quantity is not always translated into quality.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Mikhail Mikhaylovich, what about the law on veterans? It is a scandal that this important law, which affects the interests of the most socially vulnerable section of society, has not been backed up with funding.

[Zadornov] Some R6.5 trillion have been allocated for the law on veterans. This will be directly funded through local budgets. Provision has been made for this money to be moved as transfers from the federal budget to local level. Everything would seem to be in order. But when we started to dig a bit deeper certain unpleasant aspects surfaced. For example, aside from the Federation components we have so-called closed territorial-administrative formations — approximately 30 cities belonging to the Defense Ministry, Atomic Energy Ministry, etc. They are wholly funded from federal budget funds. We started looking at the budget but there was no allusion to "veterans." We have now requested all materials on the law: If this is how matters stand we will recheck everything anew.

I am not inclined to absolve either parliament or the committee of responsibility for the current situation. But when our committee considers the draft of some law we always demand financial and economic substantiation. Unfortunately this has not become the rule for the Duma as a whole. Sometimes when there is the slightest objection the question is put as follows: Are you for or against veterans, for or against solving the nuclear energy problem? But lobbyists are not worried that there are no funds for the law and that because of this it will remain an empty declaration....

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Mikhail Mikhaylovich, your committee is also elaborating banking legislation. Right now, when commercial banks are "collapsing" and delaying payments to their clients, depositors are feeling very uncomfortable. What is being done to protect their rights?

[Zadornov] We have adopted several laws — on the Central Bank, on banks and banking activity and amendments to it, on the securities market. What is the most important thing here? Privatization of the Savings Bank has been prohibited. As the most popular bank it remains under the state's patronage, and that means it remains the most reliable bank. So that, in the event of bankruptcy, a bank which has "gone to the wall" can always pay its depositors, it has been stipulated that the sum of citizens' funds attracted by a bank cannot be greater than its own funds. In addition, a kind of probationary period has been established for new banks: They can start working with the population only after they have been open for two years. There are also many interesting aspects to the law on the securities market, which, incidentally, does not allow finance companies to work with the population without the consent of the Securities Commission. But the president has vetoed this law as well as the law on banks and banking activity. And to this day they have not been improved one iota. All because some people think that the status of their organ as defined by the law does not correspond to how they want to see it. In short, bureaucrats' personal ambitions have gotten in the way.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] The following procedure exists in Finland: If a bank goes bankrupt the investor not only gets back the hard-earned money which he deposited there but also all the interest due to him.

[Zadornov] We adopted the Law on the Compulsory Insurance of the Population's Deposits in its first reading. Out of admission and regular dues the banks themselves will form a so-called compulsory insurance fund. In the event of bankruptcy a client is guaranteed to recover 90 percent of the sum invested.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] The current State Duma has adopted around 200 laws. The president has signed approximately 120 of them. When exactly will it be possible to say that we have created the legislative base necessary for the state and economy to function normally?

[Zadornov] In 18 months we have, with difficulty, plugged several gaps. We have substantially progressed, for example, in providing normative support for judicial and legal reform. Laws on the legal system, the status of judges, and the arbitration procedure code have been adopted. There has been a visible breakthrough in the economy — the first part of the Civil Code. I think that given another three or four years of parliamentary work in conditions of at least relative political stability and a new legislative base for a market-oriented, democratic Russia will on the whole have been formed.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Mikhail Mikhaylovich, are you running for a Duma seat at the upcoming elections?

[Zadornov] Yes, in a single-seat district in Kamchatka.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] From which bloc?

[Zadornov] "Yabloko," like last time.

Government Stance on 1996 Budget Viewed

MM1010134695 Moscow IZVESTIYA (Financial Section) in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 1

[Report by Yevgeniya Pismennaya under general heading: "Government May Agree To Concede 1 Percent Inflation to Parliament"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Three positions set forth in the draft budget for next year will be defended by the government: the pace of inflation, the level of the budget deficit, and the noninflationary nature of sources of financing the budget deficit (that is the government does not agree to Central Bank credits).

Vladimir Petrov, first deputy minister of finances, claims that all government policy depends on these components. To reject them means failing to fulfill the medium-term programs and coordinated statements with the Central Bank. Moreover, talks with international financial organizations on credits and extinguishing them and on restructuring the foreign debt will be considerably complicated. On the rest the government agrees to compromises. For instance, interbudget relations can be widely discussed as can the structure of budget expenditure or several questions of taxation policy.

Before submitting the draft budget to the State Duma the government calculated it in seven options, including one with an inflation rate of 2.5-3 percent and 5 percent a month. The executive branch believes that in a situation where the rate of inflation rises to 5 percent production stagnation and a substantial rise in unemployment are inevitable. Inflation rates reaching 3 percent presuppose less depressing indicators but nonetheless ones which do not lead to positive results. It became clear from both calculations that the government will be unable to index wages at the same rate at which inflation is growing. Actually this had already been demonstrated graphically enough in previous years. If inflation rates are kept down to 1 percent the indexing of wages will even be somewhat higher than inflation.

In the opinion of Vladimir Petrov achieving an inflation rate of 1-1.2 percent a month is feasible but on condition that "a number of key measures" are taken to put the price formation of some base industries in order. Obviously a tougher prices policy is planned. As an example of these measures an interdepartmental organ — the energy commission — will be created. It should engage in implementing prices policy in the electricity industry at federal level which, the government suggests, will lead to a considerable reduction of inflation rates. It is planned to do the same with rail transport and other basic sectors.

Vladimir Petrov assures us that the government knows the mechanism for implementing these programs. As early as the fourth quarter of 1995 the complex of these measures will be put into operation at full capacity.

Statistics Board Reports Fall in GDP

LD1010214695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1658 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 10 (INTERFAX) — Russia's gross domestic product fell 3% in January through September as compared with the same period last year to 1,045 trillion rubles, the Russian Board of Statistics has said. In the same period last year the GDP was down 12%.

Last month Russia's GDP remained unchanged as compared with the previous month and fell by 1% as compared with September last year. Russia produced 2% less electricity than in January through September 1994 and the production of coal was down 4%, of gas, 2%, and of oil, 3% than in the same period last year.

Russia's foreign trade, including petty vendors, grew 20% in January through September as compared with the same period last year to 99.9 billion dollars. Export totalled 58.1 billion dollars, and import, 41.8 billion.

Compensation Mechanism for Savings Worked Out

LD1010211595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2046 GMT 10 Oct 95

[By Liliya Kuznetsova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 10 (ITAR-TASS) — The Commission of the Public Chamber at the Russian President on socio-economic problems has considered and endorsed the mechanism of the compensation for Russian citizens' savings devalued during the reform.

Savings deposits that existed prior to the reform are treated in the law "On the Restoration and Protection of Russian Citizens' Savings" as the state's internal debt, it was said at the commission's meeting on Tuesday. What with the budget deficit, there is no real opportunity for compensating for citizens' lost savings at present. Therefore, monetary compensation is envisaged only for the less protected sections of the population.

Purpose-oriented debt obligations will be used as a means of payment for privatisation by the mass of the population. This means that part of property will be set aside for privatisation not for funds but for debt obligations.

So any Russian citizen will be able to receive compensation for his or her savings either through purchasing state property for debt obligations or through entrusting debt obligations to the management of commercial structures. They are issued with special licences for the management of state property allocated for the compensation for the lost savings. Commercial structures buy debt obligations from holders and are entrusted with some or other facilities of state property as a result.

And there is one more way of compensation when the savings remain on a citizen's noncash account in the Savings Bank. Holders of debt obligations receive the interest that the state can give in a given economic situation. Their savings will be fully compensated for in the long run.

New Bonds' Impact on Gold Sales, Output Examined

MM1010132395 Moscow IZVESTIYA (Financial Section) in Russian 6 Oct 95 p 3

[Article by Elmar Guseynov: "Gold Reserves Might Not Be Enough To Guarantee Federal Loans"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The year 1996 could be the year when a full-fledged gold market is created in Russia as well as a period of an unprecedented reduction in the precious metal's production in our country.

The development of a gold market will be determined by the implementation of the 5 September edict signed by the Russian president, in accordance with which the issue of federal loan bonds guaranteed by gold is due to begin. The bonds will be income bonds — the interest on them will be determined in accordance with LIBOR [London Interbank Offered Rate] index indicators. The bonds' owners, including individual persons, will be able to exchange the securities for gold freely.

The total amount of gold being allocated to guarantee bonds is 30 tonnes. In terms of value, taking account of the world price of gold, this is around 1.6-1.7 trillion rubles [R]. The Finance Ministry and Central Bank have been given the job of devising a mechanism to issue and sell bonds and provide a normative base for this process.

Roskomdragmet [Russian Federation Committee for Precious Metals and Precious Stones], which was one of the initiators of the issue of a gold loan, hoped that the bonds would be guaranteed by ingots of between 5 grams [g] and 1 kg. This would make it possible to give as wide a circle of private investors as possible access to the bonds. But judging by information received it will just be a question of 1-kg ingots.

It is not yet clear where the funds from floating a gold loan will go. Roskomdragmet believes that this money must be used primarily to purchase the precious metal from producers, for which there are insufficient funds at present. Thereby gold, without moving out of the state reserves, would help to produce new gold. But it is not ruled out that the funds from the gold loan will be "gobbled up" and will disappear into the general budget hole.

Although it is not yet clear how the many problems associated with the issue of gold bonds will be solved, it is obvious that on the whole their appearance will lead to revolutionary movements on the domestic precious metals market. Permission for private persons to own gold ingots will entail a sharp widening of the spectrum and volumes of banks' security [zalogovyy] transactions and purchasing transactions involving gold, will initiate a considerable increase in the network of private purchasing centers and pawnshops, and will create a new and fairly powerful capitals market. Giving nonresidents permission to buy bonds must inevitably lead to the liberalization of regulations governing the export and import of gold ingots, including for individual persons.

The main obstacle to the normal functioning of a gold-backed securities market could be the retention of a foreign exchange band in its present form. At the moment almost all gold settlements in our country are in one way or another indexed in dollars. Given the dollar's effective devaluation in Russia, this will lead to a situation whereby the owners of gold bonds will begin to incur losses and will try to exchange them for the physical metal as quickly as possible.

It is the foreign exchange band's introduction that has already effectively brought Russia's gold-extracting industry to its knees. The cost of the metal bought by the state from producers is tied to the dollar price of gold on world markets. Consequently, while in the first half of this year extraction enterprises were paid R63,000 for 1 g of gold, they are now getting only R54,000. In the same period the cost of raw and other materials used by gold extractors has increased by approximately 25 percent in ruble prices.

Gold prospectors, for example, have already calculated that, taking account of ruble inflation, the cost of gold acquired by the state must now be at least R87,000 just to preserve the profitability of their production at the first half-year's level.

The gold extraction situation also remains unstable because the state, in trying on the one hand to retain control over the purchasing of the precious metal, is on the other hand itself undermining the sector's sources of funding. Thus, R10 trillion was incorporated into the 1995 budget for the acquisition of precious metals from producers. At the moment around R3 trillion has been spent on these purposes. But only R214 million have gone on buying gold from the budget. Around another R800 billion has been received from the sale of gold from state reserves and R2 billion from the sale of Gokhran [State Depository of Valuables] valuables, mainly uncut diamonds.

One can only guess where the R9.8 trillion incorporated into the budget for buying gold went — whether it went on the war in Chechnya or on plugging other holes in the budget. Meanwhile gold is being used very actively to cover the government's budget miscalculations. According to our data around 30 tonnes of gold from state reserves must be sold in the near future to cover the state's debts to pensioners.

Because of the lack of funds a reliable source of producing secondary gold — buying metal from the population — is drying out. While the State Central Purchasing Organization handed over 12 tonnes of the precious metal in scrap to Gokhran in 1988, it managed to purchase only 4.1 tonnes in 1994 and no more than 2.5 tonnes in the first half of 1995.

This is at a time when there now are many more people wishing to sell gold jewelry than in 1988, although the purchase price is only R37,265 or around $8.20 per gram of 583-standard scrap. The benefit to the state of buying gold from the population is obvious, because it can sell gold to jewelry producers at R110,000 per gram.

Maybe allowing all individual and legal persons to trade freely in gold ingots, reinforced by a relaxation in the sphere of exporting gold ingots out of the country, will extend banks' participation in precious metal transactions. At the moment only around 15 banks have concluded contracts with gold producers to purchase a total volume of only 5.4 tonnes of the metal, which is no more than 3.5 percent of annual extraction. Of these banks the largest purchases are being planned by Bank-Kredit, Inkombank, Promstroybank, Rossiyskiy Kredit, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Kuzbassotsbank, Bank Yenisey, Lesprombank, Natsionalnyy Kredit, and Imperiyal.

If the foreign exchange band and the methodology for forming purchase prices are retained in their present form until the beginning of 1996, an inevitable decrease in production awaits Russia's gold extraction. Judging from data received from individual regions it could total between 15 and 40 percent of the 1994 level.

International Affairs

Concern Over Nukes in Western Bordering Countries

LD1010141895 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1515 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — At a briefing at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry on 10 October, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko said, in reply to journalists' questions about statements by some countries on the location of NATO nuclear weapons on their territory should they enter the alliance, that the appearance of nuclear weapons near the Ukrainian border would be a provocation against our country.

The foreign minister said the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry has not received an official statement about this. He stressed that Ukraine is concerned by this issue, and expressed the hope that "NATO will not take such a step, because this would considerably complicate the situation in Europe."

According to Hennadiy Udovenko, Ukraine will not violate the obligations it assumed in accordance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and will work "to avoid the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons."

Udovenko: 'Common Attitude' With Russia on NATO

LD1010195595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1853 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, Oct 10 (Interfax-Ukraine) — Ukraine's top diplomat Gennady Udovenko said he and Russian counterpart Andrey Kozyrev will discuss NATO's plan for eastward expansion and issues connected with bilateral and international cooperation at an upcoming meeting in Moscow.

"We must have a common attitude, or at least be informed about each other's stand" on the issue of NATO's expansion, he told a news conference in Kiev on Tuesday.

Earlier Udovenko expressed concern about the possible deployment of NATO nuclear arms in the adjoining countries of Eastern Europe.

The final date for his meeting with Kozyrev will be agreed upon later, Udovenko said. He said he hopes that the upcoming talks will take place in a positive vein.

According to Udovenko, he and Kozyrev agreed to begin discussion of bilateral relations with positive aspects, which do exist.

With reference to achievements in relations between the two countries Udovenko singled out the considerable number of documents signed to step up economic cooperation, and the initialling of the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between Ukraine and Russia.

Special Envoy Comments on NATO Expansion Study

AU1010185095 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 5 Oct 95 p 6

["Express interview": "NATO's Forthcoming Expansion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A special session of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council was held in Brussels. It was attended by Volodymyr Vasylenko, envoy for special missions. Here is what he said:

"A NATO's study on issues of expanding the alliance was presented. The objective of the study was to find out what leads the alliance to such a step and what this process must be like. I want to stress that the document did not specify who or when will become a member of NATO, notably, there is no agreed upon list. It is a subject for more research."

The document was a culmination of the first stage of work on resolving the problem of NATO expansion. It outlines ways for ensuring positive effect of the process on stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic Region, commitments imposed by membership of the alliance, its terms, and criteria. The criteria are, in particular, as follows: availability of a stable system of democratic institutions, respect for human rights and rights of ethnic minorities, absence of ethnic conflicts or territorial claims upon neighbors, and so on. NATO Secretary General Willy Claes and other leaders of the alliance took part in the presentation.

Polish Paper Interviews Prime Minister Marchuk

WS1010151395 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 9 Oct 95 p 8

[Interview with Prime Minister Yevheniy Marchuk by Piotr Koscinski; place and date not given: "Making Up for Lost Time"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Koscinski] What is Ukraine's current view on the expansion of NATO, particularly in the context of the Williamsburg summit?

[Marchuk] We have frequently stated that the decision on NATO expansion has to be made by the interested states. No one has the right to impose his will on another state. We think NATO should not grow in the course of one-sided decisions, regardless of what the relations between NATO and Russia are.

Considering the fact that each state has a right to join NATO, that there exists a need to retain the very fine balance that has been achieved in Europe and that Russia is an Eurasian superpower, we think it would be best if the alliance evolved by focusing on political issues, playing down the military factor, and if Russia developed its relations with NATO. It is very important that Russia cooperate with NATO, or at least not confront the alliance. Otherwise, it will be difficult to speak of peace and stability in Europe.

[Koscinski] The Kiev-based NEZAVISIMOST daily recently published a confidential letter written by Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko to President Leonid Kuchma stating that Russia does not intend to observe the provisions of international law in its relations with the former Soviet republics. What is your assessment of Ukrainian-Russian relations? You headed the Ukrainian delegation during talks on the friendship and cooperation treaty and the division of the Black Sea Fleet.

[Marchuk] I still remain the head of the Ukrainian delegation in talks with Russia. One thing has to be stressed: Relations between Russia and Ukraine should simply be normal. Attaining that normalcy depends on the politicians of both countries. Regardless of political circumstances in Russia — we are on the eve of elections in that country — and regardless of the situation in our country, in Ukraine, we must remember the economic ties between our two states that still exist, about the 12 million Russians who live in Ukraine, and about the 5.5 million Ukrainians living in Russia. These factors have an influence on politics.

The faster the advance of deep economic reforms in Russia and in Ukraine and the deeper the market transformations in our countries, the better the relations between the economies of our countries shall be and — as an effect — political issues will normalize. Political activity should be stimulated by the economy.

Naturally, there are many problems in our relations with Russia pertaining primarily to the relics of the USSR. Some Russian politicians, in particular those who are not in power, issue various statements which do not serve normalization. Nevertheless, the talks are carried out on a continuous basis. Three Ukrainian working groups visited Russia over the last ten days, numerous Russian delegations visited our country. We shall continue the talks.

[Koscinski] Polish-Ukrainian contacts have recently intensified. The interpresidential Consultation Commission met for the first time in years, the Ukrainian defense minister visited Poland, and the speaker of the Sejm of the Polish Republic paid a visit to Ukraine. Why do you think our relations have become so lively particularly now? How does Ukraine view cooperation with our country?

[Marchuk] Contacts intensified not only with Poland, but also with NATO and many other states. Ukraine, due to a series of internal problems, had somewhat curbed its international activities. Now, in line with the directives of the president, we are developing foreign policies in all directions — not only to the East and not only to the West.

Ukraine and Poland are neighbors sharing a common history, with strong economic ties and huge potential for cooperation. For many reasons, to no fault of the Ukrainian authorities, we have decelerated the tempo of developing our relations. Currently, however, we are trying to make up for lost time. I have spoken with Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy and we agreed we should meet, but not necessarily officially with full rites. Working talks are needed. I do wish to stress, however, that our cooperation is not targeted against other states. In particular, it is not targeted against Russia. On the contrary, we are interested not only in improving Ukrainian-Russian relations, but Polish-Russian as well.

In line with the provisions of our foreign policy, relations with Poland — our big neighbor — are a priority, and I consider that normal.

Marchuk, Czech Foreign Minister Discuss Cooperation

LD1010200895 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Ukrainian Prime Minister Yevheniy Marchuk and Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec, who is now in Ukraine on an official visit, at a meeting on 10 October discussed a wide sphere of issues to do with, first of all, deepening and expanding trade and economic links between Ukraine and the Czech Republic.

Yevheniy Marchuk said to his guest: Your visit and the work of the delegation which you head have great importance for us. I am sure that the results of the visit will have a positive effect on the activization of our economic relations. I think that both sides note with pleasure that the volumes of our trade and economic relations and trade turnover are growing. Of course, they could be much higher. We have a large potential for that and we could at least double it in the near future. However a number of organizational measures are necessary for that. This could be helped by the acceleration of the privatization process in Ukraine.

Yevheniy Marchuk said: We would also need development of technologies to speed bank operations, an agreement on avoidance of double taxation, and a solution to a number of other problems. It is especially important to expand and to deepen the legal basis and to activate the work of the joint Ukrainian-Czech commission.

The Czech foreign affairs minister agreed with the opinion of the Ukrainian prime minister and said that for his country it is very important that Ukraine should be part of the all-European structures. He stressed that that was not only due to the feeling of friendship between our people but also to the interests of the Czech Republic which would like to see stable development, not only in the region, but generally between the East and the West — and Ukraine is a strong and important factor. I have repeated it more than once but I cannot help but say it again that to have Ukraine free, sovereign, and progressing economically would be not only in the vital interests of the Czech Republic, but also in the interests of Europe as a whole.

During the meeting, the sides discussed a number of specific proposals on giving new impetus to the Ukrainian-Czech cooperation in all the spheres of trade and economic relations. The sides also discussed a number of other issues. They expressed confidence that the relations between our countries have good prospects for further development. The meeting was attended by the minister of foreign affairs, Hennadiy Udovenko, the minister of the Cabinet of Ministers, Valeriy Pustovoytenko, and other officials.

Moroz Outlines Priorities For Spending on TACIS Aid

LD1010205195 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1835 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — Oleksandr Moroz, head of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, and Luis Moreno Abati, head of the mission of the Commission of European communities in Ukraine, have reached a concrete agreement on the implementation of the TACIS [Technical Assistance to CIS Countries] program for providing financial assistance for the Ukrainian parliament's legislative work.

As Oleksandr Moroz told the news agency UNIAN today, he will sign a letter of agreement on 11 October outlining the priority needs of the parliament. In particular, these are drafting laws in the sphere of banking, price regulation, credit, and taxation policy, and work of state and independent business structures.

The head of parliament said that he sees his task in placing the implementation of the TACIS program on an official basis so that it will "not be used by certain political forces in their interests."

Crimea Sends 'Open Letter' to Russian, Ukrainian Leaders

LD1010115295 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1030 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Simferopol — An open letter from the Crimean Supreme Council and government to Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and Russian President Boris Yeltsin expresses concern at the fate of 474 Black Sea Fleet military camps located on the peninsula's territory. UNIAN learned this at the Crimean government's press office.

"We earnestly request the esteemed presidents to make use of your authority and the strength of the power given to you to soften the blow, which has befallen Crimea's military camps and settlements," the document says.

The Crimean Supreme Council and government have once again addressed a proposal to the Ukrainian and Russian leadership to hand four deep-water moorings being operated by the Black Sea Fleet to a Russian trading sea port.

National Affairs

Odessa Team Meets With 14th Army Chief on Old Ammunition

AU1110082595 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY
in Ukrainian 6 Oct 95 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Explosions... From Across the Border"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Explosions were recently felt quite strongly (in some buildings windows were blown out and cracks appeared) by residents in the border village of Stanislavka in Kotovskyy Rayon of Odessa Oblast. It was soon found out that Russian servicemen from a subdivision of the former 14th Army, preparing to leave the Dniester region, had been blowing up old ammunition on neighboring Moldovan territory.

To clarify the situation and prevent further harm, a delegation, headed by Valeriy Balukh, deputy chairman of the oblast council, left Odessa for Tiraspol. There, the delegation met with Major General Valeriy Yevnevich, commander of Russian troops in the Dniester Region. It appears that explosions could not be avoided: A large part of the old munitions are in such poor shape that there can be no talk of transporting them. Moreover, their continued storage is becoming too risky because in case of unexpected and spontaneous detonation of even a single explosive device, a simultaneous explosion involving many land mines, cartridges, and missiles may occur, and then blown out windows would seem like a joke by comparison with what may happen.

How about the people in the neighboring villages? In the case of Stanislavka, it was decided to create a joint Ukrainian-Russian group to study the situation and, possibly, compensate for the losses incurred. It was also agreed, in the future, to blow up ammunition in amounts that would do no harm.

Legal Commission: Kuchma Acted Unlawfully On National Guard

LD1110095095 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0800 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Supreme Council Commission for Issues of Law and Order concluded that the Ukrainian president's edict on the resubordination of the National Guard to the president violates state legislation. According to an INTERFAX-UKRAINE correspondent, this decision was adopted at a meeting of the commission on Tuesday [10 October]. According to the commission's conclusions, the president's edict contravenes the Ukrainian law "On the National Guard of Ukraine" according to which direct control over the National Guard is exercised by the commander in chief who is appointed by the parliament at the president's submission. The commission concluded that the president's edict contravenes the constitutional treaty between parliament and the president in accordance with which issues pertaining to defense and state security are determined by Ukrainian laws. In addition, the constitutional treaty envisions that the president of Ukraine has the right to issue edicts exclusively within the limits of his powers.

Nationalist Party To Take Legal Action Against Kuchma

LD1110085095 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1835 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev, 10 Oct — The Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian National Self-Defense [UNA-UNSO] plans to take legal action on 13 October against President Leonid Kuchma and the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice for the withdrawal of its registration, UNA-UNSO deputy leader Dmytro Korchynskyy told a news conference.

Members of the organization today ended the hunger strike staged in protest against the annulment. According to Korchynskyy, the strike attracted some 170 new members, bringing the UNA-UNSO total membership to 1,500. The assembly is planning to organize a protest march to the Cabinet of Ministers to demand social guarantees for working people.

Marchuk on Government Program 1995-96

WS1110090095 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 28 Sep 95 pp 3, 4

[Interview with Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "Organizational and Administrative Support for the Program of Government Activity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent] Yevhen Kyrylovych, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers has submitted a program of activity to the Supreme Council. Does this mean that the government is proposing something cardinally new to our parliament and society, something lacking in its former activity?

[Marchuk] I want to emphasize at the very beginning of our interview that the government perceives its activity as the process of solidifying the basic provisions of economic policy announced in October 1994 and developed in successive speeches by [President] L. Kuchma. Therefore, in this respect, the government continues to implement the policy of economic reforms in our society. Life, however, usually introduces its own corrections. Therefore, after analyzing the recent situation in Ukraine's economy, we have concluded that it is necessary to introduce certain corrections in our reforms. This primarily refers to exerting a purposeful influence by the state on economic processes and phenomena to systematize efforts in reforming economic relations. Hence, the proposed program of the government's activities includes a number of new approaches and propositions. I think that it is not necessary to consider novelty an end in itself. Possibly, an optimal program should harmoniously combine rational achievements of the past with timely innovations oriented toward the future.

[Correspondent] Former governments were also working out and publicizing their programs, but none of them has managed to curb the crisis. In your opinion, what is the difference between the former programs and that proposed today by your government? On what is your optimism based?

[Marchuk] You know, I am not going to depreciate the efforts of those working in the government prior to us; the former governments' programs, too, included many interesting ideas and serious proposals. Another matter is why they have not been implemented. By analyzing the experience of my predecessors, I come to the conclusion that even the best program risks remaining only a declaration of intentions if its authors have not provided for how to implement it. Therefore, while working out our own program, we wanted to implant a structure of implementation. If you read the program carefully, you will surely pay attention to a purely practical addendum to the text, which is called "The Basic Measures Regarding the Implementation of the Program of Activities of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers in 1995-1996." This document testifies to our readiness — in the event when it is adopted — to start implementing the program immediately, so to say, "without gaining momentum." What is more, I must admit that this seemingly modest working document is of no lesser importance for me than the program itself. I perceive this document as one of the guaranties for the practical implementation of our program. I will say even more: If we are not hampered, if we are given a possibility, the program will definitely be implemented. Then our society will be able to judge by tangible results the meaning and distinctive features of our program.

[Correspondent] "The Basic Measures..." addendum, which you mentioned, is a document of a dozen pages in all. Do you think that this is enough for listing all implementation mechanisms of the program?

[Marchuk] As a matter of fact, the issue is not exhausted by "The Basic Measures..." document alone. I mentioned it simply to cite an example. It includes only urgent steps to be taken in an 18-month period. If your readers are interested in more details concerning this issue, I will briefly elucidate it to them. First, the mechanism of implementation of the government's program has been included in the text of the program. Each chapter, aside from determining the main objectives in a given branch or sphere, includes the determination of resources needed to achieve these objectives. In addition, the Cabinet of Ministers has prepared a draft resolution formulating specific organizational measures to implement the program in 1995-1996. Jointly with necessary material-technical and financial resources, these measures in the aggregate present a real set of activities intended to immediately fulfill the tasks mapped out in the program. At the same time, this set of activities is very specific, including the dates of implementation and the names of executors. Using the well-known saying from the management world, I can say that we have done everything to give every problem, which must be resolved, its first, middle, and last name.

Thus, there are people to organize the implementation of the program, and there are also those to be held responsible if the program is not implemented.

A special governmental commission has recently inspected the discipline in executing resolutions by ministries and departments. I must admit that the inspection has revealed serious problems. A good many edicts and directives by the president, resolutions by the government, as well as laws and other documents are not timely considered and implemented. Therefore, I think that the implementation of the program is predetermined by the introduction of discipline and elementary order in the administration system, as well as by the creation of an efficient system of oversight on all levels. This is what we are now working on.

The role of ministries and departments will be changed. They will have to transform from supplicants asking for privileges, [credit] limits, and deferments [of payment] into responsible organizers of financial stabilization in their areas, which will be able to create necessary conditions to increase production and raise its quality.

Local bodies of power, too, should assume upon themselves the full responsibility for implementing the government program at the local level. In this way, the complex of organizational measures will be implemented on all levels: the government — ministry — and local bodies of power.

[Correspondent] Yevhen Kyrylovych, is the current structure of ministries and other central bodies of executive power in Ukraine rational? Is there any correspondence between the structure of these bodies and the structure of the program?

[Marchuk] The current structure of state administration bodies is not optimal. There are many objective and subjective reasons for this. Although there is no straight and direct correspondence between the structure of the government and that of the program, we will nevertheless correlate the current structure of the executive power with the program to bring the functional structure of the government as accurately and efficiently as possible in line with the complex of measures and tasks mapped out by the program. In short, we will assign each set of the program tasks to a functional unit which will formally be obliged to fulfill these tasks. This does not always refer to one individual ministry or department. In such a case, there will be no contradictions between the structure, functions, and contents of the administration's activities.

[Correspondent] To what extent is the administration vertical structure capable of ensuring the implementation of the government's program? There is a threat that the program may be "buried" at the local level by barriers put up to its implementation, as happened many times in the past.

[Marchuk] Your readers probably know very well that the formation of a viable administration vertical structure is one of the most important strategic tasks set by the Ukrainian president. Of course, there are problems here. Several years of slackening discipline and responsibility, of impunity and connivance, have led to the current situation where some elements of the administration vertical structure — both individual officials and entire sectors — remain unadapted both organizationally and psychologically, and, possibly, are already incapable of any efficient management.

However, for the sake of objectivity, it must be said that the administration today is forced to work under an extremely tight timetable. In addition, it should be admitted that the equipment of workplaces does not always meet modern standards. A portion of experienced and skilled specialists has left for the private sector, because the average salary in the state administration is not high these days — approximately 36th place among other job categories.

The government is aware that the success of socioeconomic transformations envisioned in its program depends, first and foremost, on efficient work of the state executive power bodies of all levels. Therefore, we think that one of the program's primary tasks is to staff these bodies with highly skilled employees and to create an integral system of work with them. The program devotes an entire chapter to the personnel issue. Appropriate normative basis and organizational forms are being created for work with the personnel in accordance with modern requirements. There is a draft statute of work with personnel of central and local executive bodies and executive committees of local councils; a statute of the formation of reserves of leaders in state enterprises, institutions, and organization; and a statute of the "Kadry" single state computer system. There are also envisioned other specific steps oriented toward enhancing the prestige of the public service and providing the country with efficient, mobile, and highly skilled administrators who could constitute a real backbone of public life.

The strengthening of the administration vertical structure today is a necessary condition for fulfilling all our plans and tasks, including the government's program. After the signing of the Constitutional Agreement between the president and the Supreme Council, all necessary legal preconditions have been created. Now it is the turn of organizational-administrative efforts. The government will not spare such efforts. The administration vertical structure will be as it has to be — sturdy, energetic, and viable. If anybody in the center or at local level tries, as you put it, to "bury" that part of the program, which he has to implement according to his position, he will immediately feel that the vertical structure does exist and is not "asleep." I would like to avoid disciplinary measures; I would like all employees to prove that their awareness and responsibility meet the requirements of time. Therefore, only concerted and intense work of the entire state administration from top to bottom can ensure the implementation of the government's program.

[Correspondent] With what other resources, aside from administrative, do you plan to ensure the implementation of the program?

[Marchuk] The government thinks that working out and adopting a package of legislative and other normative acts will be one of the most important tasks in implementing the government's program of activities. The program is supplemented by a list of laws, presidential edicts, and governmental resolutions which either are being or have already been worked out, and which are to constitute the legal basis ensuring the implementation of the program. I will note that the Cabinet of Ministers has already submitted 125 draft laws to the fourth session of the Supreme Council. They include 16 draft laws of the social-cultural nature and 13 concerning issues of combating organized crime, a matter of great concern for people today. There are also many economic draft laws, in particular, 12 on macroeconomy, seven on ownership and entrepreneurship, and six on the agro-industrial complex and food provisions. There are also draft laws on environment, the fuel and energy complex, as well as science and new technologies.

The government's legislative work will be focused on achieving the main goal — stabilizing the production sector and heightening the level of people's life. Legal acts will allow the program's provisions to become mandatory for state bodies and public officials. The nonfulfillment of these provisions in accordance with the law will entail responsibility — disciplinary, administrative, and even criminal.

I will also note that we have fixed specific dates of preparation and specific executors for each of these legal acts, which and who should ensure the implementation of our projects.

Thus, the organizational-legal mechanism for implementing the government's program has been created and its tasks have been determined. This is a guarantee that the program's provisions will be implemented.

[Correspondent] As is known, you can arrive at the same goal going along different roads. What road, out of many, has the Ukrainian Government chosen? Do you not think that it may prove wrong or too long?

[Marchuk] It is a difficult question. There is no doubt that the government has no euphoric expectations of quick success. The road leading to economic stabilization does not promise to be short. Oriental sages used to say that every long road starts with a small step. To make this step, we should choose the main directions on which the government will concentrate its efforts. The program determined 11 such directions, ranging from social to financial policies. Instead of listing all of them, let me emphasize the main thing: Special emphasis will be put on concreteness and practical implementation of all those directions. As an example, let us take the sphere of industrial reconstruction that is so critical for reforming the economy. The government's program does not simply declare the need for reconstruction, but it also specified urgent measures aimed at practical implementation of the reconstruction. They include overcoming non-system structural distortions in restorable and inter-industrial proportions [as published], stimulating the development of industries with quick capital turnover and high-technology industries, reconstruction of unviable enterprises, creation of financial-industrial groups, etc. I would least of all like to bore our readers with professional terminology, but we cannot do without the economic categorical apparatus [as published] in our conversation. I would like people to understand that the government is not conducting a loose talk about a plan of its activities; instead, it has determined concrete economic and management measures to make goals declared in the program a reality. Moreover, every provision in the government's program is a reference point for ministries and institutions, based on which they devise — and some of them have already done so — their specific industry programs.

Thus, we now have a coherent system of implementing the government's program, covering the Cabinet of Ministers leadership, industry ministries, as well as the actual production sphere and socio-economic processes.

As for correctness of our road, a thorough analysis and examination of the program by qualified specialists allows us to hope that we have chosen the correct path. On the other hand, I remember [German philosopher] Hegel's saying that practice is the best criterion of the truth. The practice will show how correct our program was.

[Correspondent] Until now, all attempts to improve things at the macroeconomic level have for some reason worsened them. How will the next attempt to stabilize the country's economy affect household economies? Will the price of Government's forces not prove too costly for people's pockets?

[Marchuk] I understand such fears. Unfortunately, people have negative experiences connected with the falling standard of living and skyrocketing prices. Some of them link the deteriorated life conditions with reforms. Well, we, indeed, are walking along a difficult road, and there are quite a few sad things and disappointments lurking around on it. History shows, however, that all states went out of crisis for a long time and with complications, and all of them went through a period of hardships and misery. We are not an exception here, unfortunately. In addition to problems common for all post-Soviet countries, we have to correct our own mistakes. But there is only one way out — pressing ahead.

One of the key chapters of the government's program was devoted to social policies. We want to give as much attention to the social sphere as possible. And again, these are not just declarations. We came up with urgent social protection measures, such as a reform of payments and a system of assistance to financially insecure social groups, families with children, as well as partial and full benefits to the unemployed. It is planned to set up an employment service and a system of social insurance. There are specific plans regarding implementation of the housing policy.

Of course, the sorest issue is obtaining funding for social programs. The government is ready to support any well grounded initiative which could, at least a bit, improve people's life. And in this sphere, we do not display, so to say, the "ministerial egoism." Here is a specific example. During a meeting with me, people's deputy V. Kolomoytsev proposed that I review the draft "Law on Indexation of Citizens' Incomes" that he made. Despite the Ukrainian president's edict on indexing savings by 2,200, I immediately signed a directive ordering relevant ministries and institutions to make a coordinated decision on this. If this draft law proves to be thoroughly made and realistic, the government will seek to adopt it. And it does not matter that this bill was not proposed by a deputy, and instead by a government official. Let me declare it once again, the government is firmly resolved to cooperate with the parliament and all political forces to foster social protection of people and gradual but steady improvement of their life. This has been said in the program's social protection part, and it is a permanent guideline for the government's activities.

[Correspondent] The program consists of more than 100 pages, and it is full of specialistic terminology, figures, tables, and charts. It is very easy to get confused by all this. How would you describe the program's prime goal? What is the most important task that the government wants to accomplish?

[Marchuk] Let me put it in simple terms, we want stabilization. Before we press ahead, we must stop our sliding down. Not only does the unbalanced economy worsen people's life, but it also acts as a delayed-action mine planted in our young statehood. To survive as an independent state and keep developing, we need to stabilize all components making up our economy. Purely financial remedy tools have so far not produced the expected results. The monetary methods should be organically complemented with organizational methods of reforming economic processes.

In recent years, we were told so much about the efficiency of economic self-regulation which the market helps carry out under liberalized approaches that we came to fear the word "regulation," equating it for some reason with the centrally administrated economy. I think that this is wrong. A balanced and prudent regulation of economic processes which will help to mend the national economy is not only possible, but also necessary. This is what many countries do.

Let me emphasize that we are not renouncing market tools. On the other hand, we understand that in the present situation, the lever of state regulation is absolutely necessary. It is in the combination of market and state regulation mechanisms that we see an optimal opportunity to achieve our main goal — stabilization of production and the economy in general.

[Correspondent] The every-day life, and not only statistics, proves that imported goods are increasingly replacing Ukrainian products in the domestic consumer market. Is it possible that we have lost our ability to produce what we produced several years ago? What is the government planning to do to support domestic manufacturers?

[Marchuk] The strategy of the government's program is entirely aimed at the development of domestic production. It is planned to devise production programs, actively look for sources of their financing, develop a system of inter-state projects. Of course, it is necessary that we activate the entire economic system to boost production. Production is the final element of the economic chain. This is why it is planned to introduce changes in financial, credit, price, and budgetary policies so that those spheres stimulate production, instead of restraining it. It is planned to accumulate funds, also by actively attracting foreign investments, as well as to hasten structural changes both at the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels, including the state sector.

Also necessary will be familiar, although recently neglected, harsh economic austerity methods to save material, first of all energy and financial, resources. It is planned to strengthen scientific and innovative activities and modernize production.

A targeted program of entrepreneurship in the technological sphere will be crafted and antimonopoly and competition-encouraging measures undertaken.

These and other planned measures are intended to stop the drop in production and stabilize the situation in the national economy so that the domestic manufacturer is a genuine master on the domestic market. Let imported goods be present in our market, but only as a garnish rather than the main dish. I hope that all of us will live to see the times when the competitiveness of Ukrainian products will let them penetrate all international markets. Already, the government is trying to lay serious fruitful groundwork for this long-term and complicated program, which is its plan of action.

[Correspondent] Ukraine is actively integrating into the international community, including in the economic sphere. How can the international situation impact implementation of the government program?

[Marchuk] On the international arena, too, Ukraine seeks the same thing as in its internal affairs — stability. The government seeks to create and sustain a system of foreign relations that would secure a worthy place in the world for Ukraine, guarantee its security, and open up new opportunities for fruitful economic cooperation. Ukraine's economic interests should be fully protected. For all hardships connected with the transition period, our country is not a colony but a powerful European state with huge potential. The government intends to utilize this potential better than in the past.

Specific measures will make our foreign policy active, preemptive, stable, and flexible. We should fully restore the system of economic commonwealth with Russia and other CIS countries, as well as to speed up integration with European and world structures, such as the EU, OSCE [Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe], and CEFTA [Central European Foreign Trade Agreement].

The active foreign policy is starting to bring results. Ukraine has been admitted to the European Council, its voice sounds more weighty, and the respect to us on the part of the world community is growing.

International financial assistance is a separate issue. Such assistance certainly facilitates resolution of some of our problems, and we will conduct active negotiations to attract international financial aid to Ukraine. With all due respect to such aid, I must say, however, that we should rely on our own forces in the first place. We may receive assistance, but no one will maintain us. This is why the government will rely primarily on its own efforts and coordinated and busy cooperation of all the people for the sake of our children and grandchildren.

[Correspondent] Do you think that the government's program may become a card in political games inside the country? After all, everyone knows that various political forces have mixed opinions about it.

[Marchuk] There are two forecasts regarding debates on the government's plan in the Supreme Council. A pessimistic forecast says that the plan will be voted down under all circumstances, while the optimistic one says that all fears are in vain, because the program will be passed without particular problems. I believe that the truth is somewhere in the middle. Legislative debates promise to be heated, but the program stands a realistic chance for passage.

I personally divide opinions about this plan into two categories. If it is a qualified and serious analysis, and if the author of this opinion really wants to improve the program and cares for the economy and state, I would like then to see all such proposals carefully examined and, if possible, taken into consideration.

I stand for active dialog and cooperation with all political forces. And it was at my initiative that I met on 22 September with leaders of the Supreme Council faction and deputy groups. Although our views did not always agree, I realized that we can come to terms with each other and that a constructive cooperation based on healthy compromise is possible. What is needed is the political will displayed by both sides. I declare with all responsibility: The Cabinet of Ministers does have the will to interact and cooperate. I hope that the other side also has it. If so, debates on this program could be held in a balanced, responsible, and constructive manner in parliament. Everyone, both the state and the people, will benefit from this. Enough of arguments — we must work. The government is all set for this.

Minister Implies 'New Chain Reaction' at Chernobyl Possible

AU1010160495 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 5 Oct 95 p 1

[Unattributed report]

[FBIS Translated Text] Environment Minister Yuriy Kostenko stated at a news conference that the second power unit at the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant is no longer prepared for operation. Regarding the sarcophagus, which contains about 200 metric tons of nuclear fuel, the minister "does not rule out a possibility of a new chain reaction occurring."

Belarus

Syanko Meets EU Diplomats, Pledges To Hold Elections

WS1010144095 Minsk BELAPAN in English
0755 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belarusian Foreign Minister Uladzimir Syanko received the heads of the Minsk-based diplomatic offices of EU member-states.

According to the Press and Information Department of the Belarusian Foreign Ministry, the diplomats confirmed the EU intention to further cooperate with Belarus, which, according to Mr. Syanko, is of great importance. The minister stressed that the president and the Cabinet of Ministers intend to complete the Supreme Soviet elections.

Mr. Syanko also received Mr. Kenneth Yalowitz, U.S. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Belarus, at the latter's request. The foreign minister shared his impressions about meetings in New York and Washington during his recent visit to the United States.

Hryb Interviewed on Russia's Integration Referendum

WS1110093495 Minsk SVABODA in Belarusian
6 Oct 95 p 1

[Interview with Belarusian Supreme Soviet Chairman Myacheslaw Hryb, by Aleh Hruzdzilovich; place and date not given: "I Have Not Supported This, And I Am Not Going To Support It"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Responding to the Russian Federation Council's decision to hold a referendum on the unification of Russia and Belarus, Belarusian Supreme Soviet Chairman Myacheslaw Hryb answered the following questions.**

[Hruzdzilovich] Mr. Hryb, how would you comment on the Russian Federation Council's statement on holding a referendum on deepening economic and political integration between Russia and Belarus?

[Hryb] Every country has the right to hold referendums on issues which are not in variance with that country's law and in which people are interested. However, when a referendum was held in Belarus questions were asked in a different plane than that proposed by Russia's Federation Council. We asked: "Do you support the strengthening of economic integration with Russia," and our people — including myself — answered "Yes." However, currently Russia's Federation Council proposes a more expanded question: "Do you support economic and political integration?" It is clear what economic integration means; however, what does political integration mean? Where is the beginning of it, and where does it end? It could be understood in various ways, including the unification of two countries into one. However, the question put in such an expanded way contradicts our Constitution, which says that the Republic of Belarus is a unitary, sovereign, and independent state. Everything that runs counter to the Constitution is explicitly rejected by me. I have not supported this, and I am not going to support it.

I would like to point another aspect. In my opinion, the way our neighbors act is not quite correct, for they propose to hold a referendum on issues which run counter to the constitution of a neighboring state.

[Hruzdzilovich] Is it conceivable that this is the first sign of playing the Belarusian card on the eve of the elections in Russia?

[Hryb] I cannot rule this out. Indeed, public attention is being drawn to this issue, including proposals to hold the referendum on the day of elections. We, too, held our referendum on the day of elections and I am beginning to realize that we made a mistake. The elections suffered from that, since all attention was paid to the referendum. As a matter of fact, observers from international groups, including from the Council of Europe, have arrived at the same conclusion.

[Hruzdzilovich] How do you assess the Belarusian president's role in the appearance of the Russian Federation Council statement? Do you not think that this is the kind of response to his initiatives expressed during the recent visits to Moscow and Sochi?

[Hryb] It is very difficult for me to assess that, since the president's trips to Moscow, Sochi, and Kiev had not been coordinated with me, and I found out about them, just as others, from the press. After the visits were paid, I was not given any additional information.

Assembly Discusses Federation With Top Russian Officials

WS1110102295 Minsk BELAPAN in English
0806 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The chairman of the Slavic Assembly "Belay Rus" (SABR) Mikalay Syarheyew and the chairman of the Vitsebsk-based cultural centre "Rus" Ihar Patapaw met the head of the Russian State Duma Ivan Rybkin, the vice-premier of Russia's cabinet Aleksey Bolshakov, the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia Aleksey II and General Aleksandr Lebed. According to information received from the SABR press-office, during the meetings the prospects of the creation of a Belarusian-Russian confederative union were discussed. It should be noted that the meetings were organised on the initiative of the Chairman of the State Duma's Committee for CIS Affairs and Relations with Compatriots Konstantin Zatulin.

Merger of National Oil Industry, Russian Slavneft Seen

WS1110105795 Minsk BELAPAN in English 0755 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] As it was reported by BELAPAN, a delegation of the Belarusian-Russian oil and gas company "Slavneft" led by the chairman of the Council of Directors, and Russia's First Deputy Minister of Fuel and Power Engineering, Mr. Anatoliy Fomin, stayed on a visit to Belarus last week. Among the members of the delegation were "Slavneft" Acting President Aleksandr Mukhin and Vice-President Dmitriy Romanov.

According to a source in the Belarusian government, the leaders of Slavneft and the Belarusian oil industry discussed ways of "Slavneft" participation in the creation of preconditions for investments in the technical development and reconstruction of the Belarusian oil-processing industry, as well as the carrying out of practical measures for the promotion of Belarusian-Russian integration within the framework of Slavneft activity. The source informed BELAPAN that the parties had signed a protocol in which the Belarusian party backed the Russian government's decision to alter the composition of the company and to increase its authorized stock (The Russian Government Resolution No. 867 of 1 September 1995).

According to the protocol, "Slavneft" will resort to the mediation of the German firm "Lurgi" which reached an agreement with the Investment Credit Bank "Deutscheindustriebank" for attracting its credit funds to the amount of $260-300 million on security of "Slavneft" to finance the reconstruction of the Mozyr refinery, a branch establishment of Slavneft. Before the completion of the reconstruction of the Mozyr refinery's catalytic reforming, Slavneft will allocate $5 million to the refinery from its own resources until 1 January 1996 and another $5 million until 1 May next year on condition 50 percent of the Mozyr refinery shares plus one share are contributed to the authorized capital of "Slavneft" in exchange for its shares.

The Slavneft leaders agreed with the parity in the distribution of the Mozyr refinery's stocks between Belarus and "Slavneft" before the aforesaid credit agreement comes into force (about 42-43 percent). The parties also agreed that to create guarantees for the "Slavneft" effective participation in the reconstruction of the Mozyr refinery it is expedient to work out and sign within a month an agreement between the Belarusian Government, the Mozyr refinery, and "Slavneft" on the principles of cooperation to ensure the reconstruction of the Mozyr refinery.

According to the source, the possibility of including the "Belarusneft" Production Amalgamation and enterprises providing the Homel and Brest region with oil products in "Slavneft" was also considered, but a final decision on this problem will be taken after the Belarusian privatisation program is approved by the leadership of the Republic.

Lukashenka Renames State News Agency

WS1110101295 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0800 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] By virtue of a Belarusian presidential edict, the state information agency [BELINFORM] has been given back its historic name — the Belarusian Telegraph Agency, BELTA. By the same edict, BELTA has received the primary right to hand over official documents and reports to the media. The president has charged press services of ministries, state committees, and other central administrative bodies with disseminating official information of public importance through BELTA. The edict has also introduced important changes in the operations of city and rayon newspapers, whose founders are state bodies. The Ministry of Communication and Information will now provide them with BELTA reports at the expense of the ministry's budget funds.

Kazakhstan

Qazhygeldin on 3-Year Reforms Program

964F0017A Almaty PANORAMA in Russian 30 Sep 95 No 38, p 2

[Askar Aukenov report on press conference given by Prime Minister Qazhygeldin on 26 September; place not given: "Prime Minister Qazhygeldin: People Are Tired of Reforms and Need Tangible Proof of Their Expediency—In the Head of Government's Opinion, the Cost of Measures To Prepare the State Administration Apparat Move to Akmola Can Be Kept Under $100 Million"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 26 September, Prime Minister Qazhygeldin held a press conference devoted to the main directions of the medium-range government program of intensified reforms in 1996-98.

Despite the topic of the meeting and the (very long) press release that was distributed, the invited journalists remained in almost total ignorance regarding the actual content of the government's new program. Therefore their questions mainly revolved around operational points and the current economic situation in the country.

To the question as to whether the increase in expenditures on social needs (which is built into the new government program and which the president has been insistently demanding lately) would cause another surge of inflation, Mr. Qazhygeldin remarked that the head of state is obliged to fulfill the social mandate of his voters. Besides, the time has passed for such statements as "wait some more, it will be better tomorrow." People have become tired of reforms and need graphic proof of their expediency—first and foremost with respect to growth in the population's income. Finally, there is also economic expediency in such measures—when income grows continuously in an environment of declining inflation, this money may become an additional reserve for reinvestment in the economy. However, this requires that one condition be met: not losing the results achieved in limiting "mad money."

"I think I am not a person who can be pushed into rush actions in the area of macroeconomics. We understand very well the potential consequences of such steps," the prime minister assured. He said that the government intends to concentrate attention on raising the incomes of state employees, since "it is no longer possible to demand that they make a full effort and at the same time not pay their salaries." Lately this category of the population has been increasingly often compelled to take jobs in alternative sectors, and those most actively leaving are highly skilled economists and lawyers.

Regarding the situation with the Roskontrakt company, which had been lobbying for some Kazakhstani enterprises to be transferred to its management, Mr. Qazhygeldin recalled that as far back as in 1994 it was offered the opportunity to take under management several warehouse-terminals on the republic territory and carry out distribution on the consignment principle. In addition to aforementioned facilities, the Russian structure was interested in some large Kazakhstani enterprises manufacturing fertilizer. Currently it has been asked to put together and present the needed capital. At the same time, the head of the government hinted that he has doubts about Roskontrakt's financial capabilities.

On the subject of which stage—decline or rise—the republic economy currently is in, after all, the prime minister remarked that the new medium-range program, much as the previous one, is an anticrisis program by nature. The presence in it of a host of issues involving enterprise reform and the financial and banking system recovery indicates a crisis. This definitely cannot be called a stage of growth. The goal is to increase industrial production in some sectors, and through this to stem the overall industrial decline.

Nevertheless, Mr. Qazhygeldin noted that while over nine months of 1994 we saw GDP fall by 31 percent, currently this indicator has shrunk to 26 percent. "If we manage to achieve 25 percent by the end of this year and keep up this trend next year, in the second half of 1996 or in 1997 we may actually have growth," he said.

Regarding arrears in paying pensions, which, according to information of the journalist who asked this question, amount to about 2 billion tenge [T], the head of the government explained that this amount, strictly speaking, is not the government's debt but mainly the debt of territorial pension funds. The amount for which the government is directly liable is less than T800 million. It arose last year because of the lag that formed when the minimum wage was raised. The prime minister promised that it will be repaid before 15 October—this task was set at the latest meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers. He said that the government actually loaned T3 billion tenge to pension funds in 1995.

Mr. Qazhygeldin also pointed out that in those oblasts where industrial production is picking up (and especially where large enterprises have been placed under the management of foreign companies), arrears in pensions have been liquidated. "We would like to see this happen everywhere," he emphasized.

Regarding new approaches to forming free economic zones [SEZ's] and the expediency of giving such status to Akmola (for the purpose of speeding up its development), the prime minister reported that a group of specialists currently is working on improvements to the law on SEZ's. Some local, limited zones will be created within its framework. On the other hand, in the opinion of the head of the government, turning the entire republic or whole cities into SEZ's in the current general state of the economy appears unrealistic, unattractive, and inexpedient.

The idea of turning the port of Aktau into an offshore zone was very tempting; however, in this case major Western countries are unlikely to grant Kazakhstan most-favored-nation status in trade and ratify agreements on eliminating double taxation.

The prime minister added that Almaty in any case will remain the nation's second capital, the financial center of Kazakhstan and Central Asia, and one of the most respected cities in the CIS: "Even if we board the train tomorrow and leave, half of the best brains will still stay here. That is life."

He categorically rejected the possibility of a hidden outflow of budget money into the nonbudget fund for moving the capital: "All matters related to the move to Akmola depend on the amount of proceeds going into this fund. Therefore, do not get the idea that a decision has been made and tomorrow everybody will take off. Definitely, nobody will move before the end of the year—there is no money."

In the prime minister's opinion, the cost of measures that need to be carried out in Akmola before the actual move takes place can easily be kept under $100 million, although, in his words, if one wanted to, this amount could be inflated as high as $100 billion.

To the request for a comment on the persistent rumors regarding imminent personnel reshuffling and structural changes in the government, Mr. Qazhygeldin said that he has never said anything that would give anyone reason to write anything like this in the press, and therefore advised journalists to ask each other about it. "When I read this I could only laugh," he continued. "We decided at least once to disappoint you in your forecasts. Simply to avoid creating a commotion around this issue. Otherwise, it may set a precedent—you wrote this, and then the government has to do something. Although rotation is a normal phenomenon. You understand, of course, that when the prime minister selects his team, he is running some risks: He takes some people on promise, and some cannot quite handle the job. Therefore, the question of 22 September in principle was raised by you. At the same time, when I presented the draft of my medium-range program, I asked the president to let me exercise my constitutional right and submit to him a proposal on personnel rotation. The president gave me 10 days. Which sectors were criticized? In the past, we were absolutely unsuccessful in implementing reforms at enterprises. Heads of agencies tasked with this just did not have the guts. Everybody jumped at the idea of transferring enterprises to outside management after the first precedent was set. Meanwhile, it was outlined in the first program, and nobody paid any attention to it at the time. So now everybody wants to do everything this way—transfer enterprises to outside management. I disagree. We have to shore up enough courage and say that with the current reappraisal of fixed assets of enterprises we intend to privatize, some of them will have to be given away in order to save production. Their market value is zero. We have not succeeded in reforming wages; we have not been able to move away from the minimum wage mechanism, which today is simply laughable. It worked well at the time of the single ruble zone, but now we need completely different indicators—the consumer basket, percentage of price increases, and so on. We have completely failed in reforming the pension system. From the legal standpoint, we are only just approaching health care reform. I could cite some objective reasons. The law on bankruptcy was delivered to us too late, and we still do not have a law on insurance. But this does not get us off the hook. Kazakhstani citizens could not care less what we have or have not succeeded in—this is not their headache."

With respect to other rumors—that work is currently underway on creating a huge political electoral bloc headed by the prime minister (along the lines of Russia Is Our Home), the latter remarked that the situation regarding elections in Kazakhstan differs somewhat from that in Russia. "We simply have no need now for a 'Kazakh home,'" the head of the cabinet joked. "I, at least, have not heard anything to this effect. There will be regular elections to the National Assembly. And in principle, when coordination and the legal boundaries of institutions of authority are clearly defined, I am not worried at all about who will be elected. Although I would like very much to see more economists, lawyers, and reform-minded people—it will make our job easier."

Regarding negotiations with the Russian prime minister in Uralsk, where, according to some reports, a final agreement was reached on the project of building the oil pipeline through Russia, Mr. Qazhygeldin explained that in this case the topic under discussion was not any particular project. The negotiations revolved around collaboration in the area of oil and gas sales in general. In his words, complete understanding was reached on all strategic issues. In addition, the SP [joint venture] LUKoil-Kazakhstan is now being set up—Russian capital intends to participate in the development of oil and gas fields on the territory of our republic because

Russia's own resources are being depleted. If we find enough capital for the KTK [Caspian pipeline construction consortium], we will build the KTK; if we find capital for the KTK with some modifications, we will build it with modifications," the prime minister summed up. "But we are fully aware that for the next 15-20 years the Black Sea is not a solution for us. Russia is aware of this too. Which means we have to think about transit through Russia, Ukraine, and Europe, through Russia, the Baltics, and the Baltic Sea, or through the Mediterranean, access to which is tremendously restricted for us. The problem is not Russia. There is the organization of OPEC, which is much more powerful than the individual countries. There is a project that envisages a gateway through China to the countries of Southeast Asia. Both Russia and Kazakhstan are part of all the projects. The main issue is capital."

Uzbekistan

Karimov Hopes For Greater OSCE Role in Regional Problems

LD1010202295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1821 GMT 10 Oct 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Uzbekistan is prepared to take an active part in UN and OSCE ecological and political problems in the region and to finance them, President Karimov has said. He was speaking as he received OSCE Secretary-General Wilhelm Hoink in Tashkent on Monday. (OSCE leader arrived in Tashkent for a four-day seminar on the restoration of the environment, being held at the initiative of the OSCE and the Uzbek State Committee for Nature Conservation.)

Karimov explained that in the first place he had in mind measures to save the Aral sea and promote stability in Central Asia.

Uzbekistan and OSCE said they were concerned about a number of issues, including ways of protecting the environment, restoring the ecological balance and promoting stabilization in the region at a time when trouble spots in Afghanistan and Tajikistan remained. The two sides agreed that those problems negatively affected the 50-million population of Central Asia.

At the same time Karimov and Hoink agreed that OSCE could and must take a more active part in handling ecological and political problems.

Uzbek-German Defense Agreements Signed

LD1010171195 Tashkent WATANPARVAR in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 1

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A delegation of the Federal Ministry of Defense of the FRG headed by Bernd Wiltz, the parliamentary state secretary at the FRG Federal Ministry of Defense, visited our republic last week. They had two days to settle a number of matters concerning military cooperation between the two states.

[Correspondent] Mr. Wiltz, could you please say a few words about the aims and tasks of your visit to our country?

[Wiltz] Our visit to Uzbekistan pursued specific aims. Above all, we intended to sign two very important documents: An agreement on future cooperation in security and defense policy and an agreement on preparing servicemen of your republic's Armed Forces in Bundeswehr units within the framework of support for military training. As you know, some of your officers are already undergoing instruction at German military colleges, but we should like to expand our activity in this area, because I think that this will bring only benefit and will strengthen our relations even further.

[Correspondent] Are you satisfied with the results of your visit and did you manage to do everything that you had planned?

[Wiltz] Undoubtedly. We had absolute mutual understanding in tackling the majority of issues with the staff of the presidential apparatus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense. That is why we managed to solve in such a short period the range of important tasks that we had planned. However, I believe that the main result of our visit is not only the signing of the agreements, but the establishment of good personal contacts as well. Our future cooperation will depend to a large extent on this. [passage omitted]

Armenia

Karabakh Leader Receives OSCE Field Official

NC1010215895 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1700 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] President Robert Kocharyan today received (Zoltan Magushi), the field assistant of the personal representative of the acting chairman of OSCE, who has arrived in Stepanakert for long-term tasks.

Aleksandr Grigoryan, NKR presidential press secretary, told the ARMENPRES correspondent that the Hungarian diplomat had informed the republic leader about his mission to Nagorno-Karabakh. The field assistants of the personal representative of the acting chairman of OSCE will be permanently stationed in the republics involved in the Karabakh conflict in order to prepare for the expansion of that organization's planned peacekeeping operations in the region.

Robert Kocharyan noted that Nagorno-Karabakh will provide the necessary assistance to the work of this OSCE group, which is headed by Polish diplomat Stanislav Pshigodski, the personal representative of the organization's acting chairman.

Karabakh Official Clarifies Position at Talks in Finland

NC1010215795 Yerevan Radio Yerevan International Service in Armenian 2000 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Which are the basic demands of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] at the ongoing talks in Finland? This question was put to Mikayel Hajyan, head of NKR Press and Information Department, by AZG's reporter Vahram Aghajanyan.

In commenting on the official position of Stepanakert, Mr. Hajyan said in particular: The demands of the Karabakh side remain the same. As always, we believe that first of all the possibility of a resumption of the military operations should be precluded and the security of the Karabakh population guaranteed. But Azerbaijan is in no hurry to confirm its readiness to refrain from military operations. Understandably, this does not contribute to mutual trust between the two conflicting sides and forces the NKR to be prepared for any possible development.

And secondly, probably the most serious issue at the current Armenian-Azerbaijani meeting is the crucial problem of the clarification the future legal status of the NKR. Among the fundamental elements of its future status is the issue of the NKR's borders, the discussion of which Azerbaijan always evades. The need to clarify border issue is extremely important to us. That is why Karabakh is stressing the importance of the demarcation of, if not state, at least some provisional borders. In our view, it will not be possible to come to any agreement before the resolution of this most important issue. In any event, the Karabakh side has no intention of making unilateral concessions, because that would negatively affect the republic's defensibility, said Mikayel Hajyan.

Azerbaijan

Aliyev Welcomes Consortium's Pipelines

NC0910204395 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 9 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] October 9 became the long-awaited day of decision on the route of the much discussed early oil. A meeting to this effect was held today by the leadership committee of the Azerbaijan International Operations Company [AIOC]. Our correspondent Ramiz Meshedihesenli reports from the meeting:

[Begin recording] [Meshedihesenli] In opening the meeting of the consortium's leadership committee, Natig Aliyev, president of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan [SOCAR], described today's meeting as an outstanding historical event. Touching upon the work done for the last ten months at the leadership committee, Natiq Aliyev said that a considerable step forward has been taken. It was noted that AIOC President Terry Adams' account report, the raft budget for 1996, and the issue of the signing of the document on the route of the early oil were placed on the agenda.

[Reporter] After the consultations at Gulistan Palace, members of the AIOC leadership committee met with President Heydar Aliyev at the presidential office. In opening the meeting, AIOC president Terry Adams spoke on the decision taken by them today. According to the unanimous decision of the consortium members, it was announced that Azerbaijan's early crude oil will be transported to the Western countries across the territories of Russia and Georgia. Thus, yet another step was taken on the way of realizing the oil contract. Our head of state was briefed on the earmarked finances and program for transporting the extracted oil to the Black Sea via Russia and Georgia as of 1996. The signing of the official document with the Russian government is planned for 1 November. Whereas, the document with Georgia will be signed after some problems are resolved.

The representative of Amoco stock company noted that the consortium will methodically implement the plan.

In addressing the members of the leadership committee, President Heydar Aliyev conveyed his congratulations on the decision taken on the oil pipeline route, and expressed his satisfaction with the consortium's work.

[Aliyev] Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, I want to state that I am very pleased about today's meeting with you, that is, with the members of the consortium's international leadership committee and the consortium's personnel implementing the oil contract.

A year ago, on 20 September 1994, we took a very serious, courageous, and important step by signing the oil contract between the consortium and the SOCAR. Over this one year much was said and done about the consortium and the contract. As a sum total of all this, it needs to be noted that — and I note this with complete satisfaction — the contract is alive and is being implemented in practice.

I receive with great satisfaction the information provided by Terry Adams on the activity of the consortium for the implementation of the contract since September 1994. Its importance lies in that all the measures and plans envisaged by the consortium and AIOC are being implemented methodically. And today during the regular session of the leadership committee you have established a tremendous and very important program to be implemented until the end of this year as well as in the next year. The most important of the accomplished work is that the extraction and exploitation of the early oil in 1996, as envisaged by the consortium's plan, has now been turned into a reality.

Mr. Terry Adams is absolutely correct in saying that at the time of the signing of the contract there were many doubts about it ever becoming a reality, and even greater doubts on the extraction of the early oil from Chirak platform. I personally never doubted. And I know that the consortium's firms too had no doubts. SOCAR never doubted its realization. However, there were many doubters in some countries and circles. Today I want to note with great satisfaction that the members of the consortium and AIOC have surmounted all these difficulties by joint work. Mr. Terry Adams said that $700,000,000 are needed for the next year. This indicates the amount of work to be done. All this proves that the contract is working, is being implemented, and will be methodically implemented in keeping with the envisioned plan.

Today you have adopted an important decision on the construction of the pipelines for the export of early oil. Two pipelines. One pipeline will take the early oil to the Black Sea through Russia, and the other pipeline will take the early oil again to the Black Sea through Georgia. You have now declared these routes. You are the experts and naturally have taken the problem's both economic and technical, and all other aspects into account. You have adopted a decision by taking all these into consideration. I congratulate you for this decision, for it was important for us to know how to export the early oil. Thus, the solution of the problem of export of the early oil, the determination of the oil routes, and the allocation of the necessary finances to ready the pipelines are very important steps. I am satisfied with the work carried out by all the firms, generally by the consortium and AIOC since the signing of the contract, and I congratulate you for these achievements. All these prove that the 11 oil companies united in the consortium are working jointly and in cohesion. Your work and achievements indicate that Azerbaijan's economy is getting closely tied with the economies of the big oil companies. In joining the consortium, the foreign oil firms are investing in Azerbaijan's economy. This indicates that Azerbaijan is walking along the path of free a economy and market, and along the path of close integration with the world economy.

The most important result rests in that henceforth it has become clear to the entire world that the signed oil contract is not a mere contract on paper, but a practically implemented contract. This inspires great hopes in us. And, undoubtedly it also attracts the international community's enormous interest in Azerbaijan. At the same time, this opens wide paths for those big international firms which want to invest in Azerbaijan. The social and political stability in Azerbaijan and the voluntary guidance given in all these endeavor by the Azerbaijani state and government have created wide opportunities for the implementation of all these projects.

As the president of the Azerbaijani Republic I had both defended the preparation and signing of this contract. I also signed the law adopted by the parliament for the implementation of the contract. I support the work done by you today, I support your path and I wish you success in this path.

[Meshedihesenli] Thus AIOC and SOCAR concluded the discussion of the various routes for the early oil. It concluded the assessment of the technical, commercial, and economic aspects of the routes for the transport of the early Azerbaijani oil to the Black Sea via Russia and Georgia. It was decided that both variants are technically feasible and are also acceptable commercially. An agreement will be signed with Russia on 1 November on the transportation of the early oil through its territory. At the same time, talks will be concluded with Georgia on the transport of oil to the West.

It was announced at the news conference that even though the early oil will be transported via Russia, in the future when the production reaches its maximum it will be more profitable to send the oil to Turkey's Ceyhan port. The situation in the Black Sea also necessitates this. In addition, views were also expressed to the effect that Kazakhstan too wants to sends its oil through Turkey. AIOC President Terry Adams highly assessed the AIOC activity so far. In his opinion Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev's wish (?is coming true): Azerbaijan's doors are open for investments from the renown international oil firms. Terry Adams finally stressed in particular that Azerbaijan is on the threshold of a bright future. [end recording]

Pakistan's President Leghari Addresses Parliament

BK1010155595 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in Urdu 1500 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari has expressed confidence that the international community, particularly friendly countries like Azerbaijan, will exert pressure on India to end the repression in occupied Kashmir and to grant the Kashmiri their right of self-determination in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions. He was addressing the parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Baku this evening. He said he hoped the world community would use its influence to force India to engage in substantive talks with Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue. He said India must realize that holding fake elections will neither fool the world, nor restore its tarnished image. President Leghari said India continues to commit massive human rights violations against the Kashmiri people. He said that Indian brutalities in occupied Kashmir have further alienated the Kashmiri people. He expressed Pakistan's thanks to Azerbaijan for supporting the cause of the Kashmiris.

Regarding Afghanistan, the president said that the continuing instability and conflict in the country has brought untold miseries to the Afghan people. It is imperative that we work together to bring peace to Afghanistan. The president said we must take into account the interests of all Afghan groups to bring about a lasting peace there.

Referring to Azerbaijan's conflict with Armenia, President Leghari said that Pakistan condemns Armenian aggression and wants the occupation forces to withdraw from the territories captured by them.

The president urged the people of Azerbaijan and their leaders to join the people and leaders of Pakistan in their efforts to bring about rapid development and resolve issues of common concern like environmental pollution, drug abuse and trafficking, and pressure of population on resources. In this connection, he said, Pakistan is ready to share its experience with Azerbaijan.

Radio Pakistan's correspondent Anwar Saeed from Baku said that Azerbaijani Parliament members greeted President Leghari's comments with thundering applause during his speech.

Pakistani President, Aliyev Address Assembly

NC1110080895 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1340 GMT 10 Oct 95

[Remarks to the Azerbaijani National Assembly, Milli Mejlis, by Pakistani President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari and President Geydar Aliyev on 10 October; live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [President Leghari in English with simultaneous Azeri translation provided by an off-screen interpreter] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful, praise be to him and prayers to his blessed prophet.

Your Excellency President Geydar Aliyev, distinguished chairman, honorable deputies of the Azerbaijani Republic. It is a great honor for me to address the honorable members of the Milli Mejlis. I bring to you the greetings of the members of the Pakistani legislative body. I also wholeheartedly congratulate you for having chosen the path of democracy. Azerbaijan has a glorious history of democratic tradition. Azerbaijani deputies can take pride in it. The rebirth of Azerbaijan as an independent state has brought to its people new hope of democratic development. The democratic process will usher in an era of development and prosperity. I am happy to learn that the parliamentary elections will be held in Azerbaijan on 12 November 1995—the first since independence. This is a sign of Azerbaijan's commitment to the path of democracy under the dynamic leadership of Geydar Aliyev. We welcome the steps being taken by President Geydar Aliyev and his government to initiate democratic and economic reforms, regardless of the complex geopolitical difficulties facing your country. Pakistan is ready to share its experience and assist you in your efforts to establish a developing and prosperous Azerbaijan. Since gaining independence, Pakistan has been waging a struggle to establish a democratic country. We can now firmly state that the Pakistani people have emerged victorious from this struggle. These are excellent examples for safeguarding human rights and equality. Pakistan is now a democratic state thanks to the mercy of omnipotent God. Pakistan promotes liberty.

Mr. Chairman, today we are at the threshold of fresh democratic cooperation to jointly usher in the 21st century. This reflects our desire to enhance peace and freedom, our joint interest in progress, our specific role, and our plans to cooperate with every democratic state. We must enter the 21st century with strength and with a progressive and positive spirit. Many difficulties must be surmounted to develop democracy and a freemarket order. The widening gap between the rich and poor countries, environmental pollution, drugs, overpopulation that strains the world's resources, and full economic freedom for women are urgent problems facing Mankind. They all require special attention. We must join together to solve these problems before they overwhelm us.

Mr. Chairman, it is most unfortunate that Azerbaijan has been in a conflict for the past six years. This has brought untold and indescribable suffering and misfortune to millions of Azerbaijani refugees and to Azerbaijan as a whole. The correlation of forces favors the Armenian occupier but the Azerbaijani people are heroically resisting the Armenian aggression. The occupation of 20 percent of territory by the Armenian Forces is unjust; it is contrary to the principles of the UN Charter. Pakistan condemns the Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan and wants them to withdraw their forces from the captured land. We hope the cease-fire in force since March 1994 will not be violated and that this problem will be solved in favor of the people of Azerbaijan.

Mr. Chairman, the continuing instability in Afghanistan forms a major obstacle to the development of our ties with Central Asia. It also obstructs the development of rail and road traffic. This instability also blocks routes to Central Asia and the transit road passing through Karachi. Pakistan is prepared to support any initiative on Afghanistan, as long as the people and leadership of Afghanistan accept it. This initiative should bring peace to Afghanistan. Pakistan does not have enemies in Afghanistan. We want Afghanistan to enjoy peace at home and abroad.

Mr. Chairman, I will take this opportunity to express the deep gratitude of the Pakistani people and State to the Azerbaijani people and State for their support over the Kashmir problem. Kashmir is a major longstanding conflict, a permanent source of tension and discord in the subcontinent. India has dispatched over 600,000 troops to suppress the Kashmiri struggle for self- determination, a right recognized in a UN Security Council resolution. India continues to massively violate the human rights of the Kashmiri people. Despite the isolation of Kashmir from the rest of the world and despite grave Indian brutalities, the Kashmiris are continuing their struggle unabated. The latest incident in (Harrari-Sherif) has shocked the conscience of the world. It has heightened the rage of the Kashmiri people against the Indian occupation forces. The alienation between Kashmir and India has peaked. Pakistan has reiterated its readiness to enter into practical talks with India. We have submitted two informal proposals to them on Kashmir and we would like these proposals to go on the agenda for talks. We would like the other urgent problems between Pakistan and India to be solved in a manner similar to the [name indistinct] issue, solved with the mediation of the World Bank, and the [name indistinct] border problem, solved through international arbitration. A plebiscite should be held in which the Kashmiri people decide whether they want to join India or Pakistan. As a democratically elected representative of the State and a believer in Islam [words indistinct], I thank you, members of the Milli Mejlis, for granting me this opportunity.

[President Aliyev, in Azeri] Esteemed Mr. President, Milli Mejlis, Ladies and Gentlemen, we have listened with great attention and respect to the address by Pakistani President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari.

Mr. President, the information you provided to the Azerbaijani Parliament on the path travelled by Pakistan and the achievements and experience it has accrued in building a state and democracy are extremely interesting and important for us. The struggle waged by the Pakistani people for national freedom and independence has brought happiness. Pakistan attained independence in 1947 and has been a fully independent state since 1956. We understand from what the president has said here that they have chosen the path of democracy and are forging their own state and lives on the basis of democratic principles. There are many similarities in the history and traditions of the Pakistani and Azerbaijani peoples. Our belonging to the same religion and similarities in our traditions and historic roots have always brought our peoples closer. On this basis there are close ties of friendship and cooperation between Pakistan and Azerbaijan. The Pakistani people attained national independence in 1947 and have been on the path toward creating a law-based and democratic state. In addition to its achievements, it is also facing many problems and difficulties. The Azerbaijani people gained freedom and state independence only four years ago. During these four years, while consolidating national freedom and independence, Azerbaijan has also been facing very difficult and grave foreign problems, including Armenia's aggression against it. Drawing on its own historic experience, Pakistan realizes how hard and difficult, yet glorious, a road we have walked in Azerbaijan in these four years. I believe this is why Pakistan recognized Azerbaijan as soon as it declared its independence, why it later worked to establish ties of friendship and cooperation with Azerbaijan, and why it has always tried to defend Azerbaijan's interests at international organizations.

We are very pleased that while it is physically far from us, Pakistan is very close to Azerbaijan. It follows the process taking place inside Azerbaijan and is attentive to Azerbaijan's position on the international platform. Esteemed President, you uttered valuable words on the democratic process taking place in Azerbaijan, on the development of the market economy in Azerbaijan, on the democratic course for Azerbaijan, and on the upcoming new democratic parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan. I thank you for evaluating the processes taking place in our republic correctly and appropriately. You can, and the international community can, rest assured that Azerbaijan will always walk along the path it has taken. The building of a democratic, law-based, and civilized state will continue in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan will go along the path of a market economy, it will consistently implement economic reforms, and it will try to occupy its deserving place in the international community. In solving these important and fateful problems we benefit from the experience of every country and will certainly try to benefit from the experience of friendly Pakistan. Azerbaijan's most serious and difficult problem is the grave situation that has emerged because of Armenia's aggression against Azerbaijan. Armenia's aggression has dealt major and heavy blows to Azerbaijan. Twenty percent of Azerbaijani territory has been occupied by the Armenian Armed Forces and nearly 1 million of our citizens have been forcibly evicted from the occupied land. They are living in difficult conditions. We did not start the war. Azerbaijan wants peace. The Azerbaijani people have always entertained peaceful feelings. That is why we are working for the peaceful solution of the problem. This is why we signed a ceasefire agreement 16 months ago and have adhered to it since then. But the Azerbaijani people will never tolerate this injustice and the aggression against Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani people are working, and will work, for the liberation of the occupied land. Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and the inviolability of its border is the most supreme goal for us. The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan, has been frequently discussed in international organizations. Taking this opportunity today I convey the Azerbaijani people's gratitude to you, personally, Esteemed President, and Pakistan. Pakistan has always defended Azerbaijan's positions and has condemned the aggression against it. Esteemed President, you have reiterated Pakistan's position in the Azerbaijani Parliament today. I thank you for that. We favor the peaceful solution of the Kashmir problem, which is of great importance for Pakistan. During the debate on the issue in international organizations Azerbaijan has always defended, and will continue defending, Pakistan's position and rights.

Esteemed President, this is the second day of your stay in Azerbaijan; you are becoming acquainted with the living conditions of the Azerbaijani people. I hope this acquaintance will be valuable in securing closer recognition of Azerbaijan by the Pakistani president and Pakistan in general on this, your first visit. I consider my talks with you to be productive. I consider the first signed documents between Pakistan and Azerbaijan as very important and believe these documents will create the valuable foundation for the speedy development of Azerbaijan-Pakistan ties. The Azerbaijani people consider Pakistan a friendly country. Our talks will help consolidate this friendship. I convey the Azerbaijani people's warm respects and greetings to the Pakistani people and wish peace and happiness to the Pakistani people.

I am hopeful that our interstate ties will develop faster and our high-level contacts will continue. I have often met and talked with Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in international organizations. I was very pleased with these meetings. Now I have also met the Pakistan president. I repeat, all these form a good foundation for our future. Esteemed President, I again ask you to convey my invitation to Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. We will be pleased to see her in Azerbaijan. I accept your invitation to visit Pakistan with pleasure and I hope that such meetings will be very helpful both for Azerbaijan and Pakistan. I again wish peace and happiness to the Pakistani people and success on the path of independence.

INTERFAX Correction to Baku Denies Attacking Chechnya

LD1010122495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1022 GMT 10 Oct 95

[INTERFAX supplies the following correction to the item headlined "Baku Denies Warplanes Attacked Chechen Village," published in the 10 October Central Eurasia DAILY REPORT, page 91: changing first paragraph to correct "a mistake made by a translator"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BAKU, Oct 9 (Interfax) — Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov denied reports that two Azerbaijani planes carried out air strikes against the Chechen village of Roshni-Chu last Sunday. [in the initial INTERFAX report, Gasanov "told Interfax that two Azerbaijani planes carried out air strikes" against the village]

At the same time, the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry issued a statement saying that its planes had not carried out any training or combat flights outside Azerbaijan.

According to the statement, the fact was confirmed by the general on duty at the Russian Central Command Air

Defense Post. The general said that Azerbaijani planes had not violated Russia's air space either last week or before.

Earlier, a representative of the Russian military headquarters in Chechnya told Interfax that the planes that bombed Roshniy-Chu flew out of Azerbaijani air space, but he did not say the air strikes were carried out by the Azerbaijani Air Force.

Georgia

Eduard Shevardnadze Weekly Interview

LD0910140295 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0641 GMT 9 Oct 95

[Interview with Eduard Shevardnadze, chairman of the Georgian Council of State, by Nato Oniani in Tbilisi — live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Oniani] Mr. Shevardnadze, as usual, we shall begin the interview with the subject of economics. The lari has been securing a position designated for it and this is the case not only in Tbilisi but also in the regions. Last week, the European Union commissioner for foreign relations, Mr Hans van den Broek, visited Georgia. This also concerns the subject of economics. So, despite the election campaign, despite the assumption that the country should be engaged only in the election fever, the economic life and the economic reform is advancing along its path.

[Shevardnadze] Thank you. Good morning.

I will give a little bit more consideration to the economic issues and the problems concerning the introduction of the lari. Last week, our community's attention was focused on the introduction of national currency. In compliance with a decree by the head of state, the lari is being established as the only legal tender in Georgia. It is probably still too early to draw final conclusions but, on the whole, the events are developing adequately. Today, the lari has an absolute dominance in all official transactions as the only legal tender and this is an achievement of key significance during the implementation of the reform. The process of establishing the lari is advancing mainly as planned and stipulated by the program. [passage indistinct]

I believe that the agreement will be signed by the end of the year as stipulated by preliminary arrangements. It will be a powerful incentive for the revival of the economy of the whole country. As I have already said, the European Union will allocate 200,000 tonnes of grain - this is aid which is not supposed to be paid off: we have to sell it and fill the budget but the EU gives it to us free of charge - 30-40,000 tonnes of fuel oil, funds to repair the railway and to bring our seaports to proper condition. In addition, the European Bank will open a credit line in Georgia to promote small and medium-sized business and will set up an investment fund of about 10, 15 and quite possibly 20m US dollars. So, everything is going on quite successfully. Along with that, the United States have allocated to Georgia additional 30,000 tonnes of grain and 100,000 tonnes of fuel oil. Aid provided by Germany is especially significant. This is over DM20m which will be used for the restoration of the Tbilisi thermal power station.

[passage omitted] There was a sharp decline in the demand for foreign currency. This is the first sign of the lari's strengthening. The demand [for foreign currencies] at the currency exchange on Monday [?2nd October] was $360,000, 62 percent of which was covered by commercial banks. You may recall that some time ago the demand reached $2.6 million. I mentioned that in my previous interviews. The exchange rate was 1.3 lari for one dollar. There was no demand for U.S. dollars at all at the trades on Wednesday and Friday, while commercial banks supplied $680,000 and $656,000 respectively. Under these circumstances, in order to prevent sharp fluctuations at the internal currency market, the National Bank permitted a drop in the rate of the dollar to the minimum, that is, 1.28 lari against one U.S. dollar. No demand for the Russian ruble was observed during the past week. It was the first time ever that this happened. Altogether 680 million rubles [R] were supplied. And again, in order to prevent sharp depreciation of the Russian roble and to meet the interests of the population, the National Bank purchased the excess of the rouble at the rate of 25 tetri against R1,000. [passage omitted]

It is very important to note that the currency market is getting stable in the circumstances when the currency reserves of the National Bank increase rather than reduce. I want you to listen attentively what I am going to say. The purchase of the currency at the internal market over the past ten days is expected to result in the increase of the currency reserves of the National Bank by $20 million. So, forecasts by some sceptics that a large amount of currency, including credits allocated by the IMF and the World Bank, will be necessary to spent in order to maintain the power of the lari do not come true. Incidentally, $25 million allocated as the second tranche of the IMF stand-by credit is added to the above-mentioned $20 million. I would like to emphasize that all presumptions and all forecasts mentioned in my decree and my speeches and interviews have proved to be correct. You may recall my saying that the country's currency reserves would increase and budget revenues would reach new highs. This was precisely the presumption on which I based my statement that we would be able to raise in November salaries, pensions, allowances for refugees, substantial allowances and to take care of socially insecure people. You can clearly see now that the reforms and decisions taken on the basis of correct prognoses and scientific computation are the best means to solve social problems. [passage omitted] Russia's Central Bank entered the lari into its registers of foreign currency exchange rates. There are some infringements in the implementation of decree about the lari. The control and law-enforcement bodies will deal with them.

According to forecasts by experts, the introduction of the lari should promote broadening the area of budget revenues. I already spoke about it. The preliminary reports on the implementation of the budget in nine months of the year show that budget revenues come to 227 million lari. [passage omitted] Of this sum, 132 million lari are from the IMF and the World Bank credit, while the sums received from republic's own revenues and grants comprise 94 million lari, that is, 42 percent. [passage omitted]

The Tax Inspectorate reports that revenues collected by the agency for local and republic's budgets in the third quarter came to 65 million lari. This exceeds the prognostic objectives determined by the IMF almost by 13 million lari or 25 percent and the total budget revenues in 1994 by 5m lari. [passage omitted] It should be noted that the Tax Inspectorate does its job quite well in these circumstances and displays fair readiness for the complex processes. [passage omitted]

This is proved by the results of the inspection the agency carried out at the Madneuli ore mining and processing enterprise where Mr Tabatadze is the manager. I would like to elaborate upon the issue. The Madneuli enterprise is one of the major payers to the budget within the ore processing industry. The produce of the enterprise is a natural resource and this is the country's national wealth. It is of strategic significance and there is a great demand for it at international markets. Its price is determined at the London exchange and is fairly high. This means that the enterprise is supposed to be a stable and serious source of budget revenues. That is why it is especially alarming that the inspection carried out by the Tax Inspectorate revealed violations of financial discipline and tax legislature which resulted in the loss of substantial sums by the republic's budget. I would like you to pay attention to the following. The management of the enterprise deliberately distorted the value of the exported produce and showed reduced figures of income in the balance sheet thus inflicting losses of tens of thousands of US dollars to the state. Because of the infringement, the Tax Inspectorate obliged the enterprise to pay into the budget additional sum in national currency equivalent of $555,000. They do not give the state what belongs to the state and the people, while formations of rather shady reputation feed well on the enterprise. We should not forget that the enterprise has been build by the state and and is the property of the people. [passage omitted]

The Customs Department has already contributed to the budget 4,196,000 US dollars. [passage omitted] This exceeds the last year's figures six-fold. There still are infringements in the work of the system and I suspect that this is just half of what the agency must give to the country. This is one of the major services which contribute to the budget. [passage omitted]

[Oniani] About two or three weeks ago, when the 29 August terrorist act was still a major topic, certain individuals made certain statements and our listeners and TV viewers remember them well. At that moment, the German government sent you as a gift an armoured Mercedes car to mark your safe recovery. Last week, Mr. Igor Giorgadze, former head of the Security Service aired absurd accusations during his appearance on the Vesti program and the same week, Germany presented a Boeing to Georgia. These acts seemed to be inconsistent.

Incidentally, since we speak about the former head of the Security Service, I should mention that the Russian deputy interior minister does not reckon evidence against Giorgadze sufficient for arresting him. A statement has been made about this.

[Shevardnadze] First of all, I would like to use the opportunity and thank the government of the Federative Republic of Germany on behalf of the people of Georgia for special concern they demonstrated about the safety of the Georgian state and its head. As far as the Boeing is concerned, it arrived in Georgia a few days ago and will serve international flights. I went to see the craft. However, this is not a gift. This is a property of a joint company. We prefer a joint company. An airline, which is called "Germany" will get 30 percent of the income and the Georgian airline will get 70 percent. This is a substantial income. If the company becomes independent and strong in future and the relations develop further, Georgia may create a powerful flying stock of Boeings. We estimate that the company will possess 10-12 Boeing aircraft in the next two or three years. It is interesting firstly because the "Germany" airline serves tourist business almost in whole Germany and not only Germany but in Europe, too. So, this creates an opportunity to develop tourism in Georgia and the company will bring tourists to Georgia.

Now, concerning Mr. Giorgadze and all terrorist acts. Interest toward Giorgadze and terrorist acts carried out in Georgia has not diminished. The authorities continue the course of mass attack on organized crime and the course will not change. I should say that the Ministry of Internal Affairs plays the decisive role in this, the Georgian Prosecutor's Office is very active and I am happy to say that the Security Service has invigorated its activities, too. They themselves will evidently report on concrete results. They will have to work day and night and spend sleepless nights to compensate for the misfortune that happened in that service.

The relief the country is feeling now, the beginning of the revival of the economy, the power of national currency and the first influx of foreign investments have resulted from order, which is gradually established in the state.

The decision to dissolve the Georgian Rescue Corps was right. It was hard to take this decision, it was hard for me personally. But it was based on the interests of the state and it was a brave and, without exaggeration, wise decision. This is how the majority of our population regarded the step.

As far as this terrorist is concerned, I would say that no state on the planet can dare today to render refuge to a terrorist of Giorgadze's range. I do not think that Russia will be an exception. I do not think so. I cannot believe that Russia is an exception among these states. Above all, there exist agreements and obligations we committed ourselves to about what we are going to do in cases like this. A perpetrator must be handed over to the state whose citizen he is immediately and without hesitation. I said in Zugdidi yesterday that special relations already achieved between Russia and Georgia value much higher and are more important than the fate of one terrorist notwithstanding any powerful forces behind him.

[Oniani] The final question. You visited Zugdidi yesterday. What was significant in this visit for you? Was it part of your election campaign or anything else? We all remember your visit to Samegrelo on 23 July 1992. We remember those pictures on TV and your reaction to it after your return to Tbilisi. You said that you realized by the reception you got there how these people had been tortured and how these people were mistreated. Three years have passed since then. What was your present visit to Samegrelo like this time?

[Shevardnadze] Yesterday, I spoke a lot about Samegrelo and about developments there over the past four or five years. In fact, Georgia's unity and integrity was demonstrated there yesterday. [passage omitted] I would call a miracle what has occurred in Samegrelo over the past year. As for what you have just spoken about, I mean what was there, what I saw there and what I felt there, it was a hell, I would say. Everyone knows very well what this province endured and who was the cause of the sufferings. The main thing is that the truth is gaining a victory, the truth has won. And the truth is always on the people's side. Yesterday, there was a celebration of the truth and of the light, I would say, the celebration of the hopes for tomorrow in Samegrelo and in all parts of our country.

The election campaign? No. It was my regular working program. So were my visits to Ajaria, Racha, Kutaisi where everything good that is occurring in Georgia was displayed in a concentrated form. So are my contacts in the capital city [Tbilisi], which gives an incentive to all the country to rise and develop and so will be my visits and trips to other regions. Given I am again authorized to manage the state, to be at the steering-wheel of the state, I will continue in the same way, having dynamic contacts with each region, each town and each citizen, if you will.

Shevardnadze Says Talks on Abkhazia Can Resume

LD1010201995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1821 GMT 10 Oct 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Representatives of all nationalities living in Georgia must be represented in the new parliament, Eduard Shevardnadze has said. He was speaking at conference of the Tanagdoma (Support) political union on Monday.

About the Abkhaz problem Shevardnadze said that the "Georgian leadership was prepared to resume talks on the peace settlement of the conflict, as long as Georgia's territorial integrity was observed. The sole alternative to that is war. If it comes to war, we have a combat-ready army capable of coping with its mission," Shevardnadze said.

Giorgadze on Shevardnadeze, Bombing

MM0910142695 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Oct 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with Igor Giorgadze, former head of the Georgian Security Service, by Aleksandr Gamov, date and place not given: "So Just Who Tried to Kill Shevardnadze? Our Correspondent Meets With Wanted Former Head of Georgian Security Service Igor Giorgadze, Who Is Suspected of Complicity in Assassination Attempt Against Head of State" — first four paragraphs are KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text]

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Dossier

Igor Giorgadze is 45. He was born into a military family. His father, Panteleymon Giorgadze, was a career general in the USSR Border Guards. He is currently leader of the United Communist Party of Georgia and a candidate for Georgian president.

Igor Giorgadze graduated from the Moscow KGB Higher School and has the rank of lieutenant general. He is a lawyer by education and knows foreign languages (Turkish and French). He has worked in intelligence and counterintelligence. He has been awarded the title of Honored KGB Staffer for fulfilling operational missions.

He saw action in Afghanistan. Returning to Georgia, he worked for a time as the republic's deputy security minister, but soon resigned owing to his disagreement with President Gamsakhurdia's policy. Switching to Defense Ministry structures, he set up a counterintelligence directorate. In October 1993 he became head of the Georgian Security Service. He was dismissed in early October 1995.

Igor Giorgadze is married with two children.

[Gamov] Igor Panteleymonovich, for some reason you do not much look like the kind of person who is being sought day and night by the Georgian special services and now by the Russian militia as well, or someone who is supposedly being hunted by hired killers. You're not even in disguise....

[Giorgadze] What are you on about! Why should I do that? My profession allows me to behave in a way that will not upset anyone or attract undue attention.

[Gamov] Nonetheless, you are the currently the focus of a lot of attention. Your picture is constantly in the newspapers and on TV. You are suspected of being involved in the attempt on the life of Eduard Shevardnadze and in an attempt to stage a coup d'etat....

[Giorgadze] To be honest, the most hurtful thing is not the accusation itself, but the suspicions about my unprofessionalism. You must understand that Shevardnadze is not the kind of terrorist target that bombs are used against. Top people are not killed like that. It was all done in an amateurish way. If I had planned a coup d'etat, Shevardnadze would not now be able to appear on TV and you and I would be talking in Georgia. But nobody gave me or my security service that mission.

[Gamov] So what did happen in Tbilisi 29 August?

[Giorgadze] Until it happened I had been out of Georgia for almost a month — first I was on an official visit abroad, then I was on leave. On 29 August I was in Moscow. When I heard about the act of terrorism, I flew to Tbilisi immediately. The scene of the attack was examined without me, so I cannot say what happened.

But I think that the act of terrorism was possible because the head of state's personal security directorate — which was removed from the Security Service and made directly subordinate to Shevardnadze — failed to provide elementary security for a routine event. The act of terrorism took place in a closed area that was the responsibility of the security directorate — the Security Service was not allowed access. Could it have physically prevented what happened? Of course not.

[Gamov] You are being accused of knowing about the planned act of terrorism and of taking no action.

[Giorgadze] Yes, we did have information to that effect. Our city directorate had been working on one group [razrabatyvalo odnu gruppu]. Shevardnadze was kept regularly informed. We proposed a whole series of measures and pointed out specific areas which needed reinforcement from the standpoint of safeguarding security. We also drew attention to the location where the terrorist act subsequently took place. We did everything in our power.

[Gamov] But the terrorist attack still happened....

[Giorgadze] I'm now starting to incline toward the view that the conditions for it were artificially created by Shevardnadze himself. I don't mean to say that he sat down and thought about how to bomb himself or what to make it look like. But the way it was done, the overall context, and everything that then followed makes me think that it was not done without some kind of assistance — put it that way.

Look at what happened. The car carrying the explosive was parked in a secure area, and the bomb went off in an area where large numbers of people were present. But there were no corpses, only a few scratches from flying glass. And serious observers have said that the scratches on Shevardnadze's forehead sometimes changed position.

[Gamov] Did you meet with Eduard Amvrosiyevich before he fired you?

[Giorgadze] Yes, he summoned me 2 September and said that he had no option but to dismiss me. Clearly, the decision had already been made to pin this terrorist attack on Giorgadze. I met with all the special subunits and said that our opponents and enemies were waiting for some kind of action from us and that this must not be allowed to happen. I took my dismissal very quietly and calmly and left Georgia a few days later to provide for my family.

[Gamov] Did you leave without let or hindrance?

[Giorgadze] MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] staffers circled around my home. But I constantly had my armed subunits with me. If the MVD men had tried a provocation, they would have received a response. Officially nobody tried to stop me.

[Gamov] Are your armed subunits with you now?

[Giorgadze] The armed subunits are in place.

[Gamov] Where exactly?

[Giorgadze] In Georgia, of course.

[Gamov] Just why, as you put it, did they decide to "pin" the act of terrorism on Giorgadze in particular? You seemed to be on very good terms with the head of state....

[Giorgadze] I was not a supporter of his, and he knew it. Everyone in Georgia knew it. Moreover, I and my service were in his way. How exactly? Shevardnadze is heading for elections. The Prosecutor's Office is in his pocket, the MVD is made up of bandits and is therefore controllable. But the Security Service stuck in his craw. It was not openly opposed to him, but it did not support him when he wanted to circumvent and violate laws and existing norms. In other words, we could not be used as a lever in the political struggle.

He was also scared of something else — our service could expose the falsifications that he would have to resort to during the elections. Now he has no obstacles in his way.

I assess the accusations from Tbilisi as Shevardnadze's reaction to my open letter, published in the Russian press, where I accuse him of very serious crimes against his own people — at the very least of promoting ethnic cleansing in Georgia, of machinations running into millions, of arms smuggling from Georgia to Iran....

And, I think, he needed this speculation — accusations and arrests will tie up certain parties. They even reached agreement to the point where another presidential candidate — Patiashvili — was said to have been living on the same landing as my father Panteleymon Giorgadze, leader of the United Communist Party and a presidential candidate. The neighbors are said to have met and decided to get rid of Shevardnadze....

[Gamov] ...To seize the airport, the telegraph office, and other important installations, and to set up a Committee of National Salvation....

[Giorgadze] My father did not have and does not have any particular view about me, from the standpoint of my work. If we had set ourselves the task of seizing the airport or anything else.... There was no force in Georgia — in terms either of numbers, equipment, or training — that could have stood in the way of the Security Service if such actions had been planned. If we had toyed even for a second with the idea of reviving the civil war, my team would have been equal to the task. All these accusations are just crazy. Some kind of theater of the absurd. And it is hard to comment on them.

[Gamov] Moreover, you are being accused of involvement in the acts of terrorism which led to the deaths of Georgiy Chanturia, chairman of the National Democratic Party; Soliko Khabeishvili [name as transliterated], president of the Shevardnadze Foundation; Deputy Interior Minister Georgiy Gulua....

[Giorgadze] ...Keep going — Kirov, Kennedy, Olof Palme.... I can't say any more.

[Gamov] Even so....

[Giorgadze] You wouldn't believe it, but Georgia today is starting to smack of the thirties-style processes and trials. And I would like to draw the attention of human-rights campaigners to this. Everyone has suddenly admitted overnight that they prepared coups and organized acts of terrorism. Because psychotropic methods and inhuman torture are being used during interrogation. All this "evidence" which Shevardnadze and people in his entourage are using is downright farcical.

[Gamov] Can you say who in Georgia today has an interest in seeing Shevardnadze go?

[Giorgadze] So many people do that it would be hard to pick anyone out. But then, before coming to any conclusions, we need a serious investigation, not just propaganda ploys.

[Gamov] According to information from Tbilisi, Igor Giorgadze has been linked with anti-Yeltsin forces in Russia.

[Giorgadze] I can assure you that Shevardnadze too will soon start speculating on the "Russian trail." My official contacts in Russia were always in the public eye, and I had a good professional and personal relationship with the leaders of the Russian special services. If they are to be considered "anti-Yeltsin forces"....

[Gamov] There was a rumor that they want to offer you a top post at the Russian Defense Ministry.

[Giorgadze] I would consider it an honor if my colleagues were to consider it possible for me to work there. But since Shevardnadze has made me an outlaw, I will not allow them to even suggest it.

[Gamov] Are you currently maintaining any contact with the Russian special services?

[Giorgadze] There is no such contact, nor could there be. And not because somebody does or does not want to help me. Following Shevardnadze's official statement on television that he was appealing to the Russian authorities to hand me over, I do not plan to put the Russians in an awkward position. And not only the Russians. I am very well aware of the countries with which Georgia has agreements on legal mutual aid, and I have no intention of going to those CIS countries where the agreements are in force. So Shevardnadze should not worry — Russia will not have to hand me over, because I won't be in Russia.

[Gamov] Where will you be?

[Giorgadze] I'd rather not say. But I am definitely not planning to run away from Georgia. Today there is no place for me there. But Georgia will not always be Shevardnadze's. And I will try to bring that day nearer. But I plan to use only methods that will not be condemned by future generations. I do not intend to take up arms.

I feel very sad about Georgia. It is feudally fragmented today, producing absolutely nothing, begging with hand outstretched from all and sundry, it has totally lost all morality, and it lacks any kind of national idea. In other words, it is a deadlocked situation. And it will get even worse. As long as Shevardnadze is in the Transcaucasus there will continue to be a seat of tension there.

[Gamov] You are being hunted. Aren't you frightened for your life?

[Giorgadze] This is nothing new for me. Although it is something you must not get used to....

Estonia

Vahi Dismisses Interior Minister Over Scandal

LD1010223595 Tallinn Estonian Television Network in Estonian 2155 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Forty-five minutes ago Prime Minister Tiit Vahi arrived back in Estonia [from Denmark] and gave a news conference at the airport. First, Vahi answered the question as to what the prime minister's plans are after the decision from the Center Party's board not to recall Internal Affairs Miniter Edgar Savisaar from his post.

[Begin Vahi recording] I think that a lot of new information has come in and just now immediately before coming to see you I signed a proposal to the president on dismissal of Edgar Savissar from his duties as internal affairs minister. We will be forwarding this paper or this document to the presidential office today. [passage omitted]

[Repeats question from journalist] What is the official reason for his dismissal? At the present moment it is excessive scandals in which he is directly involved. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Vahi Concerned About Coalition

LD1010171995 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1600 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The adviser of Edgar Savisaar, Internal Affairs Minister Vilja Laanaru, today told Estonian Radio that the secret recordings which have come to light in the course of the tapes scandal were made by her. [passage omitted] Laanaru claimed that she wanted to protect Savisaar from possible provocations and record conversations in an authentic manner.

Here is Estonian Radio's exclusive interview with Prime Minister Tiit Vahi who is on an official visit to Denmark.

[Begin recording] [Vahi] This is indeed something that is news to me. As new information keeps coming in I have very serious doubts at present — and perhaps see it almost as impossible — that Edgar Savisaar could work in the government. And secondly, there are indeed major problems with the coalition.

[Correspondent] Does this mean that when you return you will request President Lennart Meri to release Minister of Internal Affairs Savisaar from his post?

[Vahi] This means precisely what I said: I will definitely begin political consultations which are somewhat broader than our coalition policy. There must be coalitions in place so as to guarantee a stable development in Estonia.

[Correspondent] Will this mean changes in the government coalition make-up?

[Vahi] This means that we will aim to find a better solution for Estonia. [end recording]

Latvia

Officials Announce Composition of New Parliament

WS1110093195 Tallinn BNS in English 1359 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Oct 10, BNS — Latvian officials have announced the unofficial distribution of mandates in the next parliament which does not include returns from abroad.

The Democratic Party Saimnieks (18 seats): Alfreds Cepanis, Ziedonis Cevers, Aivars Kreituss, Ilga Kreituse, Dainis Turlais, Ilmars Bisers, Ivars Kezbers, Eriks Kaza, Atis Sausnitis, Valdis Krisbergs, Juris Kaksitis, Ernests Jurkans, Modris Goba, Leonards Teniss, Valdis Nagobads, Juris Zakis, Juris Celmins, Janis Razna.

People's Movement for Latvia (16 seats): Odisejs Kostanda, Ojars Grinbergs, Andris Saulitis, Olgerts Dunkers, Modris Plate, Janis Maulins, Janina Kusnere, Janis Strods, Janis Kazaks, Krlis Cerans, Guntis Enins, Edmunds Grinbergs, Gunta Gannusa, Maris Rudzitis, Andris Rubins, Elmars Zelgalvis.

Latvia's Way (17 seats): Anatolijs Gorbunovs, Maris Gailis, Janis Adamsons, Valdis Birkavs, Andrejs Pantelejevs, Aivars Endzins, Dzintars Abikis, Imants Daudiss, Janis Lagzdins, Kristiana Libane, Peteris Apinis, Vilis Kristopans, Indulis Berzins, Antons Seiksts, Janis Bunkss, Andris Tomasuns, Romans Apsitis.

Fatherland and Freedom (14 seats): Maris Grinblats, Leopolds Ozolins, Oskars Grigs, Juris Vidins, Aleksandrs Petersons, Janis Straume, Guntars Grinblats, Aigars Jirgens, Juris Sinka, Andrejs Pozarnovs, Vents Balodis, Roberts Zile, Roberts Jurdzs, Normunds Peterkops.

Latvian Unity Party (eight seats): Viesturs Gredzens, Janis Rubulis, Roberts Dilba, Viktors Kalnberzs, Anatolijs Tucs, Raitis Apalups, Edgars Bans un Gundars Valdmanis.

The coalition of Farmers Union, Christian Democrats and Latgale Democratic Party (seven seats): Pauls Putnins, Anta Rugate, Aida Predele, Ervids Grinovskis, Maris Vitols, Andrejs Naglis, Paulis Klavins.

The coalition of Latvian National Conservative Party LNNK and Green Party (seven seats): Anna Seile, Aleksandrs Kirsteins, Juris Dobelis, Janis Kalvins, Peteris Tabuns, Andrejs Krastins, Indulis Emsis, Aristids Lambergs.

National Harmony Party (six seats): Janis Jurkans, Leonards Stass, Andris Ameriks, Vladlens Dozorcevs, Ludmila Kuprijanova, Janis Urbanovics.

Latvian Socialist Party (six seats): Aleksandrs Bartasevics, Martijans Bekasovs, Aleksandrs Golubovs, Olegs Denisovs, Modris Lujans, Nikolajs Krasohins.

Latvian 'Right-Wing Extremist' To Stand Trial in Hamburg

AU0910201895 Hamburg BILD AM SONNTAG in German 8 Oct 95 p 2

[Report by Helmut Boeger: "Latvian Election Victor Must Face Trial in Germany"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The German-Latvian right-wing extremist Joachim Siegerist (48), whose "Pro Latvia" party won 16 seats in the Latvian parliamentary elections last week and will form part of the government, must face a court in Germany. BILD AM SONNTAG learned that Klaus Wille, presiding judge in the tiny Sixth Penal Chamber of the Hamburg Land Court, wants to put Siegeris on trial before the end of the year for "instigating racial hatred."

When Latvia received its independence from the Soviet Union, Siegerist was granted Latvian citizenship because his father was also born in the Baltic region. He subsequently founded "Pro Latvia" and gained a seat in parliament. In April 1994, he was sentenced to 18-months imprisonment without remission in Hamburg for describing gypsies as an "evil, criminal bunch who breed like rabbits." Siegerist: "I have not taken back a single word." He says that he will travel to Germany to face trial.

Whichever way the trial ends, Siegerist wants to run for president of Latvia next year, even though he speaks the difficult language poorly, which prevented him from taking up his parliamentary seat personally. "I will win a majority," says Siegerist.

Until then, with his right-left coalition of extremists, he wants to govern poor Latvia together with former communists, whom he described as "swine, thugs, and gangsters" before the elections.

Lithuania

Gylys Links Baltic Security to European Security

LD1010191095 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1415 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Lithuanian Foreign Affairs Minister Povilas Gylys held a news conference at the Foreign Affairs Ministry today. Here is our correspondent Vincenta Dapkiene with the details.

[Dapkiene] The foreign affairs minister presented Lithuania's viewpoint on problems of security, its wish to integrate into Europe, and its concern caused by the processes taking place in the neighborhood, especially in the East. He voiced his concern with regard to the publications on the basic principles of the Russian defense doctrine prepared by the headquarters of the Russian Armed Forces, which foresees that Russia will immediately deploy its troops in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia if the above countries were accepted in NATO. [passage omitted]

[Begin Gylys recording] Lithuania cannot set up an individual, separate security system. This is a common matter for all European countries. [passage omitted] This government is doing everything in order to avoid a new division of Europe into confronting blocs. To my mind, Mr. Landsbergis, does not see any sense in pursuing such a policy. In other words, he automatically goes for the so-called black scenario. We cannot deny that events may take a turn in any direction, therefore, various scenarios are possible.

However, we must work toward the good scenario, that is to work in order to reduce the possibility of confrontation on the continent. The factor of wisdom and stability urged us to conclude agreements with its neighbors without much delay concerning the state borders and ethnic minorities. [passage omitted]

It is clear that Europe will not be able to achieve its own stability without stability in the Baltic region. This is a matter of pragmatism. On the other hand, there is also a certain moral debt. Mr. Kohl (?said this) about five days ago when he spoke to the Baltic states about moral debt. And the best way to pay it back is to support Lithuania's statehood. The Baltic states want to develop a market economy and a democratic political system. [end recording]

U.S. Support Welcomed

WS1110094395 Tallinn BNS in English 1359 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, Oct 10, BNS — The Lithuanian minister of foreign affairs Povilas Gylys welcomed Washington's guarantee of political support for the sovereignty of the Baltic countries.

At a press conference on Tuesday [10 October], he commented on a statement by Nicholas Burns, the U.S. Department of State press spokesman, in which the U.S. expressed its concern with the security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Baltic countries.

"Any note by anyone in Russia that somehow Russia has the right to station its troops or to station nuclear weapons outside the borders of Russia is irresponsible and inconsistent with international law," the U.S. State Department official said. He expressed his criticism of a draft of Russia's new military doctrine which appeared recently in the Russian press. This draft proposal envisions an invasion of the Baltic states, were they to become members of NATO.

Alfonsas Eidintas, the Lithuanian ambassador in Washington, requested the U.S. state department last week that it publicly express its position on the Russian threats.

In a transcript of a press briefing received Tuesday by the Lithuanian foreign ministry from Washington, Burns recalls the words of American vice-president Al Gore during his visit to Tallinn in March, when he said that "the security of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia is of direct and material interest to the United States."

In the opinion of foreign minister Povilas Gylys, the statement of the state department spokesman testifies to the political vested interest of the U.S. in Baltic security.

"Europe cannot be stable without stability in the Baltic region — this is clear to everyone," Gylys said Tuesday.

The minister also mentioned the West's "moral debt" to the Baltic countries and welcomed the pronouncements of Helmut Kohl, the German chancellor on this theme. "It is very touching that Kohl spoke of a moral debt of the West to the Baltic countries. The best way to repay this debt is by supporting Lithuanian sovereignty and the country's desire to develop a market economy and a democratic political system," the Lithuanian foreign minister said.

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